Identity fraud and torrens - minimising the risks and allocating the loss to achieve a sustainable system

Immediate indefeasibility is the cornerstone of the Torrens system of land registration. However, when combined with the apparent ease in which forged mortgages become registered, the operation of this doctrine can come into question. This article seeks to argue that, rather than question indefeasibility, the focus should be on the verification of identity of parties to land transactions. Whilst no system can ever be infallible, it is suggested that by correctly imposing the responsibility for identity verification on the appropriate individual, the Torrens system can retain immediate indefeasibility as its paramount principle, yet achieve the optimum level of fairness in terms of allocation of responsibility and loss. With the dawn of a new era of electronic conveyancing about to begin, the framework suggested here provides a model for minimising the risks of forged mortgages and appropriately allocating the loss.

'Attaching' warning statements by facsimile consumer protection prevails!

Section 366 of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) (‘PAMDA’) mandates that all contracts for the sale of residential property in Queensland (other than contracts formed on a sale by auction) have a warning statement ‘attached’ as the first or top sheet. Alternative judicial views have emerged concerning the possibility of attaching a warning statement to a contract sent by facsimile. In recognition of the consumer protection nature of the legislation, in MP Management (Aust) Pty Ltd v Churven [2002] QSC 320 Muir J favoured a restrictive view of the word ‘attached’ requiring physical joinder of the warning statement to the relevant contract. In contrast, in MNM Developments Pty Ltd v Gerrard [2005] QDC 10 Newton DCJ opined that the requirements of the PAMDA could be met where the warning statement preceded the contract of sale in a facsimile transmission sent in one continuous stream. Newton DCJ considered that this broader approach promoted commercial convenience. In an appeal from the decision of Newton DCJ, in MNM Developments Pty Ltd v Gerrard [2005] QCA 230 a majority of the Queensland Court of Appeal has held that the restrictive view propounded by Muir J is correct. Notwithstanding possible commercial inconvenience, it is not possible for a warning statement to be attached to a contract sent by facsimile.

Differentially private stochastic gradient descent algorithm for multiparty classification

We consider the problem of developing privacy-preserving machine learning algorithms in a dis-tributed multiparty setting. Here different parties own different parts of a data set, and the goal is to learn a classifier from the entire data set with-out any party revealing any information about the individual data points it owns. Pathak et al [7]recently proposed a solution to this problem in which each party learns a local classifier from its own data, and a third party then aggregates these classifiers in a privacy-preserving manner using a cryptographic scheme. The generaliza-tion performance of their algorithm is sensitive to the number of parties and the relative frac-tions of data owned by the different parties. In this paper, we describe a new differentially pri-vate algorithm for the multiparty setting that uses a stochastic gradient descent based procedure to directly optimize the overall multiparty ob-jective rather than combining classifiers learned from optimizing local objectives. The algorithm achieves a slightly weaker form of differential privacy than that of [7], but provides improved generalization guarantees that do not depend on the number of parties or the relative sizes of the individual data sets. Experimental results corrob-orate our theoretical findings.

Anonymous Authentication with Shared Secrets

Anonymity and authenticity are both important yet often conflicting security goals in a wide range of applications. On the one hand for many applications (say for access control) it is crucial to be able to verify the identity of a given legitimate party (a.k.a. entity authentication). Alternatively an application might require that no one but a party can communicate on its behalf (a.k.a. message authentication). Yet, on the other hand privacy concerns also dictate that anonymity of a legitimate party should be preserved; that is no information concerning the identity of parties should be leaked to an outside entity eavesdropping on the communication. This conflict becomes even more acute when considering anonymity with respect to an active entity that may attempt to impersonate other parties in the system. In this work we resolve this conflict in two steps. First we formalize what it means for a system to provide both authenticity and anonymity even in the presence of an active man-in-the-middle adversary for various specific applications such as message and entity authentication using the constructive cryptography framework of Mau11, MR11]. Our approach inherits the composability statement of constructive cryptography and can therefore be directly used in any higher-level context. Next we demonstrate several simple protocols for realizing these systems, at times relying on a new type of (probabilistic) Message Authentication Code (MAC) called key indistinguishable (KI) MACs. Similar to the key hiding encryption schemes of BBDP01] they guarantee that tags leak no discernible information about the keys used to generate them.

