Changing dynamics of the interinstitutional relationships between executive and legislature power in Colombia (2002/2006)

This paper describes the relationship between the executive and legislative branches during the first government of Alvaro Uribe Vélez. We will focus on reviewing the legislative output of each branch of power, along with the effectiveness and efficiency they showed as promoters of this production. We will review the impact they had on the legislative agenda setting and on the control of the legislative process  itself, making a diachronic analysis in which each legislature is used as a unit. Thus, we will try to identify the presence (or not) of some kind of pattern interactions,  and we will evaluate, at one hand, the existence of hierarchical and transactional trends, and, on the other, the different types of balances produced  between them.

The executive toolbox: building legislative support in a multiparty presidential regime

How do presidents win legislative support under conditions of extreme multipartism? Comparative presidential research has offered two parallel answers, one relying on distributive politics and the other claiming that legislative success is a function of coalition formation. We merge these insights in an integrated approach to executive-legislative relations, also adding contextual factors related to dynamism and bargaining conditions. We find that the two presidential “tools” – pork and coalition goods – are substitutable resources, with pork functioning as a fine-tuning instrument that interacts reciprocally with legislative support. Pork expenditures also depend upon a president’s bargaining leverage and the distribution of legislative seats.

Agenda power in Brazil's Câmara dos Deputados , 1989 to 1999

This paper examines the structure of agenda power in the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies). Our main question concerns when consistent agenda control by a single majority coalition, as opposed to agenda control by shifting majorities, has emerged in the post-1988 Câmara. Consistent agenda control emerges routinely in parliamentary regimes: the government commands a majority in the assembly; the legislative agenda is negotiated among the governing parties, typically with each able to “veto” the placement of bills on the agenda. However, the Câmara faces an external executive, the president, with substantial formal powers to set its agenda. Consistent agenda control thus can emerge only if the president chooses to ally with a majority coalition in the assembly. If the president always chose to form such an alliance—a presidentially-led agenda cartel—then one would expect some consistently parliamentary patterns in Brazil: the appointment of legislative party leaders to the cabinet; the use of statutes rather than decrees to achieve policy goals; the avoidance of bills that would pass and split the governing coalition. We find that only the Cardoso presidency displays consistent evidence of such a presidentiallyled agenda cartel. In this sense, our argument differs from that of Figueiredo and Limongi (1999; 2000), who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a parliamentary mode of governance in Brazil. Yet it also differs from those who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a shifting-coalitions strategy. Our results suggest that presidents make a strategic choice, with much hinging on that choice.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Paths to Power: The Ascendance of Contemporary Democratic Congressional Leaders

Congressional leadership is a constantly changing phenomenon. New factors and actors are constantly affecting and altering which members ascend to positions of leadership and how that leadership is exercised. A critical change that has occurred in recent times is the inclusion of women in the congressional leadership for the first time. While there has been a great deal of theoretical work on gender and on congressional leadership, there have not been enough actual female leaders in Congress to perform a study until now. The present study examines the impact of gender, committee/legislative performance, ideology, and fundraising ability on leadership ascendancy. The variables are investigated through a comparative case study of Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Rep. Rosa DeLauro, Sen. Hillary Clinton and Sen. Harry Reid.

The EU power sector needs long-term price signals. CEPS Special Report No. 135/April 2016

By 2030, half of the EU’s electricity demand will be covered by renewables and will need to be accompanied by flexible conventional back-up resources. Due to the high upfront costs inherent to renewables and the progressively lower running times associated with back-up capacity, the cost of capital will have a proportionately greater impact on total costs than today. This report examines how electricity markets can be designed to provide long-term price signals, thereby reducing the cost of capital for these technologies and allowing for a more efficient transition. It finds that current market arrangements are unable to provide long-term price signals. To address this issue, we argue that a system for long-term contracts with a regulated counterparty could be implemented. A centralised system where capacity or energy or a combination of both is contracted, could be introduced for conventional and renewable capacity, based on a regional adequacy assessment and with a competitive bidding system in place to ensure cost-effectiveness. Member states face a number of legislative barriers while implementing these types of systems, however, which could be reduced by merging legislation and setting EU framework rules for the design of these contractual agreements.

Reorganization plan no. 9 of 1950 : providing for the reorganization of the Federal Power Commission : report (to accompany S. Res. 255)

Also in Congressional serial volume 11368.

State legislatures and energy policy in the Northeast : energy facility siting and legislative action /

"BNL 50679."

Report of the Giant power board.

Mode of access: Internet.

