Electricity markets: transmission prices methods

In the context of electricity markets, transmission pricing is an important tool to achieve an efficient operation of the electricity system. The electricity market is influenced by several factors; however the transmission network management is one of the most important aspects, because the network is a natural monopoly. The transmission tariffs can help to regulate the market, for this reason transmission tariffs must follow strict criteria. This paper presents the following methods to tariff the use of transmission networks by electricity market players: Post-Stamp Method; MW-Mile Method Distribution Factors Methods; Tracing Methodology; Bialek’s Tracing Method and Locational Marginal Price. A nine bus transmission network is used to illustrate the application of the tariff methods.

Rentabilidade e risco na comercialização agregada de energia elétrica

Dissertação para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica na Área de Especialização de Energia

Multi-agent Simulation of Bilateral Contracting in Competitive Electricity Markets

Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets that promote competition among suppliers and provide consumers with a choice of services. Market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. Electricity can be traded in both organized markets or using forward bilateral contracts. This article focuses on bilateral contracts and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral trading in competitive markets. Special attention is devoted to the negotiation process, demand response in bilateral contracting, and risk management. The article also presents a case study on forward bilateral contracting: a retailer agent and a customer agent negotiate a 24h-rate tariff. © 2014 IEEE.

Multi-agent simulation of bilateral contracting in competitive electricity markets

Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets that promote competition among suppliers and provide consumers with a choice of services. Market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. Electricity can be traded in both organized markets or using forward bilateral contracts. This article focuses on bilateral contracts and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral trading in competitive markets. Special attention is devoted to the negotiation process, demand response in bilateral contracting, and risk management. The article also presents a case study on forward bilateral contracting: a retailer agent and a customer agent negotiate a 24h-rate tariff. © 2014 IEEE.

The role of implicit contracts: Building public works in the 1840s in Portugal

Business History, Vol 50 No 2, p147-162

Multi-agent Simulation of Bilateral Contracting in Competitive Electricity Markets

Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets that promote competition among suppliers and provide consumers with a choice of services. Market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. Electricity can be traded in both organized markets or using forward bilateral contracts. This article focuses on bilateral contracts and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral trading in competitive markets. Special attention is devoted to the negotiation process, demand response in bilateral contracting, and risk management. The article also presents a case study on forward bilateral contracting: a retailer agent and a customer agent negotiate a 24h-rate tariff.

Melhortarifa.pt – simulador de tarifários

Assistimos à queda de um serviço, que em muitos países, figurava como um serviço de um modelo social europeu, passando de um monopólio para um sistema de mercado liberalizado e concorrencial: o mercado energético. (EURO COOP, 2014) Em maio de 2014, o mercado livre chegou a ultrapassar os 2,8 milhões de consumidores, tendo um crescimento face a maio de 2013 de 64%, com uma taxa média mensal de 4,2%. (Entidade Reguladora dos Energéticos - ERSE, 2009). Perante a crescente adesão de consumidores para o mercado liberalizado, e suas possíveis futuras mudanças, e tendo em conta com os potenciais clientes a aderirem, foi proposto então construir a plataforma MelhorTarifa.pt . Apesar da já existência de simuladores, estes demonstram-se a ser pouco intuitivos e a não demonstrar toda a informação que o utilizador pretende bem como não existir uma imagem de marca associada a um apoio à mudança de tarifário, tendo sido estas umas das razões que levaram ao desenvolvimento do MelhorTarifa.pt. O âmbito principal deste trabalho, é fornecer uma plataforma informática grátis, imparcial, com o acréscimo até à data, em relação a outros simuladores, da disponibilização de faturas detalhadas sobre o produto que o cliente pretende adquirir, serviços de consultoria, tudo isto de forma rápida e de simples acesso. Com este trabalho pretende-se também definir o atual estado de arte de simuladores idênticos em Portugal e no estrangeiro, pretendendo-se também dar conhecimento do trabalho desenvolvido para esta dissertação, denominado como MelhorTarifa.pt.