A ascenção do Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira e a construção de uma nova hegemonia (1988-1998)

Em um contexto de democratização, os partidos políticos adquirem papel importante para a obtenção e a manutenção do poder. Através do seu estudo, podermos analisar uma parte da História desse período. Os partidos políticos nos fornecem informações sobre os grupos que se esforçaram por reunir pessoas tendo em vista uma ação comum sobre o poder ou a organização da sociedade. Nesse sentido, a tese busca estudar a formação e ascensão ao poder do Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB). Criada em junho de 1988, a sigla cinco anos depois conseguiria eleger o presidente da República. A tese examina as origens do partido, articulando-as às contradições e conflitos internos do Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB). Em seguida, acompanha o processo de formação da nova agremiação política, sem perder de vista as rivalidades internas e externas, que permearam a sua organização. Aborda, ainda, as alianças e disputas que redundaram na vitória eleitoral do seu candidato à presidência, em 1994, Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

Client-ship and Citizenship in Latin America

Taylor, L. (2004). Client-ship and Citizenship in Latin America. Bulletin of Latin American Research. 23(2), pp.213-227. RAE2008

The Justice Gap in Global Forest Governance

Claims of injustice in global forest governance are prolific: assertions of colonization, marginalization and disenfranchisement of forest-dependent people, and privatization of common resources are some of the most severe allegations of injustice resulting from globally-driven forest conservation initiatives. At its core, the debate over the future of the world's forests is fraught with ethical concerns. Policy makers are not only deciding how forests should be governed, but also who will be winners, losers, and who should have a voice in the decision-making processes. For 30 years, policy makers have sought to redress the concerns of the world's 1.6 billion forest-dependent poor by introducing rights-based and participatory approaches to conservation. Despite these efforts, however, claims of injustice persist. This research examines possible explanations for continued claims of injustice by asking: What are the barriers to delivering justice to forest-dependent communities? Using data collected through surveys, interviews, and collaborative event ethnography in Laos and at the Tenth Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, this dissertation examines the pursuit of justice in global forest governance across multiple scales of governance. The findings reveal that particular conceptualizations of justice have become a central part of the metanormative fabric of global environmental governance, inhibiting institutional evolution and therewith perpetuating the justice gap in global forest governance.

Issue salience in regional and national party manifestoes in the UK

The study reveals the salience of particular issues in the manifestos of the main British parties for the 1997 and 2003 UK general elections, as well as the 2003 Scottish and Welsh elections, using the method introduced by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and a modified list of issue categories to reflect the division of government competences between the central and regional governments. Ideological and social base of a party, as well as the delimitation of government competences, are found to be important determinants of issue salience. A more consensual institutional design of the regional government in Scotland and Wales seems to have conditioned larger differences among the issue profiles of parties competing in regional elections, in comparison with general elections. With the institutionalisation of devolution, however, we observe an increase in the similarity of the issue profiles of the same parties in general and in Scottish and Welsh elections, as well as among different parties competing in the same regional elections. © 2005 Taylor & Francis.

Increasingly ‘Irrational’ Party Systems: Evidence that There Are Increasingly More Than Two at the District level

Recent work has noted an increase in the number of parties at the national level in both proportional and majoritarian electoral systems. While the conventional wisdom maintains that the incentives provided by the electoral system will prevent the number of parties at the district level from exceeding two in majoritarian systems, the evidence presented here demonstrates otherwise. I argue that this has occurred because the number of cleavages articulated by parties has increased as several third parties have begun articulating cleavages that are not well represented by the two larger parties.

