Rebellion, repression and welfare

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society.

Seguridad democrática, presencia de la policía y conflicto en Colombia

Este artículo evalúa uno de los componentes fundamentales de la política más icónica del gobierno de Álvaro Uribe: la ´ Seguridad Democrática. En particular, se evalúa el impacto sobre la intensidad del conflicto armado de los despliegues y refuerzos de policía en municipios con poca o nula presencia policial antes de agosto de 2002. Para ello se utiliza el estimador de diferencia en diferencias que compara el cambio en la dinámica del conflicto una vez se asignan los nuevos efectivos a los municipios receptores, relativo al cambio ocurrido simultáneamente en los municipios no receptores. Nuestros resultados sugieren que tanto los despliegues (instauración de inspecciones de policía en municipios que carecían de ´estas) como los refuerzos (envío de nuevos efectivos a municipios con poca presencia policial previa) generan incrementos en el número de ataques guerrilleros. Por otro lado, también hay evidencia que en los casos en los que la asignación de efectivos policiales estuvo acompañada de la movilización de tropas del ejército el conflicto disminuyó en las áreas afectadas, lo que sugiere que la coordinación de las fuerzas armadas resulta clave para el éxito de iniciativas regionales de seguridad.

Sunlight disinfects? Free media in weak democracies

Free media may not favor political accountability when other democratic institutions are weak, and may even bring undesirable unintended consequences. We propose a simple model in which politicians running for office may engage in coercion to obtain votes. A media scandal that exposes these candidates increases their coercion effort to offset the negative popularity shock. This may result in the tainted politicians actually increasing their vote share. We provide empirical evidence from one recent episode in the political history of Colombia, the ‘parapolitics’ scandal featuring politicians colluding with illegal armed paramilitary groups to obtain votes. We show that colluding candidates not only get more votes than their clean competitors, but also concentrate them in areas where coercion is more likely (namely, areas with more paramilitary presence, less state presence, and more judicial inefficiency). Harder to reconcile with other explanations and as a direct test of the effects of media exposure, we compare tainted candidates exposed before elections to those exposed after. We find that those exposed before elections get as many votes as those exposed once elected, but their electoral support is more strongly concentrated in places where coercion is more likely. Our re

The environmental impact of civil conflict : the deforestation effect of paramilitary expansion in Colombia

Despite a growing body of literature on how environmental degradation can fuel civil war, the reverse effect, namely that of conflict on environmental outcomes, is relatively understudied. From a theoretical point of view this effect is ambiguous, with some forces pointing to pressures for environmental degradation and some pointing in the opposite direction. Hence, the overall effect of conflict on the environment is an empirical question. We study this relationship in the case of Colombia. We combine a detailed satellite-based longitudinal dataset on forest cover across municipalities over the period 1990-2010 with a comprehensive panel of conflict-related violent actions by paramilitary militias. We first provide evidence that paramilitary activity significantly reduces the share of forest cover in a panel specification that includes municipal and time fixed effects. Then we confirm these findings by taking advantage of a quasi-experiment that provides us with an exogenous source of variation for the expansion of the paramilitary. Using the distance to the region of Urab´a, the epicenter of such expansion, we instrument paramilitary activity in each cross-section for which data on forest cover is available. As a falsification exercise, we show that the instrument ceases to be relevant after the paramilitaries largely demobilized following peace negotiations with the government. Further, after the demobilization the deforestation effect of the paramilitaries disappears. We explore a number of potential mechanisms that may explain the conflict-driven deforestation, and show evidence suggesting that paramilitary violence generates large outflows of people in order to secure areas for growing illegal crops, exploit mineral resources, and engage in extensive agriculture. In turn, these activities are associated with deforestation.

