Does speed matter? : the impact of the EU membership incentive on rule adoption in minority language rights protection

Denna avhandling tar sin utgångspunkt i ett ifrågasättande av effektiviteten i EU:s konditionalitetspolitik avseende minoritetsrättigheter. Baserat på den rationalistiska teoretiska modellen, External Incentives Model of Governance, syftar denna hypotesprövande avhandling till att förklara om tidsavståndet på det potentiella EU medlemskapet påverkar lagstiftningsnivån avseende minoritetsspråksrättigheter. Mätningen av nivån på lagstiftningen avseende minoritetsspråksrättigheter begränsas till att omfatta icke-diskriminering, användning av minoritetsspråk i officiella sammanhang samt minoriteters språkliga rättigheter i utbildningen. Metodologiskt används ett jämförande angreppssätt både avseende tidsramen för studien, som sträcker sig mellan 2003 och 2010, men även avseende urvalet av stater. På basis av det \"mest lika systemet\" kategoriseras staterna i tre grupper efter deras olika tidsavstånd från det potentiella EU medlemskapet. Hypotesen som prövas är följande: ju kortare tidsavstånd till det potentiella EU medlemskapet desto större sannolikhet att staternas lagstiftningsnivå inom de tre områden som studeras har utvecklats till en hög nivå. Studien visar att hypotesen endast bekräftas delvis. Resultaten avseende icke-diskriminering visar att sambandet mellan tidsavståndet och nivån på lagstiftningen har ökat markant under den undersökta tidsperioden. Detta samband har endast stärkts mellan kategorin av stater som ligger tidsmässigt längst bort ett potentiellt EU medlemskap och de två kategorier som ligger närmare respektive närmast ett potentiellt EU medlemskap. Resultaten avseende användning av minoritetsspråk i officiella sammanhang och minoriteters språkliga rättigheter i utbildningen visar inget respektive nästan inget samband mellan tidsavståndet och utvecklingen på lagstiftningen mellan 2003 och 2010.

Does speed matter? : the impact of the EU membership incentive on rule adoption in minority language rights protection

Denna avhandling tar sin utgångspunkt i ett ifrågasättande av effektiviteten i EU:s konditionalitetspolitik avseende minoritetsrättigheter. Baserat på den rationalistiska teoretiska modellen, External Incentives Model of Governance, syftar denna hypotesprövande avhandling till att förklara om tidsavståndet på det potentiella EU medlemskapet påverkar lagstiftningsnivån avseende minoritetsspråksrättigheter. Mätningen av nivån på lagstiftningen avseende minoritetsspråksrättigheter begränsas till att omfatta icke-diskriminering, användning av minoritetsspråk i officiella sammanhang samt minoriteters språkliga rättigheter i utbildningen. Metodologiskt används ett jämförande angreppssätt både avseende tidsramen för studien, som sträcker sig mellan 2003 och 2010, men även avseende urvalet av stater. På basis av det \"mest lika systemet\" kategoriseras staterna i tre grupper efter deras olika tidsavstånd från det potentiella EU medlemskapet. Hypotesen som prövas är följande: ju kortare tidsavstånd till det potentiella EU medlemskapet desto större sannolikhet att staternas lagstiftningsnivå inom de tre områden som studeras har utvecklats till en hög nivå. Studien visar att hypotesen endast bekräftas delvis. Resultaten avseende icke-diskriminering visar att sambandet mellan tidsavståndet och nivån på lagstiftningen har ökat markant under den undersökta tidsperioden. Detta samband har endast stärkts mellan kategorin av stater som ligger tidsmässigt längst bort ett potentiellt EU medlemskap och de två kategorier som ligger närmare respektive närmast ett potentiellt EU medlemskap. Resultaten avseende användning av minoritetsspråk i officiella sammanhang och minoriteters språkliga rättigheter i utbildningen visar inget respektive nästan inget samband mellan tidsavståndet och utvecklingen på lagstiftningen mellan 2003 och 2010.

Language minority, illiteracy, and voting data used in making determinations for the Voting rights act amendments of 1975 (Public law 94-73).

Item 142-C

Cambodia : limited progress on free elections, human rights, and mine clearing : briefing report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives /

"B-270716"--P. 1.

Multifractal regime transition in a modified minority game model

The search for more realistic modeling of financial time series reveals several stylized facts of real markets. In this work we focus on the multifractal properties found in price and index signals. Although the usual minority game (MG) models do not exhibit multifractality, we study here one of its variants that does. We show that the nonsynchronous MG models in the nonergodic phase is multifractal and in this sense, together with other stylized facts, constitute a better modeling tool. Using the structure function (SF) approach we detected the stationary and the scaling range of the time series generated by the MG model and, from the linear (non-linear) behavior of the SF we identified the fractal (multifractal) regimes. Finally, using the wavelet transform modulus maxima (WTMM) technique we obtained its multifractal spectrum width for different dynamical regimes. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Cultural relativism in the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council

This Working Paper aims to offer an up-to-date list of cultural relativist players and arguments with respect to human rights, constituted by China, Viet Nam, Myanmar, Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, Malaysia and Cuba. This working paper argues that Indonesia, Iraq, Colombia and Mexico are not in the same cultural relativist group of states maintained by renowned scholars, notably Cristina Cerna and Dianne Otto. As such, apart from this form of cultural relativism based on the respect for the self-determination of indigenous peoples and communities, this working paper exposes two different categories of radical cultural relativism based on revolutionary discourse and/or radical Islamism, as well as targets the credibility on the latter two based on the information facilitated by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (HRC) Universal Periodic Review (UPR).