What’s information got to do with it? Third-party voting in plurality systems

Although strategic voting theory predicts that the number of parties will not exceed two in single-member district plurality systems, the observed number of parties often does. Previous research suggests that the reason why people vote for third parties is that they possess inaccurate information about the parties’ relative chances of winning. However, research has yet to determine whether third-party voting persists under conditions of accurate information. In this article, we examine whether possessing accurate information prevents individuals from voting for third-placed parties in the 2005 and 2010 British elections. We find that possessing accurate information does not prevent most individuals from voting for third-placed parties and that many voters possess reasonably accurate information regarding the viability of the parties in their constituencies. These findings suggest that arguments emphasizing levels of voter information as a major explanation for why multiparty systems often emerge in plurality systems are exaggerated.

Green prospects in Greece

The radical left-wing Syriza and the Green party Ecologists Greens/Oikologoi Prasinoi (EG) have been seen as representatives of the left-libertarian/new politics party families in Greece. These type of parties are marked by a commitment to new politics issues such as gender and racial equality, peace and ecology. In countries where two party formations of this kind are in competition to attract a very similar clientele and one of them is electorally significant, it is unlikely for the other to achieve autonomous electoral success. This is a well-known fact that has penetrated discussions on the strategic orientation of both parties since their first electoral participation in 2004 (only European parliament elections for EG).

Electoral Systems, Ethnic Cleavages, and Experience with Democracy

Recent studies show the effects of electoral systems and ethnic cleavages on the number of parties in emerging democracies differ from those effects observed in more established democracies. Building on recent arguments maintaining the quality of democracy improves with experience, we argue the reason for the differences in the findings between established and emerging democracies is that the effects of these variables on the number of parties differ according to a country’s experience with elections. To test this argument, we analyse party system fragmentation in 89 established and emerging democracies and the conditioning effects experience with elections have on the effects of district magnitude, ethnic cleavages, and variables relating to the presidential party system. The results show the effects of institutional and social cleavage variables differ substantially between emerging and established democracies, but these effects begin to approximate those seen in more established democracies with additional experience with elections.

Potentially Voting across the Divide in Deeply Divided Places: Ethnic Catch-All Voting in Consociational Northern Ireland

I elaborate a model of cross-bloc party support in deeply divided places. The model expects that the variation in the level of electoral support that citizens in Community A have for parties in Community B is a function of citizens' evaluations of the relative ability of parties in Community B to represent the interests of all communities. This 'ethnic catch-all' model of cross-bloc party support is tested in the context of consociational Northern Ireland, using data from a representative survey conducted directly after the 2010 Westminster general election. The findings are asymmetric: the model explains Protestant support for nationalist parties but not Catholic support for unionist parties. The findings, and their implications, are discussed.

Not all social cleavages are the same: On the relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation

Most studies examining the relationship between social cleavages and party system fragmentation maintain that higher levels of social diversity lead to greater party system fragmentation. However, most aggregate-level studies focus on one type of social cleavage:ethnic diversity. In order to develop a better understanding of how different cleavages impact electoral competition, this paper considers another type of social cleavage: religious diversity.Contrary to previous literature, higher levels of religious diversity provide incentives for cross-religious cooperation, which in turn reduces party system fragmentation. Using a cross national data set of elections from 1946-2011, the results show that, in contrast to most studies examining the effects of social cleavage diversity on the number of parties, higher religious diversity is associated with lower levels of party system fragmentation.

