Report

Mode of access: Internet.

Business Conditions

"Compliments of American Eagle Fire Insurance Co., the Continental Insurance Company, Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Co"

Insurance Policy from the Quebec Fire Assurance Company to Mr. Joseph Power Bradley

Insurance Policy from the Quebec Fire Assurance Company to Mr. Joseph Power Bradley for his household furniture, linen wearing apparels, glass, earthenware and printed books in a house occupied as a dwelling and belonging to Joseph Legare Junt in the town of Quebec, Oct. 10, 1830

Fire blight (Erwinia amylovora) of rosaceous plants. Pathogen virulence and selection and characterization of biological control agents

El fuego bacteriano, causado por Erwinia amylovora, es una enfermedad muy importante a nivel comercial y económico porque afecta a plantas de la familia de las rosáceas y es especialmente agresiva en manzano (Pyrus malus) y peral (Pyrus communis), así como en plantas ornamentales (Crataegus, Cotoneaster o Pyracantha). Esta enfermedad está distribuida por todo el mundo en zonas climáticas templadas de Amércia del Norte, Nueva Zelanda, Japón, Israel, Turquí y Europa. En España, el fuego bacteriano fue detectado por primera vez en 1995 en el norte del País (Euskadi) y más tarde en nuevos focos aparecidos en otras áreas. La enfermedad puede ser controlada comercialmente mediante la aplicación de pesticidas quimicos (derivados de cobre, antibioticos). Sin embargo, muchos de los productos químicos presentan baja actividad o causan fitotoxicidad, y la estreptomicina, el producto más eficaz, esta prohibido en muchos países, incluyendo España. Por tanto, en ausencia de apropiados agentes químicos, el control biológico se contempla como una buena alternativa. En el presente trabajo, un agente de control biológico, Pseudomonas fluorescens EPS62e, ha sido seleccionada de entre 600 aislados de las especies P. fluorescens y Pantoea agglomerans obtenidos de flores, frutos y hojas de plantas de la familia de las rosáceas durante una prospección llevada a cabo en varias áreas geográficas de España. La cepa ha sido seleccionada por su capacidad de suprimir la infecciones producidas por E. amylovora frutos inmaduros, flores y brotes de peral en condiciones de ambiente controlado, presentando unos niveles de control similares a los obtenidos mediante el control químico usando derivados de cobre o antibióticos. La cepa además ha mostrado la capacidad de colonizar y sobrevivir en flores y heridas producidas en frutos inmaduros en condiciones de ambiento controlado pero también en flores en condiciones de campo. La exclusión de E. amylovora medinate la colonización de la superficie, el consumo de nutrientes, y la interacción entre las células del patógeno y del agente de biocontrol es la principal causa de la inhibición del fuego bacteriano por la cepa EPS62e. Estas características constituyen aspectos interesantes para un desarrollo efectivo de la cepa EPS62e como un agente de biocontrol del fuego bacteriano en condiciones comerciales.

The Bankers', insurance managers', and agents' magazine.

Separately paged supplements accompany some numbers.

The law of insurance of the state of Ohio : including fire, life, accident, casualty, quaranty, mutual benefit, fraternal and marine insurance, and pleading, practice and evidence relating thereto, as determined by the courts and contained in the statutes ... from the earliest period to date of publication, with full annotations from the decisions of the courts of Ohio and other states /

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Factory accounts, their principles and practie; a handbook for accountants and manufacturers with appendices on the nomenclature of machine details; the income tax acts, the rating of factories; fire and boiler insurance, etc.

Printed in Great Britain.

Full insurance, asymmetric information and genetic testing

This paper extends previous resuls on optimal insurance trading in the presence of a stock market that allows continuous asset trading and substantial personal heterogeneity, and applies those results in a context of asymmetric informationwith references to the role of genetic testing in insurance markets.We find a novel and surprising result under symmetric information:agents may optimally prefer to purchase full insurance despitethe presence of unfairly priced insurance contracts, and other assets which are correlated with insurance.Asymmetric information has a Hirschleifer-type effect whichcan be solved by suspending insurance trading. Nevertheless,agents can attain their first best allocations, which suggeststhat the practice of restricting insurance not to be contingenton genetic tests can be efficient.