The persistent colombian conflict bubnational analysis of the duration of violence

The growing empirical literature on the analysis of civil war has recently included the study of conflict duration at the cross-country level. This paper presents, for the first time, a within-country analysis of the determinants of violence duration. I focus on the experience of the Colombian armed conflict. While the conflict has been active for about five decades, local violence ebbs and flows and areas experiencing continuous conflict coexist with places that have been able to resile and where violence is mostly absent. I examine a wide range of factors potentially associated with violence duration at the municipal level, including scale variables, geographical conditions, economic and social variables, institutions and state presence, inequality, government intervention, and victimization variables. I characterize a few variables robustly correlated with the persistence of localized conflict, both across specifications and using different econometric models of duration analysis.

The politics of resource booms

This paper develops a simple model to investigate how resource-driven economic booms shape the equilibrium political institutions of resource-rich societies and influence the likelihood of experiencing civil war. In our model a strong government apparatus favors property rights protection but also makes the state more powerful and hence may induce predatory autocratic regimes over democracy. We characterize the parameter space of each political outcome in terms of the type of the available natural resources. Economic booms based on resources that are privately exploited empower the citizens and tend to ease democratic transitions. In contrast, booms based on resources exploited by the state tend to favor more dictatorial regimes. Finally, economic booms based on resources that can be exploited either by the state or by private citizens incite preemptive actions by both parties that may result in civil war. We discuss the predictions of the model using historical and contemporary examples.

Violence and growth in colombia : a review of the quantitative literature

This is a critical review of the empirical literature on the relationship between violence and economic growth in Colombia: an interesting case study for social scientists studying violence, conflict, crime and development. We argue that, despite the rapid development of this literature and the increasing use of new techniques, there is still much room for research. After assessing the contribution of the most influential papers on the subject, we suggest directions for future research.

Beyond divide and rule : weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict

We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation’s natural resources to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents. Inter-group fighting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil conflict for his own profit, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specific heterogeneity.

Can SMS Technology Improve Low Take-up of Social Benefits?

Low take up of stigma-free social benefits is often blamed on information asymmetries or administrative barriers. There is limited evidence on which of these potential channels is more salient in which contexts. We designed and implemented a randomized controlled trial to assess the extent to which informational barriers are responsible for the prevalent low take-up of government benefits among Colombian conflict-driven internal refugees. We provide timely information on benefits eligibility via SMS to a random half of the displaced household that migrated to Bogot´a over a 6-month period. We show that improving information increases benefits’ take up. However, the effect is small and only true for certain type of benefits. Hence, consistent with previous experimental literature, the availability of timely information explains only part of the low-take up rates and the role of administrative barriers and bureaucratic processes should be tackled to increase the well-being of internal refugees in Colombia.

Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war

Why do some civil wars terminate soon, with victory of one party over the other? What determines if the winner is the incumbent or the rebel group? Why do other conáicts last longer? We propose a simple model in which the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it is able to recruit. This is in turn a function of the relative ëdistanceíbetween group leaderships and potential recruits. We emphasize the moral hazard problem of recruitment: Öghting is costly and risky so combatants have the incentive to defect from their task. They can also desert altogether and join the enemy. This incentive is stronger the farther away the Öghter is from the principal, since monitoring becomes increasingly costly. Bigger armies have more power but less monitoring capacity to prevent defection and desertion. This general framework allows a variety of interpretations of what type of proximity matters for building strong cohesive armies ranging from ethnic distance to geographic dispersion. Di§erent assumptions about the distribution of potential Öghters along the relevant dimension of conáict lead to di§erent equilibria. We characterize these, discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war, and illustrate with historical and contemporaneous case studies.

Does the unemployment benefit institution affect the productivity of workers? evidence from a field experiment

We investigate whether and how the type of unemployment benefit institution affects productivity. We designed a field experiment to compare workers’ productivity under a welfare system, where the unemployed receive an unconditional monetary transfer, with their productivity under a workfare system, where the transfer is received conditional on the unemployed spending some time on ancillary activities. First, we find that having an unemployment benefit institution, regardless of whether it makes transfers conditional or unconditional, increases workers’ productivity. Second, we find that productivity is higher under Welfare than under Workfare. Becoming unemployed under Welfare comes at the psychological cost of a drop in self-esteem, presumably due to the shame or stigma associated with receiving an unconditional unemployment benefit. We document the empirical relevance of precisely this channel. The differences we observe in productivity suggest that this psychological cost acts as an extra nonmonetary incentive for workers under Welfare to put a higher effort in their work.

