Gazprom's expansion in the EU - co-operation or domination? OSW Report, April 2008

The energy sector, especially with regard to natural gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the character of this co-operation has given rise to increasing doubts both in Brussels and among the EU member states. The questions have emerged whether this co-operation does not make the EU excessively dependent on Russian energy supplies, and whether Gazprom's presence in the EU will not allow Moscow to interfere in the proces of devising the EU energy policy. This report is intended to present the factual base and data necessary to provide accurate answers to the foregoing questions. The first part of the report presents the scope and character of Gazprom's economic presence in the EU member states. The second part shows the presence of the EU investors in Russia. The data presented has been provided by the International Energy Agency, European Commission, the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. Some of the data is the result of calculations made by the Centre for Eastern Studies' experts who were basing on the data provided by energy companies, the specialist press and news agencies.

Gazprom's expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? OSW Report, October 2009

The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports (for the previous edition,see Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? April 2008 – pdf 1.2 MB) is to provide facts which will permit an accurat answer to these questions to be formulated.

Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? OSW Report, October 2009. Second edition, revised

Introduction. The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports (for the previous edition,see Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? April 2008 – pdf 1.2 MB) is to provide facts which will permit an accurat answer to these questions to be formulated. Over the course of last year, two new factors strongly affected Gazprom’s capability to operate on the EU market. One was the ongoing global economic crisis, which has depressed demand for gas both in Russia and in Europe. Gazprom has cut both its own production and the quantities of gas it purchases from the Central Asian states, and the decrease in export revenues has forced the company to modify some of its current investment plans. Less demand for gas and the need to reduce production are also having a positive impact – the Russian company is likely to avoid the difficulties in meeting all of its export commitments which, only a year or so ago, it was expected to experience. The other factor affecting Gazprom’s expansion in Europe is the observed radicalisation of the rhetoric and actions of both the company itself and of the Russian authorities with regard to the gas sector as broadly understood. The gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009, which resulted in a two-week interruption of gas supplies from Russia to Europe via Ukraine, was the most prominent example of this radicalisation. The hardening of rhetoric in the ongoing energy talks with the EU and other actors, and increased political and business activities designed to promote Russian gas interests in Europe, in particular the lobbying for the Nord Stream and South Stream projects, are further signs of this shift in tone. These issues raise the question of whether, and to what extent, the current condition of Gazprom’s finance will permit the company to implement the infrastructural projects it has been endorsing and its other investment plans in Europe. Another important question is whether the currently observed changes in how Gazprom operates will take on a more permanent character, and what consequences this will have for the European Union. The first part of this report discusses Gazprom’s production and export potential. The second comprehensively presents the scope and nature of Gazprom’s economic presence in the EU member states. Finally, the third part presents the Russian company’s methods of operation on foreign markets. The data presented in the report come mainly from the statistics of the International Energy Agency, the European Commission and Gazprom, as well as the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Statistical Office. The figures presented here also include proprietary calculations by the OSW based on figures disclosed by energy companies and reports by professional press and news agencies.

No other choice but co-operation. The background of Lithuania's and Latvia's relations with Belarus. OSW Commentary No. 99, 2013-01-04

For years now Belarus has been a key economic partner for Lithuania and Latvia. These two Baltic states have well-developed port infrastructure and thus provide what are the geographically closest and also the cheapest exit to international outlets for Belarusia’s petrochemical and chemical industries, both of which are export-oriented. As a result, the transit of Belarusian goods is one of the major sources of income for the state budgets of the two countries. This economic interdependence has affected the stance Riga and Vilnius take on Minsk at the EU forum. When in February and March 2012 the Council of the European Union was resolving the issue of imposing economic sanction on selected Belarusian companies which backed Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime, this triggered a discussion on what the point of such measures is and on possible economic losses in Lithuania and Latvia. As a result of firm resistance from Latvia (which was backed by Slovenia), the Council removed those companies which were most strongly engaged in co-operation with Latvian partners from the list of those to be covered with economic sanctions. Lithuania, which is more critical of the political situation in Belarus, did not express its official opposition to the sanctions. Despite some differences in the policies adopted by Riga and Vilnius, it turned out that Minsk could count on strong support from local business groups in both of these countries, as these groups fear impediments in this highly profitable co-operation and also retaliation from the Belarusian government. The existing economic bonds mean that neither Vilnius nor Riga have any other choice but to co-operate with Belarus. They must therefore adopt a carefully balanced policy towards Minsk. At the same time, being EU member states, they do not officially deny that a problem exists with the violation of human rights by Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime. It is for this reason that the governments of Latvia and Lithuania will be interested in maintaining the status quo in relations with Minsk. On the other hand, Belarus in a way also has no other choice but to use the ports in Lithuania and Latvia, and this will prevent it from excessively escalating tension in relations with these two countries.

