994 resultados para Liquidity risk
Resumo:
We assess the predictive ability of three VPIN metrics on the basis of two highly volatile market events of China, and examine the association between VPIN and toxic-induced volatility through conditional probability analysis and multiple regression. We examine the dynamic relationship on VPIN and high-frequency liquidity using Vector Auto-Regression models, Granger Causality tests, and impulse response analysis. Our results suggest that Bulk Volume VPIN has the best risk-warning effect among major VPIN metrics. VPIN has a positive association with market volatility induced by toxic information flow. Most importantly, we document a positive feedback effect between VPIN and high-frequency liquidity, where a negative liquidity shock boosts up VPIN, which, in turn, leads to further liquidity drain. Our study provides empirical evidence that reflects an intrinsic game between informed traders and market makers when facing toxic information in the high-frequency trading world.
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Research into the topic of liquidity has greatly benefited from the availability of data. Although bid-ask spreads were inaccessible to researchers, Roll (1984) provided a conceptual model that estimated the effective bid-ask prices from regular time series data, recorded on a daily or longer interval. Later data availability improved and researchers were able to address questions regarding the factors that influenced the spreads and the relationship between spreads and risk, return and liquidity. More recently transaction data have been used to measure the effective spread and researchers have been able to refine the concepts of liquidity to include the impact of transactions on price movements (Clayton and McKinnon, 2000) on a trade-by-trade analysis. This paper aims to use techniques that combine elements from all three approaches and, by studying US data over a relatively long time period, to throw light on earlier research as well as to reveal the changes in liquidity over the period controlling for extraneous factors such as market, age and size of REIT. It also reveals some comparable results for the UK market over the same period.
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Research on the topic of liquidity has greatly benefited from the improved availability of data. Researchers have addressed questions regarding the factors that influence bid-ask spreads and the relationship between spreads and risk, return and liquidity. Intra-day data have been used to measure the effective spread and researchers have been able to refine the concepts of liquidity to include the price impact of transactions on a trade-by-trade analysis. The growth in the creation of tax-transparent securities has greatly enhanced the visibility of securitized real estate, and has naturally led to the question of whether the increased visibility of real estate has caused market liquidity to change. Although the growth in the public market for securitized real estate has occurred in international markets, it has not been accompanied by universal publication of transaction data. Therefore this paper develops an aggregate daily data-based test for liquidity and applies the test to US data in order to check for consistency with the results of prior intra-day analysis. If the two approaches produce similar results, we can apply the same technique to markets in which less detailed data are available and offer conclusions on the liquidity of a wider set of markets.
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Covered bonds are a promising alternative for prime mortgage securitization. In this paper, we explore risk premia in the covered bond market and particularly investigate whether and how credit risk is priced. In extant literature, yield spreads between high-quality covered bonds and government bonds are often interpreted as pure liquidity premia. In contrast, we show that although liquidity is important, it is not the exclusive risk factor. Using a hand-collected data set of cover pool information, we find that the credit quality of the cover assets is an important determinant of covered bond yield spreads. This effect is particularly strong in times of financial turmoil and has a significant influence on the issuer's refinancing cost.
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This paper examines the effects of liquidity during the 2007–09 crisis, focussing on the Senior Tranche of the CDX.NA.IG Index and on Moody's AAA Corporate Bond Index. It aims to understand whether the sharp increase in the credit spreads of these AAA-rated credit indices can be explained by worse credit fundamentals alone or whether it also reflects a lack of depth in the relevant markets, the scarcity of risk-capital, and the liquidity preference exhibited by investors. Using cointegration analysis and error correction models, the paper shows that during the crisis lower market and funding liquidity are important drivers of the increase in the credit spread of the AAA-rated structured product, whilst they are less significant in explaining credit spread changes for a portfolio of unstructured credit instruments. Looking at the experience of the subprime crisis, the study shows that when the conditions under which securitisation can work properly (liquidity, transparency and tradability) suddenly disappear, investors are left highly exposed to systemic risk.