A (in)segurança privada em Portugal

Along with the food and the comfort, safety has always been one of the human priorities. In pursuit of this objective, man developed self-preservation mechanisms, went to live in society and created rules to control the community life. In the West and in the late eighteenth century, with the creation of states as we know them today, the monopoly of security, among other powers, has been preserved untouched until the last quarter of this century. With the bankruptcy of the welfare state and the rise of the regulatory state, many of the essential tasks for the community have also been carried out by private companies or institutions, including education, health care and security. Although not easy, education and health care have been more opened to be managed by the private sector. Instead, the privatization of the security sector has seen much more resistance. Still, especially in the West, the states have delegated some of the security competences to private companies. Portugal is no exception to the rule and, after a few years of unregulated activity, in 1982 was published the first law regulating the private security. After the initial stages of development (evolution and maturation), which lasted until the early years of the 2000‘s, the private security now seems to have reached maturity. Today, now with a new legal system, composed by Law no. 34/2013, of 16 may, its regulations and complementary legislation, now private security encompasses other activities and competences - becoming, an increasingly complement to public safety. It has also increased the pre-requisites and control mechanisms for private security companies, and strengthened the rules that limit their scope of activity.

Para um (novo) modelo de intervenção penal na União Europeia: uma reflexão a partir do princípio de legalidade como limite material de atuação da Procuradoria Europeia

Tese de Doutoramento em Ciências Jurídicas (área de especialização em Ciências Jurídicas - Públicas)

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Taxation of banks: a theoretical framework

The goal of this paper is to develop a model of financial intermediation analyze the impact of various forms of taxation. The model considers in a unified framework various functions of banks: monitoring, transaction services and asset transformation. Particular attention is devoted to conditions for separability between deposits and loans. The analysis focuses on: (i) competition between banks and alternative financial arrangements (investment funds and organized security markets), (ii) regulation, and (iii) bank's monopoly power and risk taking behavior.

Optimal regulation of specialized medical care in a mixed system

We study the optimal public intervention in setting minimum standards of formation for specialized medical care. The abilities the physicians obtain by means of their training allow them to improve their performance as providers of cure and earn some monopoly rents.. Our aim is to characterize the most efficient regulation in this field taking into account different regulatory frameworks. We find that the existing situation in some countries, in which the amount of specialization is controlled, and the costs of this process of specialization are publicly financed, can be supported as the best possible intervention.

Scheduled service versus personal transportation: the role of distance

This paper analyzes both theoretically and empirically the relationship between distance and frequency of scheduled transportation services. We study the interaction between a monopoly firm providing high-speed scheduled service and personal trans- portation (i.e., car). Most interestingly, the carrier chooses to increase frequency of service on longer routes when competing with personal transportation because provid- ing a higher frequency (at extra cost) it can also charge higher fares that can boost its profits. However, when driving is not a relevant option, frequency of service de- creases for longer flights consistently with prior studies. An empirical application of our analysis to the European airline industry con?rms the predictions of our theoretical model.

Harmful competition in the insurance markets

There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for di erent distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.

Scheduled Service Versus Personal Transportation: The Role of Distance

This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship be- tween frequency of scheduled transportation services and their substitutability with personal transportation (using distance as a proxy). We study the interaction between a monopoly firm providing a high-speed scheduled service and private transportation (i.e., car). Interestingly, the carrier chooses to increase the frequency of service on longer routes when competing with personal transportation because by providing higher frequency (at extra cost) it can also charge higher fares which can boost its profits. However, in line with the results of earlier studies, frequency decreases for longer flights when driving is not a viable option. An empirical application of our analysis to the European airline industry confirms the predictions of our theoretical model. Keywords: short-haul routes; long-haul routes; flight frequency; distance JEL Classification Numbers: L13; L2; L93