Development co-operation made in Germany. OSW REPORT 2015-07-29

For years, development policy has attracted the attention of public opinion in Germany and been strongly supported by the public. It takes the form of an agreement between equal partners who draw mutual benefits from this co-operation. German development policy is structured to support the German economy. This policy and the state’s significant share in development projects reduces the investment risk incurred by German entrepreneurs who engage their assets in developing countries. Furthermore, bilateral co-operation successfully builds the made in Germany brand as regards both development policy and further economic co-operation, making the beneficiaries of development co-operation indirectly dependent on German goods and services. Development co-operation, along with diplomacy and defence policy, is the third pillar of German foreign policy. In this context it plays above all a preventive function in the case of international conflicts. Investing funds as part of development projects in areas affected by military conflicts or facing a high risk of military conflict is viewed by Germany as its contribution to overcoming crises or removing their causes. This goes hand in hand with the conviction that international conflicts, wherever they appear, adversely affect the German economy, which heavily relies on exports.

The Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, March 24-July 8, 1992 : a report /

Shipping list no.: 92-0664-P.

Monographs on agricultural co-operation in various countries.

Contents: v.1. Germany, Denmark, British India, France, Great Britain and Ireland, Norway, Holland, Russia, Sweden. --v.2. Argentine, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Switzerland.

Monographs on agricultural co-operation in various countries.

v 1. Germany. Belgium. Denmark. British India. France. Great Britain and Ireland. Norway. Holland. Russia. Sweden.- v. 2. Argentina. Austria. Kingdom of Hungary. Italy. Switzerland.

Towards an international approach for geography education

"Geography education is indispensable to the development of responsible and active citizens in the present and future world" is one of the main statements in the International Charter on Geographical Education. This charter was edited in 1992 by Haubrich, chair of the Commission on Geographical Education of the International Geographical Union (IGU). Twenty years later this statement is still true. Geography educators all over the world are looking for ways to talk with young people about their image of their world and to help them to develop their knowledge, skills and ideas about the complex world we live in. However, different ideas exist about what geography we should learn and teach and how. The Commission on Geographical Education of the International Geographical Union tries to help to improve the quality and position of geography education worldwide promoting the dissemination of good practices and research results in the field of geography education.

Learning challenges of NGOs in development : Co-operation of Finnish NGOs in Morogoro, Tanzania

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have gained an important role in development co-operation during the last two decades. The development funding channelled through NGOs has increased and the number of NGOs engaged in development activities, both North and South, has been growing. Supporting NGOs has been seen as one way to strengthen civil society in the South and to provide potential for enhancing more effective development than the state, and to exercise participatory development and partnership in their North-South relationships. This study focuses on learning in the co-operation practices of small Finnish NGOs in Morogoro, Tanzania. Drawing on the cultural-historical activity theory and the theory of expansive learning, in this study I understand learning as a qualitative change in the actual co-operation practices. The qualitative change, for its part, emerges out of attempts to deal with the contradictions in the present activity. I use the concept of developmental contradiction in exploring the co-operation of the small Finnish NGOs with their Tanzanian counterparts. Developmental contradiction connects learning to actual practice and its historical development. By history, in this study I refer to multiple developmental trajectories, such as trajectories of individual participants, organisations, co-operation practices and the institutional system in which the NGO-development co-operation is embedded. In the empirical chapters I explore the co-operation both in the development co-operation projects and in micro-level interaction between partners taking place within the projects. I analyse the perceptions of the Finnish participants about the different developmental trajectories, the tensions, inclusions and exclusions in the evolving object of co-operation in one project, the construction of power relations in project meetings in three projects, and the collision of explicated partnership with the emerging practice of trusteeship in one project. On the basis of the empirical analyses I elaborate four developmental contradictions and learning challenges for the co-operation. The developmental contradictions include: 1) implementing a ready-made Finnish project idea vs. taking the current activities of Tanzanian NGO as a starting point; 2) gaining experiences and cultural interaction vs. access to outside funding; 3) promoting the official tools of development co-operation in training vs. use of tools and procedures taken from the prior activities of both partners in actual practice; and 4) asymmetric relations between the partners vs. rhetoric of equal partnership. Consequently, on the basis of developmental contradictions four learning challenges are suggested: a shift from legitimation of Finnish ideas to negotiation, transcending the separate objects and finding a partly joint object, developing locally shared tools for the co-operation, and identification and reflection of the power relations in the practice of co-operation. Keywords: activity theory; expansive learning; NGO development co-operation; partnership; power

NORDEK : A Plan for Increased Nordic Economic Co-operation and Integration 1968-1970

For the first time the attempt of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to increase Nordic economic co-operation and integration (NORDEK 1968-1970) is analysed by using records from the four governments archives and interviews with central actors participating. A dominating argument has until now been that dynamics in Nordic economic integration is different from dynamics in European integration. This archive based study disproves the myth however of ideological Nordism and of short term political developments outside Norden as most important for the NORDEK initiative. The NORDEK initiative was actually more a consequence of a long term socioeconomic and socio-political path dependant process. The study also disproves the myth that the NORDEK plan was a political and ideological symbol without socioeconomic substance. The purpose with NORDEK was to create a better basis for generating economic growth and social welfare. The proposed NORDEK institutions were therefore developed to promote economic progress. The study finally shows that the NORDEK failure in 1970 was not a result of lacking economic rationale or incompatible economic interests. The failure was a result of a power struggle in Finnish domestic policy and lacking political will in the other Nordic countries to continue without Finland.