Resumo:
Trading commercial real estate involves a process of exchange that is costly and which occurs over an extended and uncertain period of time. This has consequences for the performance and risk of real estate investments. Most research on transaction times has occurred for residential rather than commercial real estate. We study the time taken to transact commercial real estate assets in the UK using a sample of 578 transactions over the period 2004 to 2013. We measure average time to transact from a buyer and seller perspective, distinguishing the search and due diligence phases of the process, and we conduct econometric analysis to explain variation in due diligence times between assets. The median time for purchase of real estate from introduction to completion was 104 days and the median time for sale from marketing to completion was 135 days. There is considerable variation around these times and results suggest that some of this variation is related to market state, type and quality of asset, and type of participants involved in the transaction. Our findings shed light on the drivers of liquidity at an individual asset level and can inform models that quantify the impact of uncertain time on market on real estate investment risk.
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O projeto de pesquisa é parte do projeto entitulado "Credibilidade de Políticas Monetárias e Fiscais para o Brasil: Risco Soberano, Instituições, Âncoras Nominais, e Acesso aos Mercados Financeiros Internacionais". Dentro do atual plano de estabilização, um estudo empírico sobre a economia brasileira fornece um exemplo vívido do impacto de vários fatores, como o grau de institucionalização das políticas monetárias e orçamentárias que tem sido utilizadas desde a implementação do Plano Real, que aumentariam a credibilidade, sustentando a política cambial e o fluxo positivo do capital internacional, na percepção do mercado do risco de suspensão de pagamento (default risk) da dívida externa de um país em desenvolvimento. O foco dentro deste projeto de pesquisa será na questão de pesquisa: "Prêmio sobre o risco (risk premium) dos títulos soberanos e política fiscal discricionária vs regras de política fiscal para um país em desenvolvimento: o caso do Brasil".
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We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately infonned "monopolistic" insider, in a model with real investment portfolio choices ex ante, and noise trading generated by aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare implications of insider trading for the ex ante expected utilities of outsiders are analyzed. The role of interim infonnation revelation due to insider trading, in improving the risk-sharing among outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, is examined in detaiL
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The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.
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Esta dissertação estuda a propagação de crises sobre o sistema financeiro. Mais especi- ficamente, busca-se desenvolver modelos que permitam simular como um determinado choque econômico atinge determinados agentes do sistema financeiro e apartir dele se propagam, transformando-se em um problema sistêmico. A dissertação é dividida em dois capítulos,além da introdução. O primeiro capítulo desenvolve um modelo de propa- gação de crises em fundos de investimento baseado em ciência das redes.Combinando dois modelos de propagação em redes financeiras, um simulando a propagação de perdas em redes bipartites de ativos e agentes financeiros e o outro simulando a propagação de perdas em uma rede de investimentos diretos em quotas de outros agentes, desenvolve-se um algoritmo para simular a propagação de perdas através de ambos os mecanismos e utiliza-se este algoritmo para simular uma crise no mercado brasileiro de fundos de investimento. No capítulo 2,desenvolve-se um modelo de simulação baseado em agentes, com agentes financeiros, para simular propagação de um choque que afeta o mercado de operações compromissadas.Criamos também um mercado artificial composto por bancos, hedge funds e fundos de curto prazo e simulamos a propagação de um choque de liquidez sobre um ativo de risco securitizando utilizado para colateralizar operações compromissadas dos bancos.
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One way to measure the lower steady state equilibrium outcome in human capital development is the incidence of child labor in most of the developing countries. With the help of Indian household level data in an overlapping generation framework, we show that production loans under credit rationing are not optimally extended towards firms because of issues with adverse selection. More stringent rationing in the credit market creates a distortion in the labor market by increasing adult wage rate and the demand for child labor. Lower availability of funds under stringent rationing coupled with increased demand for loans induces the high risk firms to replace adult labor by child labor. A switch of regime from credit rationing to revelation regime can clear such imperfections in the labor market. The equilibrium higher wage rate elevates the household consumption to a significantly higher level than the subsistence under credit rationing and therefore higher level of human capital development is assured leading to no supply of child labor.
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In this paper, we aim to identify the political and financial risk components that matter most for the activities of multinational corporations. Our paper is the first paper to comprehensively examine the impact of various components of not only political risk but also financial risk on inward FDI, from both long-run and short-run perspectives. Using a sample of 93 countries (including 60 developing countries) for the period 1985-2007, we find that among the political risk components, government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, religious tensions, democratic accountability, and ethnic tensions have a close association with FDI flows. In particular, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, and external conflict appear to be the most influential components of political risk in attracting foreign investment. Among the financial risk components, only exchange rate stability yields statistically significant positive coefficients when estimated only for developing countries. In contrast, current account as a percentage of exports of goods and services, foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, net international liquidity as the number of months of import cover, and current account as a percentage of GDP yield negative coefficients in some specifications. Thus, multinationals do not seem to consider seriously the financial risk of the host country.
