Doctor Daniel Brigham's Book, 1789-1810 (inclusive)

Ledger maintained by Dr. Daniel Brigham (1760-1837) containing financial accounts for medical patients treated primarily in Northborough, Westborough, and Marlborough, Massachusetts from 1789 to 1837. The ledger details the charges for medical services and the corresponding payments, often made by payment-in-kind. Common charges included a shilling for a visit and administration of cathartics, emetics, or anodynes. Extraction of a tooth cost eight pence, and Brigham charged one woman nine shillings for delivering her son. A number of entries are obscured by pasted-in newspaper articles.

Account book of David Townsend, 1774-1791

Account book kept by Dr. David Townsend (1753-1829) that records patients treated, illnesses, and fees charged in Boston, Massachusetts, and neighboring towns from 1774 to 1791. His patients included a number of soldiers and sailors, as well as figures like the French-American writer John Hector St. John (1735-1813). Townsend's treatments typically consisted of delivering cathartics or emetics. For the family of Samuel Appleton, Townsend administered smallpox inoculation in 1776, charging him 4 pounds, 4 shillings. Townsend sometimes recorded the occupation or race of the patient. For example, he attended the delivery of a child of Sappho Henshaw, "black girl," in 1786; in 1787 he attended to an unnamed "black man at [who lived at the] corner of Board Alley" in the North End of Boston. Other patients included John Hancock (1736-1793) and members of Hancock's household, as well as Federalist publisher John Fenno (1751-1798).

Docket and fees book / 1791-1797

Records of cases heard in the Massachusetts Court of Common Pleas (Middlesex Co.) in Cambridge, Mass., and the New Hampshire Inferior Court of Common Pleas (Hillsborough Co.) in Amherst, N.H and matters brought before justices of the peace. Records identify the litigants, with some notes on fees and settlements; many of the cases concern debts. Justices of the peace include: Israel Atherton (Lancaster, Mass.); Samuel Dana (Amherst, N.H.); Joshua Longley (Shirley, Mass.); Nathaniel Paine (Worcester, Mass.); James Prescott (Westford, Mass.); Jeremiah Stiles (Keene, N.H.); William Swan (Groton, Mass.); Sampson Tuttle (Littleton, Mass.); and Henry Woods (Pepperell, Mass.).

Multilateral Interchange Fees: Competition and regulation in light of recent legislative developments. ECRI Research Report No. 14, 31 January 2014

Two-sided payment card markets generate costs that have to be distributed among the participating actors. For this purpose, payment card networks set an interchange fee, which is the fee paid by the merchant’s bank to the cardholder’s bank per transaction. While in recent years many antitrust authorities all over the world - including the European Commission - have opened proceedings against card brands in order to verify whether agreements to collectively establish the level of interchange fees are anticompetitive, the Reserve Bank of Australia – as a regulator - has directly tried to address market failures by lowering the level of interchange fees and changing some network rules. The US has followed with new legislation on financial consumer protection, which also intervenes on interchange fees. This has opened a strong debate not only on legitimacy of interchange fees, but also on the appropriateness of different public tools to address such issues. Drawing from economic and legal theories and a comparative analysis of recent case law in the EU and other jurisdictions, this work investigates whether a regulation rather than a purely competition policy approach would be more appropriate in this field, considering in particular, at EU level, all of the competition and regulatory concerns that have arisen from the operation of SEPA with multilateral interchange fees. The paper concludes that a wider regulation approach could address some of the shortcomings of a purely antitrust approach, proving to be highly beneficial to the development of an efficient European single payments area.

Low-income first time mothers: Effects on advanced practice nurse (APN) follow up telephone calls on maternal and infant health and health care charges

