Energetic neutral atom imaging of the lunar surface

Since the Moon is not shielded by a global magnetic field or by an atmosphere, solar wind plasma impinges onto the lunar surface almost unhindered. Until recently, it was assumed that almost all of the impinging solar wind ions are absorbed by the surface. However, recent Interstellar Boundary Explorer, Chandrayaan-1, and Kaguya observations showed that the interaction process between the solar wind ions and the lunar surface is more complex than previously assumed. In contrast to previous assumptions, a large fraction of the impinging solar wind ions is backscattered as energetic neutral atoms. Using the complete Chandrayaan-1 Energetic Neutral Analyzer data set, we compute a global solar wind reflection ratio of 0.16 ± 0.05 from the lunar surface. Since these backscattered neutral particles are not affected by any electric or magnetic fields, each particle's point of origin on the lunar surface can be determined in a straight-forward manner allowing us to create energetic neutral atom maps of the lunar surface. The energetic neutral atom measurements recorded by the Chandrayaan-1 Energetic Neutral Analyzer cover ˜89% of the lunar surface, whereby the lunar farside is almost completely covered. We analyzed all available energetic neutral atom measurements recorded by the Chandrayaan-1 Energetic Neutral Analyzer to create the first global energetic neutral hydrogen maps of the lunar surface.

Proton entry into the near-lunar plasma wake for magnetic field aligned flow

We report the first observation of protons in the near-lunar (100-200 km from the surface) and deeper (near anti-subsolar point) plasma wake when the interplanetary magnetic field (IMF) and solar wind velocity (vsw) are parallel (aligned flow; angle between IMF and vsw≤10°). More than 98% of the observations during aligned flow condition showed the presence of protons in the wake. These observations are obtained by the Solar Wind Monitor sensor of the Sub-keV Atom Reflecting Analyser experiment on Chandrayaan-1. The observation cannot be explained by the conventional fluid models for aligned flow. Back tracing of the observed protons suggests that their source is the solar wind. The larger gyroradii of the wake protons compared to that of solar wind suggest that they were part of the tail of the solar wind velocity distribution function. Such protons could enter the wake due to their large gyroradii even when the flow is aligned to IMF. However, the wake boundary electric field may also play a role in the entry of the protons into the wake.

First direct observation of sputtered lunar oxygen

We present the first direct measurement of neutral oxygen in the lunar exosphere, detected by the Chandrayaan-1 Energetic Neutral Analyzer (CENA). With the lunar surface consisting of about 60% of oxygen in number, the neutral oxygen detected in CENA's energy range (11 eV−3.3 keV) is attributed to have originated from the lunar surface, where it was released through solar wind ion sputtering. Fitting of CENA's mass spectra with calibration spectra from ground and in-flight data resulted in the detection of a robust oxygen signal, with a flux of 0.2 to 0.4 times the flux of backscattered hydrogen, depending on the solar wind helium content and particle velocity. For the two solar wind types observed, we derive subsolar surface oxygen atom densities of N0= (1.1 ± 0.3) · 107m−3 and (1.4 ± 0.4) · 107m−3, respectively, which agree well with earlier model predictions and measured upper limits. From these surface densities, we derive column densities of NC= (1.5 ± 0.5) · 1013 m−2and (1.6 ± 0.5) · 1013 m−2. In addition, we identified for the first time a helium component. This helium is attributed to backscattering of solar wind helium (alpha particles) from the lunar surface as neutral energetic helium atoms, which has also been observed for the first time. This identification is supported by the characteristic energy of the measured helium atoms, which is roughly 4 times the energy of reflected solar wind hydrogen, and the correlation with solar wind helium content.

