How (In)Consistent is the Court of Justice in the Application of the Market Access Test?”

Invited panel speaker at a Jean Monnet Chair funded research workshop organised by the Europa Institute, School of Law, University of Edinburgh (9 December 2011), http://www.pol.ed.ac.uk/research_themes/index/jean_monnet_centre_of_excellence/principles_of_market_access_workshop

Considering Just-World Thinking in Counter-Terrorism Cases: Miscarriages of Justice in Northern Ireland

Recent literature has drawn a parallel between the discriminatory application of counterterrorism legislation to the Irish population in the United Kingdom during the Northern Ireland conflict and the targeting of Muslims after September 2001. Less attention has been paid to lessons that can be drawn from judicial decision making in terrorism-related cases stemming from the Northern Ireland conflict. This Article examines Northern Ireland Court of Appeal (“NICA”) jurisprudence on miscarriages of justice in cases regarding counterterrorism offenses. In particular, the Article focuses on cases referred after the 1998 peace agreements in Northern Ireland from the Criminal Cases Review Commission (“CCRC”), a relatively new entity that investigates potential wrongful convictions in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Although the NICA’s human rights jurisprudence has developed significantly in recent years, the study of CCRC-referred cases finds that judges have retained confidence in the integrity of the conflict-era counterterrorism system even while acknowledging abuses and procedural irregularities that occurred. This study partially contradicts contentions that judicial deference to the executive recedes in a post-conflict or post-emergency period. Despite a high rate of quashed convictions, the NICA’s decisions suggest that it seeks to limit a large number of referrals and demonstrate a judicial predisposition to defend the justness of the past system’s laws and procedure. This perspective is consistent with what social psychologists have studied as “just-world thinking,” in which objective observers, although motivated by a concern with justice, believe—as a result of cognitive bias—that individuals “got what they deserved.” The Article considers other potential interpretations of the jurisprudence and contends that conservative decision making is particularly dangerous in the politicized realm of counterterrorism and in light of the criminalization of members of suspect communities.

Using Comparative Reasoning in Human Rights Adjudication:The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights Compared

This article examines the relationship between the methods that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) use to decide disputes that involve ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights claims, and the substantive outcomes that result from the use of these particular methods. It has a limited aim: in attempting to understand the interrelationship between human rights methodology and human rights outcomes, it considers primarily the use of ‘comparative reasoning’ in ‘human’ and ‘fundamental’ rights claims by these courts. It is not primarily concerned with examining the extent to which the use of comparative reasoning is based on an appropriate methodology or whether there is a persuasive normative theory underpinning the use of comparative reasoning. The issues considered in this chapter do some of the groundwork, however, that is necessary in order to address these methodological and normative questions.

Digital evidence as a means of proof before the International Court of Justice

This article discusses the use of digital evidence as a means of proof before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The absence of specific Court rules and procedures for digital evidence (with the exception of Practice Direction IX bis) is not necessarily an obstacle to its production and evaluation before the ICJ, as the general evidentiary rules can also be applied to digital evidence. The article first looks at the rules on the production of documentary evidence and then examines the specific issues related to audiovisual evidence. Finally, it examines the admissibility of digital evidence unlawfully obtained by a litigant through unilateral transborder access to data. The article concludes that, even if specific regulation may be needed as to the specific way in which authenticity and accuracy of digital evidence are to be established, the particular facts of the case and the grounds of challenge can vary widely, and it is doubtful that any regulation could be sufficiently flexible to deal with this in advance.