An alternative approach for quasi-truth

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Reino da natureza, reino dos fins, e proto-reino: um estudo de traduções conservativas

We provide conservative translations from propositional modal logic KT (the simplest normal alethic logic) into propositional modal logic KD (the simplest normal deontic logic), and from this into the propositional modal logic K (the simplest normal logic simpliciter). Following an idea discussed by Jaakko Hintikka, these conservative translations are based on the third formulation of Kantian categorical imperative, the formulation of the Kingdom of Ends.

A syntactic realization theorem for justification logics

Justification logics are refinements of modal logics where modalities are replaced by justification terms. They are connected to modal logics via so-called realization theorems. We present a syntactic proof of a single realization theorem that uniformly connects all the normal modal logics formed from the axioms \$mathsfd\$, \$mathsft\$, \$mathsfb\$, \$mathsf4\$, and \$mathsf5\$ with their justification counterparts. The proof employs cut-free nested sequent systems together with Fitting's realization merging technique. We further strengthen the realization theorem for \$mathsfKB5\$ and \$mathsfS5\$ by showing that the positive introspection operator is superfluous.

Logical omniscience as infeasibility

Logical theories for representing knowledge are often plagued by the so-called Logical Omniscience Problem. The problem stems from the clash between the desire to model rational agents, which should be capable of simple logical inferences, and the fact that any logical inference, however complex, almost inevitably consists of inference steps that are simple enough. This contradiction points to the fruitlessness of trying to solve the Logical Omniscience Problem qualitatively if the rationality of agents is to be maintained. We provide a quantitative solution to the problem compatible with the two important facets of the reasoning agent: rationality and resource boundedness. More precisely, we provide a test for the logical omniscience problem in a given formal theory of knowledge. The quantitative measures we use are inspired by the complexity theory. We illustrate our framework with a number of examples ranging from the traditional implicit representation of knowledge in modal logic to the language of justification logic, which is capable of spelling out the internal inference process. We use these examples to divide representations of knowledge into logically omniscient and not logically omniscient, thus trying to determine how much information about the reasoning process needs to be present in a theory to avoid logical omniscience.

Intuitionistic common knowledge or belief

Starting off from the usual language of modal logic for multi-agent systems dealing with the agents’ knowledge/belief and common knowledge/belief we define so-called epistemic Kripke structures for intu- itionistic (common) knowledge/belief. Then we introduce corresponding deductive systems and show that they are sound and complete with respect to these semantics.

Culture and World Vision: The Cognitive Mythical Mode

Culture is the system of knowledge, from whose meanings the human being screened and selected their understanding of Reality in the broad sense, and interprets and regulates the facts and data of social behavior. In this sense, culture is a program for social action and acting in humans during the process of socialization and social interaction. The meanings of each culture are the cumulative product of collective and individual thinking, in ecological economic, social and political specific situations, so are the expression of each particular cultural historical conjuncture. Moreover, the universal cognitive structure for the apprehension of cultural reality is the World Vision (WV). Due to its importance and significance as substratum of religious and political belief systems, we will gird our study to mythical cognitive mode or mythical WV.

Methods for Solving Necessary Equivalences

Nonmonotonic Logics such as Autoepistemic Logic, Reflective Logic, and Default Logic, are usually defined in terms of set-theoretic fixed-point equations defined over deductively closed sets of sentences of First Order Logic. Such systems may also be represented as necessary equivalences in a Modal Logic stronger than S5 with the added advantage that such representations may be generalized to allow quantified variables crossing modal scopes resulting in a Quantified Autoepistemic Logic, a Quantified Autoepistemic Kernel, a Quantified Reflective Logic, and a Quantified Default Logic. Quantifiers in all these generalizations obey all the normal laws of logic including both the Barcan formula and its converse. Herein, we address the problem of solving some necessary equivalences containing universal quantifiers over modal scopes. Solutions obtained by these methods are then compared to related results obtained in the literature by Circumscription in Second Order Logic since the disjunction of all the solutions of a necessary equivalence containing just normal defaults in these Quantified Logics, is equivalent to that system.

Structural Damage Detection Using Modal Curvature and Fuzzy Logic

A fuzzy logic system (FLS) with a new sliding window defuzzifier is proposed for structural damage detection using modal curvatures. Changes in the modal curvatures due to damage are fuzzified using Gaussian fuzzy sets and mapped to damage location and size using the FLS. The first four modal vectors obtained from finite element simulations of a cantilever beam are used for identifying the location and size of damage. Parametric studies show that modal curvatures can be used to accurately locate the damage; however, quantifying the size of damage is difficult. Tests with noisy simulated data show that the method detects damage very accurately at different noise levels and when some modal data are missing.

Interactions between normative systems and software cognitive agents. A formalization in temporal modal defeasible logic and its implementation

Sustainable computer systems require some flexibility to adapt to environmental unpredictable changes. A solution lies in autonomous software agents which can adapt autonomously to their environments. Though autonomy allows agents to decide which behavior to adopt, a disadvantage is a lack of control, and as a side effect even untrustworthiness: we want to keep some control over such autonomous agents. How to control autonomous agents while respecting their autonomy? A solution is to regulate agents’ behavior by norms. The normative paradigm makes it possible to control autonomous agents while respecting their autonomy, limiting untrustworthiness and augmenting system compliance. It can also facilitate the design of the system, for example, by regulating the coordination among agents. However, an autonomous agent will follow norms or violate them in some conditions. What are the conditions in which a norm is binding upon an agent? While autonomy is regarded as the driving force behind the normative paradigm, cognitive agents provide a basis for modeling the bindingness of norms. In order to cope with the complexity of the modeling of cognitive agents and normative bindingness, we adopt an intentional stance. Since agents are embedded into a dynamic environment, things may not pass at the same instant. Accordingly, our cognitive model is extended to account for some temporal aspects. Special attention is given to the temporal peculiarities of the legal domain such as, among others, the time in force and the time in efficacy of provisions. Some types of normative modifications are also discussed in the framework. It is noteworthy that our temporal account of legal reasoning is integrated to our commonsense temporal account of cognition. As our intention is to build sustainable reasoning systems running unpredictable environment, we adopt a declarative representation of knowledge. A declarative representation of norms will make it easier to update their system representation, thus facilitating system maintenance; and to improve system transparency, thus easing system governance. Since agents are bounded and are embedded into unpredictable environments, and since conflicts may appear amongst mental states and norms, agent reasoning has to be defeasible, i.e. new pieces of information can invalidate formerly derivable conclusions. In this dissertation, our model is formalized into a non-monotonic logic, namely into a temporal modal defeasible logic, in order to account for the interactions between normative systems and software cognitive agents.