Corporate aging and investment decisions

Paper I: Corporate aging and internal resource allocation Abstract Various observers argue that established firms are at a disadvantage in pursuing new growth opportunities. In this paper, we provide systematic evidence that established firms allocate fewer resources to high-growth lines of business. However, we find no evidence of inefficient resource allocation in established firms. Redirecting resources from high-growth to low-growth lines of business does not result in lower profitability. Also, resource allocation towards new growth opportunities does not increase when managers of established firms are exposed to takeover and product market threats. Rather, it seems that conservative resource allocation strategies are driven by pressures to meet investors’ expectations. Our empirical evidence, thus, favors the hypothesis that established firms wisely choose to allocate fewer resources to new growth opportunities as external pressures force them to focus on efficiency rather than novelty (Holmström 1989). Paper II: Corporate aging and asset sales Abstract This paper asks whether divestitures are motivated by strategic considerations about the scope of the firm’s activities. Limited managerial capacity implies that exploiting core competences becomes comparatively more attractive than exploring new growth opportunities as firms mature. Divestitures help stablished firms free management time and increase the focus on core competences. The testable implication of this attention hypothesis is that established firms are the main sellers of assets, that their divestiture activity increases when managerial capacity is scarcer, that they sell non-core activities, and that they return the divestiture proceeds to the providers of capital instead of reinvesting them in the firm. We find strong empirical support for these predictions. Paper III: Corporate aging and lobbying expenditures Abstract Creative destruction forces constantly challenge established firms, especially in competitive markets. This paper asks whether corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms to counteract the decline in rents over time. We find a statistically and economically significant positive relation between firm age and lobbying expenditures. Moreover, the documented age-effect is weaker when firms have unique products or operate in concentrated product markets. To address endogeneity, we use industry distress as an exogenous nonlegislative shock to future rents and show that established firms are relatively more likely to lobby when in distress. Finally, we provide empirical evidence that corporate lobbying efforts by established firms forestall the creative destruction process. In sum, our findings suggest that corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms to retain profitability in competitive environments.

Samlade vitterhesarbeten af svenska författare från Stjernhjelm till Dalin /

v.1--G. Stjernhjelm, G. Rosenhane, och J. Columbus. v.2--Thomas, Urban, Carl Urban, Johan och Erland Fredrik Hjärne. v.4--P. Lagerlöf, E. Lindschöld, Edmund, Nils och Carl Gripenhjelm, J. G. Werwing och J. T. Geisler. v.5--Wollimhaus-Gyllenborg. v.6--G. Eurelius, C. Leyoncrona I. Holmstrm̈, J. Paulinus och O. Wexionius. v.7--Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie, Jacob Arrhenius, Israel Kolmodin, Gustaf Ollon, Jacob Boëthius och Peter Brask. v.8--Märta Berendes, Ebba Marie och Joh. Eleonora de la Gardie, Amalia Wilh. och Maria Aurora von Königsmark, Thorsten Rudeen samt Carl och Ulrik Rudenschöld. v.9--Sven Dalius. Lars Wivallius och Johan Gabriel von Beyer. v.10--Lasse Johanson (Lucidor den Olycklige) och Nils Keder. v.11--En svensk fånge i Simbirsk, And. Rydelius, Harald Oxe, Germund, Carl Gustaf och Carl Wilhelm Cederhjelm. v.12--Olaf Rudbeck, (Far och sön) Erik Wennaesius, Carl Arosell, och Henrik Georg von Brobergen. v.13--Andreas Wallenius, Johan Vultejus, Christ. Tiburtius, Ernst Gestrinius, Michael Renner, Jonas Hjortzberg, och Peter Warnmark. v.15--J. Svedberg, H. Ausius, A. Amnelius, N. Tiällman, J. Schmedeman, P. Törnevall, och C. Eldh. v.16--Samuel Westhius, Gabr. Tuderus, W. von Rosenfeldt, Lars Stjerneld, Didr. Granatenflycht, Daniel Achrelius, Johan Risell, Lars Salvius, och Olof Carelius. v.17--Sophia Elisabeth Brenner. v.19--Johan Göstaf Hallman, Gustaf Palmfelt, och Carl Johan Lohman. v.22--Samuel Petri Brask, Magnus Stenbock, Jacob Fabricius.

State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing

This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the parameters.