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Spain has a long tradition of encouraging toll highways by granting concessions to private companies. Concessions in Spain have been characterized by a willingness to transfer considerable risk to the private sector. Traffic demand, acquisition of the right-of-way, and financial risk have often been allocated to the private sector. From 1996 to 2011, 16 toll highway concessions, covering a total distance of 835 km, were awarded by the central government of Spain with this approach. Some of those highways started their operations just before the economic recession began. The recession had negative consequences for Spain's economy. The gross domestic product per capita plummeted, and the unemployment rate increased from 9% to 20% of the working population in just 2 years. The recession also had severe consequences for the economic performance of toll highway concessions. Traffic levels declined at a much greater rate than did the gross domestic product. In addition, the conditions imposed by the financial markets on borrowers became much stricter because of the liquidity crisis. This study analyzes the impact that the economic recession ultimately had on the performance of toll highway concessions in Spain and the actions that the government adopted to avoid the bankruptcy of the concessionaires. It was found that the economic recession helped identify some deficiencies in how risk had been allocated in Spain. The measures that both Spain and the European Union are adopting so as to improve risk allocation are discussed.
Resumo:
A cikkben a magyar fedezetlen bankközi forintpiac hálózatának időbeli alakulását vizsgáljuk 2002 decemberétől 2009 márciusáig. Bemutatjuk a piac általános jellemzőit (forgalom, kamatláb, koncentráció stb.) és az alapvető hálózati mutatókat. Azt tapasztaljuk, hogy az időszak első felében ezek a jellemzők lényegében stabilak voltak. 2006-2007-től kezdve azonban a mutatók egy része kezdett jelentősen megváltozni: a hitelfelvevők koncentrációja nőtt, az átlagos közelség és az átlagos fokszám csökkent, továbbá a hálózat magjának mérete is csökkent. Ezek a jelek arra utalhatnak, hogy a bankok már a válság kitörése előtt érzékelték a növekvő hitelkockázatot, és egyre inkább megválogatták, hogy kinek adnak hitelt. Figyelemre méltó, hogy mindeközben az általános piaci mutatók (forgalom, kamatláb, illetve ezek volatilitása) semmiféle változásra utaló jelet nem tükröztek egészen 2008 októberéig, de ekkor hirtelen minden mutatóban egyértelművé vált a rezsimváltás. Végül részletesen elemezzük az egyes szereplők viselkedését, és megmutatjuk, hogy válságban az egyes szerepek drasztikusan megváltoztak (például forrásokból nyelők lettek, és fordítva). / === / The article examines the changes in the network of Hungary's uncovered interbank forint market over the period Decembcr 2000 to March 2009. It presents the general features of the market (volume, interest rates, concentration etc.) and its basic network. It is found that the features were largely stable in the first half of the period, but some of the indicators began to change significantly in 2006-7: the concentration of borrowers incrcased, average distance and average degree declined, as did the size of the core of the network. These signs pointed to the fact that the banks had sensed an increase in credit risk even before the crisis broke and were becoming increasingly choosy selective in their lending. Meanwhile, however. there aerc no indications of change in the general market indicators (volume, interest rates, or volatility of these) right up to October 2008, when the change of regime was clear in all indicators. Finally, the authors analyse in detail the behaviour of each participant and show that thc roles of some altered drastically with the crisis (e.g. sources became consumers and vice versa).
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When I started writing this paper, I thought I would only be writing about the parallel between the mathematical theory of inventory and production – as a familiar model of operations research – and liquidity management. And then during the writing process, predictably enough I must say, the scandals surrounding the Buda-Cash and Quaestor brokerages erupted. Likewise in this period, the debate about foreign currency lending gained fresh impetus; about who made which mistakes when, or whether there was anyone who didn’t make mistakes. The most surprising twist revealed in the Buda-Cash and Quaestor cases – beyond alleged losses running into several hundreds of billions of forints – was that all this could be accumulated in 15 years of selfless effort. And even if this information proves to be comment born of initial over-excitement, it still demands an explanation one way or another. If it’s true, then how can this be? And if it isn’t, then what made it appear as if this is what happened? The questions and contradictions are obvious. But the main questions are these: What do risk managers actually do? What do we pay them for? And how far can we trust them?