Basque nominalizations and the role of structural Case in the licensing of null arguments

[EN] This article investigates the question of the licensing of null arguments in the so-called pro-drop languages. By focusing on the licensing of null subjects in the different types of -T(Z)E nominalizations in Basque, it aims at defining in a precise way the crucial feature that makes pro-drop possible in a clause. The central claim is that what licenses subject-drop is the assignment of structural Case. That is, it is argued that a subject can be null if and only if it is assigned structural Case. Different aspects of T(Z)E nominalizations are also explored, which show that even if these clauses are similar in the surface, they can be syntactically very different and furthermore, that infinitive clauses marked with the same nominalizing morpheme can also have diverging structures.

Applications of outsourcing theory to collaborative purchasing and licensing

Urquhart, C. (2003). Applications of outsourcing theory to collaborative purchasing and licensing. VINE: The Journal of Information and Knowledge Management Systems, 32(4), 63-70.

One Careful Owner: An exploration and critique of the licensing provisions of the Housing Act 2004

One careful owner ? an exploration and critique of the licensing provisions of the Housing Act 2004. [2006] The Coneyancer and Property Lawyer 123-136. RAE2008

Licensing in an international triopoly

We study the effects of entry of two foreign firms on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the incumbent is technologically superior to the entrants. We consider two different situations: (i) the cost-reducing innovation is licensed to both entrants; (ii) the cost- reducing innovation is licensed to just one of the entrants. We analyse three kind of license: (lump- sum) fixed-fee; (per-unit) royalty; and two-part tariff, that is a combination of a fixed-fee and a royalty. We prove that a two part tariff is never an optimal licensing scheme for the incumbent. Moreover, (i) when the technology is licensed to the two entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only output royalty; and (ii) when the technology is licensed to just one of the entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only a fixed-fee.

Per-unit royalty and fixed-fee licensing in a differentiated Stackelberg model

In the present paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a per-unit royalty and a fixed-fee. We analyse the implications of these types of licensing contracts over the R&D effort, the profits of the firms, the consumer surplus and the social welfare. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results.

The Pursuit of Efficient Copyright Licensing : How Some Rights Reserved Attempts to Solve the Problems of All Rights Reserved

This dissertation analyses the growing pool of copyrighted works, which are offered to the public using Creative Commons licensing. The study consist of analysis of the novel licensing system, the licensors, and the changes of the "all rights reserved" —paradigm of copyright law. Copyright law reserves all rights to the creator until seventy years have passed since her demise. Many claim that this endangers communal interests. Quite often the creators are willing to release some rights. This, however, is very difficult to do and needs help of specialized lawyers. The study finds that the innovative Creative Commons licensing scheme is well suited for low value - high volume licensing. It helps to reduce transaction costs on several le¬vels. However, CC licensing is not a "silver bullet". Privacy, moral rights, the problems of license interpretation and license compatibility with other open licenses and collecting societies remain unsolved. The study consists of seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the research topic and research questions. The second and third chapters inspect the Creative Commons licensing scheme's technical, economic and legal aspects. The fourth and fifth chapters examine the incentives of the licensors who use open licenses and describe certain open business models. The sixth chapter studies the role of collecting societies and whether two institutions, Creative Commons and collecting societies can coexist. The final chapter summarizes the findings. The dissertation contributes to the existing literature in several ways. There is a wide range of prior research on open source licensing. However, there is an urgent need for an extensive study of the Creative Commons licensing and its actual and potential impact on the creative ecosystem.

The Ex Post Profitability of Licensing Thechnology.

Rapport de recherche

Cinematographic Licensing

In India, film censorship originated with Cinematograph Act 1918 empowering the Provincial Governments to establish censorial authorities. In 1949, an amendment provided for a Central Board of Film Censors. In 1952, a new legislation gave the Central Government enormous powers, making the Board to function as a department of the Central Government. The Government had control over the Board with the mechanism of issuing 'directions' to the censors and laying down censorship rules. The legislation did not provide any objective criteria for censoring films. The 1959 amendment, aimed at curing this defect, only incorporated the grounds contained in Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Even after expert studies and a significant decision by the Supreme Court, pointing out the inadequacy of the existing system, and governmental attempts to bring reforms by way of fresh directions, appointment of appellate authority and framing of new rules, the system still warrants radical change. The thesis explores them.

INFO2009 Group 1 -- Open Source Software Licensing Infographic

An infographic for open source software licensing. This resource can serve as a simple introduction to open source software licensing, and as a reference for future use.

Self-licensing and financial rewards: is morality for sale?

This paper studies the impact of financially rewarding good deeds on self-licensing. We run a between-subjects experiment comprised of an adapted dictator game preceded by paid and unpaid pro-environmental tasks. We find that prefacing the dictator game with an unpaid good deed seems to establish a 'moral rectitude' which licenses subsequent selfish behaviour, whereas a paid good deed dampens this effect. Interestingly, the nature of the initial task has more of an effect on the binary option (give vs. not give) than on the amount donated.

Smug alert! Exploring self-licensing behaviour in a cheating game

We test experimentally a prediction of the ‘moral credit model’, in which committing a virtuous act creates moral credits that can license immoral behavior in a succeeding decision. We use a basic cheating experiment that was either preceded by a virtuous deed or not in a developing country context. We found that people who previously achieved a good deed cheat more. Gender and origin are also significant explicative variables for cheating.

Technology licensing and grantbacks under hidden information

This paper explores technological transfer via licensing under hidden information. The transaction features a quality choice of technology to be transferred between a licensor and a licensee that has private information about its ability to implement and refine the technology. The model accounts for the possible damage that drastic refinements and reverse licensing can do to the licensor's market position, and makes predictions on the structure of licensing contracts. We show under what conditions a licensing contract will include a further contractual provision such as a grantback clause. Finally, the welfare implications of grantback inclusion are assessed.