Don't make war, make elections : Franchise extension and violence in XIXth-century Colombia

This paper studies the effect of strengthening democracy, as captured by an increase in voting rights, on the incidence of violent civil conflict in nineteenth-century Colombia. Empirically studying the relationship between democracy and conflict is challenging, not only because of conceptual problems in defining and measuring democracy, but also because political institutions and violence are jointly determined. We take advantage of an experiment of history to examine the impact of one simple, measurable dimension of democracy (the size of the franchise) on con- flict, while at the same time attempting to overcome the identification problem. In 1853, Colombia established universal male suffrage. Using a simple difference-indifferences specification at the municipal level, we find that municipalities where more voters were enfranchised relative to their population experienced fewer violent political battles while the reform was in effect. The results are robust to including a number of additional controls. Moreover, we investigate the potential mechanisms driving the results. In particular, we look at which components of the proportion of new voters in 1853 explain the results, and we examine if results are stronger in places with more political competition and state capacity. We interpret our findings as suggesting that violence in nineteenth-century Colombia was a technology for political elites to compete for the rents from power, and that democracy constituted an alternative way to compete which substituted violence.

El lado oscuro de la equidad: violencia y equidad en el desempeño escolar

La literatura empírica sobre el impacto de los conflictos violentos en variables educativas se ha enfocado en el impacto de la violencia sobre la acumulación de capital humano, dejando de lado otras variables relevantes como la equidad educativa. Usando la implementación empírica de Ferreira y Gignoux (2011) del marco conceptual de igualdad de oportunidades de Roemer (1998), este trabajo estima el impacto de la intensidad del conflicto armado sobre la equidad educativa en Colombia medida a través del desempeño escolar en las pruebas Saber 11 para el periodo 1997-2010. Para resolver sesgos potenciales por simultaneidad o por variable omitida se utilizan las capturas de homicidas por parte de la fuerza pública como fuente de variación exógena de la violencia en una estimación de variables instrumentales. Los resultados apuntan a que el conflicto aumenta la equidad de oportunidades en los logros educativos. Al aumentar las tasas de deserción escolar, el conflicto genera una selección positiva en términos de habilidad y esfuerzo para la fracción de estudiantes que el sistema retiene. Esto sugiere que hay que tener cautela al interpretar patrones de equidad en educación basada en resultados en lugar de procesos.

Empowering IDP with SMS: a randomized controlled trial in Bogotá

We carried out a randomized controlled trial in Bogotá, the recipient of Colombia´s highest number of internally displaced people (IDP), to assess whether the use of SMS to communicate eligibility to social benefits fosters the welfare of victimized internal refugees. Only a fraction of IDP are elegible to benefits. We inform eligibility via SMS to a random half of IDP-households who are, and estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect of the text message on the knowledge of the benefits available tothe displaced population. We show that while on the average treated households know their rights better than controls, a more disaggregate analysis suggest that there is variation of awareness across benefits. The intervention was overall successful in empowering IDP and the use of SMS should be widened as a social policy instrument. However our results suggest that text messages should be complemented with other communication strategies, yet to be evaluated.

Hitos del conflicto y riesgo país

Este trabajo estudia el efecto que tienen los hitos recientes del conflicto armado en el riesgo país de Colombia. Para este fin se utilizan las permutas de incumplimiento crediticio, más conocidas en el mundo de las finanzas por su nombre y sigla en inglés: Credit Default Swaps, CDS. Estos instrumentos financieros son en la práctica seguros de riesgo soberano y por lo tanto su precio refleja la percepción del mercado acerca de la probabilidad de repudio de la deuda soberana. El trabajo evalúa el componente no explicado del precio del CDS colombiano en los días posteriores a cada hito del conflicto armado, y lo contrasta con el componente no explicado de un precio contrafactual sintético, construido con base en los CDS de otros países de la región.