Implications of dynamic trading for insurance markets

We study the interaction between insurance and capital markets within singlebut general framework.We show that capital markets greatly enhance the risksharing capacity of insurance markets and the scope of risks that areinsurable because efficiency does not depend on the number of agents atrisk, nor on risks being independent, nor on the preferences and endowmentsof agents at risk being the same. We show that agents share risks by buyingfull coverage for their individual risks and provide insurance capitalthrough stock markets.We show that aggregate risk enters private insuranceas positive loading on insurance prices and despite that agents will buyfull coverage. The loading is determined by the risk premium of investorsin the stock market and hence does not depend on the agent s willingnessto pay. Agents provide insurance capital by trading an equally weightedportfolio of insurance company shares and riskless asset. We are able toconstruct agents optimal trading strategies explicitly and for verygeneral preferences.

Equilibrium unemployment insurance

In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insuranceinto a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictionsand on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populatedby identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distributionof human capital across agents, may choose very different unemploymentinsurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interactionbetween the political decision about the level of the unemployment insuranceand the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to aself-reinforcing mechanism whichmay generate multiple steady-stateequilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with highunemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist withan American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnoverand low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model featurestwo distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and durationrates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.

Insurance with frequent trading

This paper looks at the dynamic management of risk in an economy with discrete time consumption and endowments and continuous trading. I study how agents in such an economy deal with all the risk in the economy and attain their Pareto optimal allocations by trading in a few natural securities: private insurance contracts and a common set of derivatives on the aggregate endowment. The parsimonious nature ofthe implied securities needed for Pareto optimality suggests that insuch contexts complete markets is a very reasonable assumption.

A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model thatcan explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility,unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote overunemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects ofinsurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration.Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their currentlocation, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent'sattachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UIreduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, thefraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The mainresult is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiplesteady-states-one 'European' steady-state featuring high unemployment,low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one'American' steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility andlow unemployment insurance.

Tuning synchronization of integrate-and-fire oscillators through mobility

We analyze the emergence of synchronization in a population of moving integrate-and-fire oscillators. Oscillators, while moving on a plane, interact with their nearest neighbor upon firing time. We discover a nonmonotonic dependence of the synchronization time on the velocity of the agents. Moreover, we find that mechanisms that drive synchronization are different for different dynamical regimes. We report the extreme situation where an interplay between the time scales involved in the dynamical processes completely inhibits the achievement of a coherent state. We also provide estimators for the transitions between the different regimes.

Consumption, investment and life insurance strategies with heterogeneous discounting

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza l'efecte que comporta l'introducció de preferències inconsistents temporalment sobre les decisions òptimes de consum, inversió i compra d'assegurança de vida. En concret, es pretén recollir la creixent importància que un individu dóna a la herència que deixa i a la riquesa disponible per a la seva jubilació al llarg de la seva vida laboral. Amb aquesta finalitat, es parteix d'un model estocàstic en temps continu amb temps final aleatori, i s'introdueix el descompte heterogeni, considerant un agent amb una distribució de vida residual coneguda. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es resol una equació de programació dinàmica no estàndard. Per al cas de funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA es troben solucions explícites. Finalment, els resultats obtinguts s'il·lustren numèricament.

Consumption, investment and life insurance strategies with heterogeneous discounting

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza l'efecte que comporta l'introducció de preferències inconsistents temporalment sobre les decisions òptimes de consum, inversió i compra d'assegurança de vida. En concret, es pretén recollir la creixent importància que un individu dóna a la herència que deixa i a la riquesa disponible per a la seva jubilació al llarg de la seva vida laboral. Amb aquesta finalitat, es parteix d'un model estocàstic en temps continu amb temps final aleatori, i s'introdueix el descompte heterogeni, considerant un agent amb una distribució de vida residual coneguda. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es resol una equació de programació dinàmica no estàndard. Per al cas de funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA es troben solucions explícites. Finalment, els resultats obtinguts s'il·lustren numèricament.