A perspective on the current and future uses of Illinois coal by the electric power industry : a technical report /

"April 1983."

A comparative evaluation of the legislative controls on unfair terms and exemption clauses in consumer and business contracts in England and Brazil

The purpose of the present study is to make a comparative evaluation of the legislative controls on unfairness in the context of B2B, B2C and small businesses contracts in England and Brazil. This work will focus on the examination of statutes and relevant case law which regulate exemption clauses and terms on the basis of their ‘unfairness’. The approach adopted by legislation and courts towards the above controls may vary according to the type of contract. Business contracts are more in line with the classical model of contract law according to which parties are presumably equals and able to negotiate terms. As a consequence interventions should be avoided for the sake of freedom of contract even if harmful terms were included. Such assumption of equality however is not applicable to small businesses contracts because SMEs are often in a disadvantageous position in relation to their larger counterparties. Consumer contracts in their turn are more closely regulated by the English and Brazilian legal systems which recognised that vulnerable parties are more exposed to unfair terms imposed by the stronger party as a result of the inequality of bargaining power. For this reason those jurisdictions adopted a more interventionist approach to provide special protection to consumers which is in line with the modern law of contract. The contribution of this work therefore consists of comparing how the law of England and Brazil tackles the problem of ‘unfairness’ in the above types of contracts. This study will examine the differences and similarities between rules and concepts of both jurisdictions with references to the law of their respective regional trade agreements (EU and the Mercosul). Moreover it will identify existing issues in the English and Brazilian legislation and recommend lessons that one system can learn from the other.

Comparação entre métodos para mensuração da potência aeróbia em atletas tetraplégicos= : Comparison of methods for aerobic power assessment in athletes with tetraplegia

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

Reliability and discriminatory power of methods for dental plaque quantification

OBJECTIVE: This in situ study evaluated the discriminatory power and reliability of methods of dental plaque quantification and the relationship between visual indices (VI) and fluorescence camera (FC) to detect plaque. MATERIAL AND METHODS: Six volunteers used palatal appliances with six bovine enamel blocks presenting different stages of plaque accumulation. The presence of plaque with and without disclosing was assessed using VI. Images were obtained with FC and digital camera in both conditions. The area covered by plaque was assessed. Examinations were done by two independent examiners. Data were analyzed by Kruskal-Wallis and Kappa tests to compare different conditions of samples and to assess the inter-examiner reproducibility. RESULTS: Some methods presented adequate reproducibility. The Turesky index and the assessment of area covered by disclosed plaque in the FC images presented the highest discriminatory powers. CONCLUSION: The Turesky index and images with FC with disclosing present good reliability and discriminatory power in quantifying dental plaque.

Power Secant Method applied to natural frequency extraction of Timoshenko beam structures

This work deals with an improved plane frame formulation whose exact dynamic stiffness matrix (DSM) presents, uniquely, null determinant for the natural frequencies. In comparison with the classical DSM, the formulation herein presented has some major advantages: local mode shapes are preserved in the formulation so that, for any positive frequency, the DSM will never be ill-conditioned; in the absence of poles, it is possible to employ the secant method in order to have a more computationally efficient eigenvalue extraction procedure. Applying the procedure to the more general case of Timoshenko beams, we introduce a new technique, named ""power deflation"", that makes the secant method suitable for the transcendental nonlinear eigenvalue problems based on the improved DSM. In order to avoid overflow occurrences that can hinder the secant method iterations, limiting frequencies are formulated, with scaling also applied to the eigenvalue problem. Comparisons with results available in the literature demonstrate the strength of the proposed method. Computational efficiency is compared with solutions obtained both by FEM and by the Wittrick-Williams algorithm.

Living Our Lives on the Edge: Power, Space and Sexual Orientation in Cape Town Townships, South Africa

Much of social science literature about South African cities fails to represent its complex spectrum of sexual practices and associated identities. The unintended effects of such representations are that a compulsory heterosexuality is naturalised in, and reiterative with, dominant constructions of blackness in townships. In this paper, we argue that the assertion of discreet lesbian and gay identities in black townships of a South African city such as Cape Town is influenced by the historical racial and socio-economic divides that have marked urban landscape. In their efforts to recoup a positive sense of gendered personhood, residents have constructed a moral economy anchored in reproductive heterosexuality. We draw upon ethnographic data to show how sexual minorities live their lives vicariously in spaces they have prised open within the extant sex/gender binary. They are able to assert the identities of moffie and man-vrou (mannish woman) without threatening the dominant ideology of heterosexuality.