Learning business strategies for competitive electronic marketplaces

This paper presents a Multi-Agent Market simulator designed for developing new agent market strategies based on a complete understanding of buyer and seller behaviors, preference models and pricing algorithms, considering user risk preferences and game theory for scenario analysis. This tool studies negotiations based on different market mechanisms and, time and behavior dependent strategies. The results of the negotiations between agents are analyzed by data mining algorithms in order to extract rules that give agents feedback to improve their strategies. The system also includes agents that are capable of improving their performance with their own experience, by adapting to the market conditions, and capable of considering other agent reactions.

Virtual power producers market strategies

This paper presents MASCEM - a multi-agent based electricity market simulator. MASCEM uses game theory, machine learning techniques, scenario analysis and optimisation techniques to model market agents and to provide them with decision-support. This paper mainly focus on the MASCEM ability to provide the means to model and simulate Virtual Power Producers (VPP). VPPs are represented as a coalition of agents, with specific characteristics and goals. The paper detail some of the most important aspects considered in VPP formation and in the aggregation of new producers and includes a case study.

Coalition of distributed generation units to Virtual Power Players - a game theory approach

Smart Grids (SGs) have emerged as the new paradigm for power system operation and management, being designed to include large amounts of distributed energy resources. This new paradigm requires new Energy Resource Management (ERM) methodologies considering different operation strategies and the existence of new management players such as several types of aggregators. This paper proposes a methodology to facilitate the coalition between distributed generation units originating Virtual Power Players (VPP) considering a game theory approach. The proposed approach consists in the analysis of the classifications that were attributed by each VPP to the distributed generation units, as well as in the analysis of the previous established contracts by each player. The proposed classification model is based in fourteen parameters including technical, economical and behavioural ones. Depending of the VPP strategies, size and goals, each parameter has different importance. VPP can also manage other type of energy resources, like storage units, electric vehicles, demand response programs or even parts of the MV and LV distribution network. A case study with twelve VPPs with different characteristics and one hundred and fifty real distributed generation units is included in the paper.

Three essays on game theory and bargaining

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

The Family Game: A Parent Education Intervention to Increase Positive Parent-Child Interactions in Parents with Learning Difficulties

Children of parents with learning difficulties (LD) are at risk for a variety of developmental problems including behavioural and psychiatric disorders. However, there are no empirically supported programs to prevent behavioural and psychiatric problems in these children. The purpose of the study was to test the effectiveness of a parenting intervention designed to teach parents with learning difficulties positive child behaviour management strategies. A multiple baseline across skills design was used with two parents, who were taught three skills: 1) clear instructions, 2) recognition of compliance and 3) correction of noncompliance. Training scores improved on each skill and maintained at a 1-month follow-up. Scores on generalization cards were high and showed maintenance, but improvements in parenting skills in the naturalistic environment were low at posttest and follow-up. Increases were seen in child compliance at posttest and 1-month follow-up. Results of pre-post social validity measures were also generally positive.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach

We study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the other agent (Sertel, 1992), and explain under which conditions a system of pre-donations can facilitate a truce. We find that for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that, the best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. However, in many cases there are no sufficient conditions for the scheme or pre-donations to be effective. We also analyze some limitations of this framework and extend the model in order to deal with some of these flaws. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results we briefly describe some of the circumstances that characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and different illegal groups.

Find the difference! : eye tracking study on information seeking behavior using an online game

With the advent of digital era web applications have become inevitable part of our lives. We are using the web to manage even the financially or ethically sensitive issues. For this reason exploration of information seeking behavior is an exciting area of research. Current study provides insight on information seeking behavior using a classic ‘Find the Difference’ game. 50 university students between the age of 19 and 26 participated in the study. Eye movement data were recorded with a Tobii T120 device. Participants carried out 4 continuous tasks. Each task included two pictures side by side with 7 hidden differences. After finishing the tasks, participants were asked to repeat the game with the same picture set. This data collection methodology allows the evaluation of learning curves. Additionally, participants were asked about their hand preference. For the purpose of analysis the following metrics were applied: task times (including saccades), fixation count and fixation duration (without saccades). The right- and left-hand side on each picture was selected as AOI (Area of Interest) to detect side preference in connection with hand preference. Results suggest a significant difference between male and female participants regarding aggregated task times (male 58.37s respectively female 68.37s), deviation in the number of fixations and fixation duration (apparently female have less but longer fixations) and also in the distribution of fixations between AOIs. Using eyetracking data current paper highlights the similarities and differences in information acquisition strategies respectively reveals gender and education (Arts vs. Sciences) dependent characteristics of interaction.

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

Winning the Accreditation Game: The Library as Key Player and Hidden Gold Mine

Libraries are a central hub of information resources supporting college and university curricula. Several library strategies, cross-campus collaborations, and philosophical considerations of electronic and print offerings led to successful accreditations in business and engineering programs.

Um modelo fuzzy-dea-game para estratégias de produção sob incerteza

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Imaginary irishness: the feminine in dramatisations of the Paster Rising in Sean O’Casey’s the plough and the stars and Tom Murphy’s The Patriot Game

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Winning On for the Gipper: Diversity Strategies and Initiative at Notre Dame

One of the enduring images linked to the University of Notre Dame is that of injured football player George Gipp imploring Coach Knute Rockne to "Win One for the Gipper. " Similarly, people of color and conscience at Notre Dame struggle with formidable challenges in implementing diversity into areas of faculty retention, university initiatives and community outreach, all while remaining sane. The panelists will discuss innovative successes and continuing efforts that can be adapted by others seeking a game plan for diversity.

Fidelity and game-based technology in management education

This study explores educational technology and management education by analyzing fidelity in game-based management education interventions. A sample of 31 MBA students was selected to help answer the research question: To what extent do MBA students tend to recognize specific game-based academic experiences, in terms of fidelity, as relevant to their managerial performance? Two distinct game-based interventions (BG1 and BG2) with key differences in fidelity levels were explored: BG1 presented higher physical and functional fidelity levels and lower psychological fidelity levels. Hypotheses were tested with data from the participants, collected shortly after their experiences, related to the overall perceived quality of game-based interventions. The findings reveal a higher overall perception of quality towards BG1: (a) better for testing strategies, (b) offering better business and market models, (c) based on a pace that better stimulates learning, and (d) presenting a fidelity level that better supports real world performance. This study fosters the conclusion that MBA students tend to recognize, to a large extent, that specific game-based academic experiences are relevant and meaningful to their managerial development, mostly with heightened fidelity levels of adopted artifacts. Agents must be ready and motivated to explore the new, to try and err, and to learn collaboratively in order to perform.