Occupational beryllium exposure: Reconciling federal policies, regulations and contractor implementation guides to protect worker health

Beryllium is a widely distributed, highly toxic metal. When beryllium particulates enter the body, the body's defense mechanisms are engaged. When the body's defenses cannot easily remove the particulates, then a damage and repair cycle is initiated. This cycle produces chronic beryllium disease (CBD), a progressive, fibrotic respiratory involvement which eventually suffocates exposed individuals. ^ Beryllium disease is an occupational disease, and as such it can be prevented by limiting exposures. In the 1940s journalists reported beryllium deaths at Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) facilities, the Department of Energy's (DOE) predecessor organization. These reports energized public pressure for exposure limits, and in 1949 AEC implemented a 2 μg/m3 permissible exposure limit (PEL). ^ The limits appeared to stop acute disease. In contrast, CBD has a long latency period between exposure and diagnosable disease, between one and thirty years. The lack of immediate adverse health consequences masked the seriousness of chronic disease and pragmatically removed CBD from AEC/DOE's political concern. ^ Presently the PEL for beryllium at DOE sites remains at 2 μg/m 3. This limit does not prevent CBD. This conclusion has long been known, although denied until recently. In 1999 DOE acknowledged the limit's ineffectiveness in its federal regulation governing beryllium exposure, 10 CFR 850. ^ Despite this admission, the PEL has not been reduced. The beryllium manufacturer and AEC/DOE have a history of exerting efforts to maintain and protect the status quo. Primary amongst these efforts has been creation and promotion of disinformation within peer reviewed health literature which discusses beryllium, exposures, health effects and treatment, and targeting graduate school students so that their perspective is shaped early. ^ Once indoctrinated with incorrect information, professionals tend to overlook aerosol and respiratory mechanics, immunologic and carcinogenic factors. They then apply tools and perspectives derived from the beryllium manufacturer and DOE's propaganda. Conclusions drawn are incorrect. The result is: health research and associated policy is conducted with incorrect premises. Effective disease management practices are not implemented. ^ Public health protection requires recognition of the disinformation and its implications. When disinformation is identified, then effective health policies and practices can be developed and implemented. ^

A New Collaboration Between Josep Lluís Sert and Joan Miró on Their Return to Spain: From the Republic Pavilion to Joan Miró Studio

Ponencia publicada en las Actas del Congreso Internacional de la EAHN (EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURAL HISTORY NETWORK), celebrado en Bruselas del 31 Mayo -3 Junio 2012.

Towards downscaling of aerosol gridded dataset for improving solar resource assessment, an application to Spain

Solar radiation estimates with clear sky models require estimations of aerosol data. The low spatial resolution of current aerosol datasets, with their remarkable drift from measured data, poses a problem in solar resource estimation. This paper proposes a new downscaling methodology by combining support vector machines for regression (SVR) and kriging with external drift, with data from the MACC reanalysis datasets and temperature and rainfall measurements from 213 meteorological stations in continental Spain. The SVR technique was proven efficient in aerosol variable modeling. The Linke turbidity factor (TL) and the aerosol optical depth at 550 nm (AOD 550) estimated with SVR generated significantly lower errors in AERONET positions than MACC reanalysis estimates. The TL was estimated with relative mean absolute error (rMAE) of 10.2% (compared with AERONET), against the MACC rMAE of 18.5%. A similar behavior was seen with AOD 550, estimated with rMAE of 8.6% (compared with AERONET), against the MACC rMAE of 65.6%. Kriging using MACC data as an external drift was found useful in generating high resolution maps (0.05° × 0.05°) of both aerosol variables. We created high resolution maps of aerosol variables in continental Spain for the year 2008. The proposed methodology was proven to be a valuable tool to create high resolution maps of aerosol variables (TL and AOD 550). This methodology shows meaningful improvements when compared with estimated available databases and therefore, leads to more accurate solar resource estimations. This methodology could also be applied to the prediction of other atmospheric variables, whose datasets are of low resolution.

Impact of economic crisis on mental health of migrant workers: what happened with migrants who came to Spain to work?

Objectives: To assess changes in mental health in a sample of migrant workers after the eruption of the economic crisis in Spain. Methods: 318 migrant workers were interviewed. Mental health, sociodemographic, and economic crisis related variables were obtained through face-to-face (2008) and phone (2011) interviews. Prevalence of poor mental health (PMH) was compared (2011–2008) and multivariate logistic regression models were fitted. Results: Change in prevalence of PMH was higher in men (aOR 4.63; 95 % CI 2.11–10.16). Subgroups of men showing the largest detrimental mental health effects were: unemployed, with low salaries (≤1,200 euros) and those reporting family burden. An increase of PMH was found in women, without significant associations. Conclusions: Mental health of migrant workers in Spain has worsened during the economic crisis.

Electricity without borders: a plan to make the internal market work. Bruegel Blueprint Series 20, 5 September 2013

The most straightforward European single energy market design would entail a European system operator regulated by a single European regulator. This would ensure the predictable development of rules for the entire EU, significantly reducing regulatory uncertainty for electricity sector investments. But such a first-best market design is unlikely to be politically realistic in the European context for three reasons. First, the necessary changes compared to the current situation are substantial and would produce significant redistributive effects. Second, a European solution would deprive member states of the ability to manage their energy systems nationally. And third, a single European solution might fall short of being well-tailored to consumers’ preferences, which differ substantially across the EU. To nevertheless reap significant benefits from an integrated European electricity market, we propose the following blueprint: First, we suggest adding a European system-management layer to complement national operation centres and help them to better exchange information about the status of the system, expected changes and planned modifications. The ultimate aim should be to transfer the day-to-day responsibility for the safe and economic operation of the system to the European control centre. To further increase efficiency, electricity prices should be allowed to differ between all network points between and within countries. This would enable throughput of electricity through national and international lines to be safely increased without any major investments in infrastructure. Second, to ensure the consistency of national network plans and to ensure that they contribute to providing the infrastructure for a functioning single market, the role of the European ten year network development plan (TYNDP) needs to be upgraded by obliging national regulators to only approve projects planned at European level unless they can prove that deviations are beneficial. This boosted role of the TYNDP would need to be underpinned by resolving the issues of conflicting interests and information asymmetry. Therefore, the network planning process should be opened to all affected stakeholders (generators, network owners and operators, consumers, residents and others) and enable the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to act as a welfare-maximising referee. An ultimate political decision by the European Parliament on the entire plan will open a negotiation process around selecting alternatives and agreeing compensation. This ensures that all stakeholders have an interest in guaranteeing a certain degree of balance of interest in the earlier stages. In fact, transparent planning, early stakeholder involvement and democratic legitimisation are well suited for minimising as much as possible local opposition to new lines. Third, sharing the cost of network investments in Europe is a critical issue. One reason is that so far even the most sophisticated models have been unable to identify the individual long-term net benefit in an uncertain environment. A workable compromise to finance new network investments would consist of three components: (i) all easily attributable cost should be levied on the responsible party; (ii) all network users that sit at nodes that are expected to receive more imports through a line extension should be obliged to pay a share of the line extension cost through their network charges; (iii) the rest of the cost is socialised to all consumers. Such a cost-distribution scheme will involve some intra-European redistribution from the well-developed countries (infrastructure-wise) to those that are catching up. However, such a scheme would perform this redistribution in a much more efficient way than the Connecting Europe Facility’s ad-hoc disbursements to politically chosen projects, because it would provide the infrastructure that is really needed.