Novos dilemas, velhas soluções? - patronagem e governos partidários

A patronagem tem sido considerada uma importante dimensão do modelo de governos partidários. Contudo, a concepção convencional da utilização da patronagem remete para a distribuição de cargos na administração pública a ocorrer para efeitos de recompensa por serviços prestados ao partido no governo, ou como mecanismo de compensação relativamente à incapacidade do partido no governo de converter as preferências em políticas públicas. Esta perspectiva não é inteiramente satisfatória. A crescente complexificação e fragmentação dos processos de governação, juntamente com o poder das estruturas administrativas no processo de políticas públicas parece impelir os governos partidários a procurarem novas formas de controlar a máquina administrativa do Estado. Através do controlo político da administração, os partidos no governo procuram obter uma máquina administrativa responsiva e accountable, o que pode ter consequências para a prossecução dos objectivos de controlo de políticas públicas dos partidos no governo. Deste modo, a patronagem – definida como a distribuição de cargos na cúpula dirigente da administração pública e semi-pública – pode converter-se num recurso chave para os partidos ao nível do controlo do processo de políticas públicas, permitindo-lhes assegurar um papel na governação democrática moderna. Este estudo permite confirmar, em primeiro lugar, a incapacidade de, durante o período democrático, institucionalizar mecanismos legais que possam promover a profissionalização da administração pública. Tal decorre da acentuada tendência para a revisão do enquadramento legal, que acompanha a alternância partidária no governo, sem contudo, permitir configurar um quadro legal capaz de restringir a discricionariedade política formal sobre a máquina administrativa do Estado. Em segundo lugar Portugal surge, no contexto dos 19 países europeus analisados, entre os países com maior amplitude na discricionariedade política formal. Tal como os seus congéneres do Sul da Europa, Portugal tem sido considerado como um país onde a patronagem pode penetrar os níveis hierárquicos mais baixos, motivada por questões de recompensa partidária. Esta narrativa negligencia, contudo, as consideráveis diferenças que existem entre níveis hierárquico, ignorando as diferentes motivações para a patronagem. Além disso, a perspectiva de políticos, dirigentes e outros observadores, sugere que a utilização efectiva dos mecanismos de controlo ex ante é limitada em Portugal, quando comparado com outras democracias europeias, apontando para o limitado poder explicativo da legislação em relação ao recurso à patronagem. Esta investigação pretende, assim, reanalisar a narrativa relativa à influência partidária e ao papel da patronagem para os governos partidários em Portugal. Desta forma, o estudo da importância da patronagem para os governos partidários foi baseado na análise dos padrões de patronagem em Portugal, através da análise empírica de 10482 nomeações para a cúpula da estrutura dirigente. Esta análise quantitativa foi complementada por entrevistas a 51 dirigentes, ministros e observadores privilegiados, que especificam a operacionalização da patronagem e as estratégias utilizadas pelos partidos políticos. A análise destas duas fontes permitiu confirmar, em primeiro lugar, a existência de influências partidárias nas nomeações para a cúpula dirigente. Em segundo lugar, este estudo permite confirmar a coexistência das duas motivações da patronagem. Com efeito, a lógica das nomeações enquanto recompensa pode subsistir, ao mesmo tempo que tende a emergir um valor instrumental das nomeações, com estas a serem utilizadas (também) para reforçar o controlo político e reduzir os riscos associados ao processo de delegação. Contudo, as diferentes motivações da patronagem podem variar consoante o nível hierárquico e a fase do ciclo governativo. Enquanto instrumento de poder, a patronagem pode ser identificada nos níveis hierárquicos mais elevados. Pelo contrário, as motivações de recompensa emergem nas posições hierárquicas mais baixas, menos sujeitas ao controlo dos partidos da oposição e dos eleitores. A patronagem de poder tende, ainda, a ser mais saliente nas etapas iniciais dos mandatos governativos, com as motivações de recompensa a poderem ser identificadas no final dos mandatos. Em terceiro lugar, os resultados sugerem que a utilização da patronagem depende da competição partidária, com a acção fiscalizadora dos partidos da oposição a poder limitar as nomeações para cargos na cúpula da estrutura administrativa sem, contudo, poder impedir as nomeações para os níveis hierárquicos menos visíveis (estruturas intermédias, serviços periféricos e gabinetes ministeriais). Em quarto lugar, a politização estrutural emerge como uma estratégia que permite aos governos partidários contornarem a indiferença da administração pública face a novas prioridades políticas, ao mesmo tempo que parece emergir como um instrumento que permite legitimar as opções políticas dos governos partidários ou adiar decisões nas áreas sectoriais menos importantes para os governos partidários. De uma forma geral, os governos partidários parecem recorrer a velhos instrumentos como a patronagem, com uma solução para os novos dilemas que se colocam ao controlo partidário do processo de políticas públicas.