Connecting Iowa’s Disproportionate Minority Confinement Efforts to the Iowa Justice Data Warehouse, 2002

Funds for this report and grant were provided to the Iowa Division of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning (CJJP) and Statistical Analysis Center, by the Justice Research and Statistics Association (JRSA) through a cooperative agreement entitled “Juvenile Justice Evaluation Resource Center” with the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).

Dusproportionate Minority Contact in Iowa's Juvenile Justice System, April 2006

This report was developed to provide summary information to allow state agency staff, practitioners and juvenile justice system officials to access a specific section of Iowa’s Three Year Plan. It includes the Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) section of Iowa’s 2006 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act formula grant Three-Year Plan. The complete Three Year Plan serves as Iowa’s application for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act formula grant funding.

Update Regarding Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) Progress of Iowa Communities, December 1, 2015

The Iowa State Court Administrator’s Office (SCA) created the CASP Advisory Committee in October 2013 to develop a state plan addressing disproportionate minority contact (DMC) in the juvenile justice system. The planning was assisted with a discretionary grant awarded from the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).

Identification and ethnic diversity underlie support for multicultural rights : a multilevel analysis in Bulgaria

Bulgaria is historically a multicultural society, composed of the Bulgarian (ethnic) majority and a number of ethnic minorities among which Bulgarian Turks and Roma are the largest. Both minority communities are stigmatized in contemporary Bulgaria, though to different degrees and for different reasons. Ethnic minorities' rights to preserve their culture, customs, and language are a topic of contentious debate. The purpose of this study was to examine individual- and context-level antecedents of the ethnic Bulgarian majority's support for multicultural rights of ethnic minorities. Multilevel regression analyses were conducted with International Social Survey Programme ISSP 2003 data (N = 920 in 28 Bulgarian districts). At the individual-level, an ethnic conception of the nation and anti-Roma symbolic prejudice were negatively related to support for multicultural rights, whereas national identification was positively related to the support of these rights. Over and above individual-level effects, and in line with recent extensions of intergroup contact theory, thepercentage ofBulgarianTurks withindistricts was positively related to support for multicultural rights. Importantly, support for multicultural rights was particularly high in districts characterized by ethnic diversity, that is, in districts with high proportions of both Bulgarian Turks and Roma. The beneficial effects of ethnic diversity and theoretical implications of findings are discussed.

Competitive Effects of Non-Controlling Minority Acquisitions – Sufficient to merit further EU merger regulation?

Partial ownership interests are a widespread phenomenon in modern corporate environment. Unless minority shareholding affords the target to exercise control over the target, they do currently not have to be notified to the European Commission under EU merger regime. However, economic research has long suggested that when linking competing or non-horizontally positioned undertakings particularly in industries with few competitors, minority shareholdings even far below the majority of shares or voting rights could lead to higher prices or lower output volumes to the detriment of consumers. The Commission has recognized this issue and proceeded to suggest an extension of the merger regime to catch also certain non-controlling minority acquisitions. Horizontal non-controlling minority shareholdings create a positive correlation between the sales revenues of the partial acquirer and target. Through the equity interest the acquirer will internalise a fraction, proportional to the financial rights attached to the shareholding, of the profit of the target. This will incentivise the acquirer to contribute to increasing the target’s business profits by increasing its own sales price (horizontal unilateral effects). When a minority stake is held in a vertically related or a conglomerate company, the minority acquirer could be allowed to hamper or eliminate the target’s rivals’ access either to inputs (input foreclosure) or customers (customer foreclosure), depending on which level of the supply chain the parties are (vertical unilateral effects). Under certain circumstances minority share acquisitions could also lessen competition because they facilitate collusion between companies active in the market (coordinated effects). Economic theory confirms that non-controlling minority shareholdings may under certain circumstances create anti-competitive effects that are unlikely to be remedies by pro-competitive effects. However, they are likely to be of less significant nature than anticompetitive effects created by full mergers. This derives fore mostly from the fact that a minority share acquirer carries all the costs associated with its unilateral action but will internalise only a fraction of the lost profits. This is likely to limit the acquirer’s incentive to raise price and the profitability of such behavior. Having in mind that the number of potentially problematic cases is expected to be next to negligible, the limited potential competitive effects of non-controlling minority share acquisitions cannot be seen to clearly merit extension of the scope of the EUMR. The system suggested by the Commission is particularly ill-fitted for such purpose given the clear lack of legal certainty and considerable administrative burden associated with it.

The Constitutional basis of aboriginal rights

Aboriginal rights are rights held by aboriginal peoples, not by virtue of Crown grant, legislation or treaty, but “by reason of the fact that aboriginal peoples were once independent, self-governing entities in possession of most of the lands now making up Canada.” It is, of course, the presence of aboriginal peoples in North America before the arrival of the Europeans that distinguishes them from other minority groups in Canada, and explains why their rights have special legal status. However, the extent to which those rights had survived European settlement was in considerable doubt until as late as 1973, which was when the Supreme Court of Canada decided the Calder case.2 In that case, six of the seven judges held that the Nishga people of British Columbia possessed aboriginal rights to their lands that had survived European settlement. The actual outcome of the case was inconclusive, because the six judges split evenly on the question whether the rights had been validly extinguished or not. However, the recognition of the rights was significant, and caught the attention of the Government of Canada, which began to negotiate treaties (now called land claims agreements) with First Nations in those parts of the country that were without treaties. That resumed a policy that had been abandoned in the 1920s, when the last numbered treaty was entered into.