The United States has over 4 million births annually. Currently healthy women with non-complicated deliveries receive little to no routine postpartum support when discharged from the hospital. This is especially problematic if mothers are first time mothers, poor, have language barriers and little to no social support after giving birth. The purpose of this randomized clinical trial was to compare maternal and infant health outcomes, and health care charges between 2 groups of mothers and newborns. A control ( n = 69) group received routine posthospital discharge care. An intervention group (n = 70) received routine posthospital discharge care plus follow up telephone calls by advanced practice nurses (APNs) on days 3,7,14,21,28 and week 8. Both groups were followed for the first 8 weeks posthospital discharge following delivery to examine maternal health outcomes (perceived maternal stress, social support and perceived maternal physical health), infant health outcomes (routine medical follow up visits immunizations, weight gain), morbidity (urgent care visits, emergency room visits, rehospitalizations), health care charges (urgent care visits, emergency room visits, rehospitalizations) in both groups and charges for APN follow up in the intervention group only. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and two-sample t-tests. Study findings indicated that intervention group had significantly lower perceived maternal stress, significantly higher rating of perceived maternal health and higher levels of social support and by the end of the 2nd month posthospital discharge compared to control group mothers. Infants in the intervention group had: increased number of immunizations; fewer emergency room visits; and 1 infant rehospitalization compared to 3 infant rehospitalizations in the control group. The intervention groups' health care charges were significantly lower compared to the control group $14,333/$497 vs. $70,834/$1,068. These study results indicate that an intervention of APN follow up telephone calls in this sample of first time low-income culturally diverse mothers was an effective, safe, low cost, easy to apply intervention which improved mothers' and infants' health outcomes and reduced healthcare charges.

Comparison between videofluoroscopy and endoscopic evaluation of swallowing for the diagnosis of dysphagia in children

OBJECTIVE: To compare videofluoroscopy swallowing study (VFSS) with the fiberoptic endoscopic evaluation of swallowing (FEES) in children and to determine the accuracy of FEES in the diagnosis of specific swallowing disorders. STUDY DESIGN: Cross-sectional study. SETTING: Hospital da Crianca Santo Antonio, affiliated with Santa Casa de Misericordia Hospital Complex, Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil. SUBJECTS AND METHODS: FEES findings were compared to those of VFSS in 30 children. Kappa coefficients for interobserver agreement were calculated. Thereafter, these coefficients were evaluated in terms of agreement between FEES and VFSS. In addition, the sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, and negative predictive value of FEES were calculated for four swallowing parameters (posterior spillover, pharyngeal residues, laryngeal penetration, and laryngotracheal aspiration). RESULTS: Interobserver agreement rates greater than 70 percent were obtained for all FEES parameters analyzed, except for pharyngeal residues with puree consistency (agreement = 66.7%, K = 0.296, P = 0.091). Laryngeal aspiration and penetration yielded the best level of agreement (100%, K = 1) for the laryngeal aspiration of puree residues. CONCLUSION: The diagnostic agreement between FEES (both observers) and VFSS was low. Regarding the analyzed parameters, laryngeal penetration and aspiration yielded the highest interobserver agreement in terms of FEES, and also showed the highest specificity and positive predictive value when compared to VFSS. (C) 2010 American Academy of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery Foundation. All rights reserved.

Lack of access and continuity of adult health care: a national population-based survey

OBJECTIVE To describe the lack of access and continuity of health care in adults.METHODS A cross-sectional population-based study was performed on a sample of 12,402 adults aged 20 to 59 years in urban areas of 100 municipalities of 23 states in the five Brazilian geopolitical regions. Barriers to the access and continuity of health care and were investigated based on receiving, needing and seeking health care (hospitalization and accident/emergency care in the last 12 months; care provided by a doctor, by other health professional or home care in the last three months). Based on the results obtained by the description of the sample, a projection is provided for adults living in Brazilian urban areas.RESULTS The highest prevalence of lack of access to health services and to provision of care by health professionals was for hospitalization (3.0%), whilst the lowest prevalence was for care provided by a doctor (1.1%). The lack of access to care provided by other health professionals was 2.0%; to accident and emergency services, 2.1%; and to home care, 2.9%. As for prevalences, the greatest absolute lack of access occurred in emergency care (more than 360,000 adults). The main reasons were structural and organizational problems, such as unavailability of hospital beds, of health professionals, of appointments for the type of care needed and charges made for care.CONCLUSIONS The universal right to health care in Brazil has not yet been achieved. These projections can help health care management in scaling the efforts needed to overcome this problem, such as expanding the infrastructure of health services and the workforce.

Urban deforestation and urban development

This paper has developed a model of a single forest owner operating with perfect foresight in a dynamic open-city environment that allows for switching between alternative competing land uses (forest and urban use) at some point in the future. The model also incorporates external values of an even-aged standing forest in addition to the value of timber when it is harvested. Timber is exploited based on a multiple rotation model a la Faustmann with clear-cut harvesting. In contrast to previous models, our alternative land use to forest land is endogenous. Within this framework, we study the problem of the private owner as well as that of the social planner, when choosing the time to harvest, the time to convert land and the intensity of development. We also examine the extent to which the two-way linkage between urban development and forest management practices (timber production and provision of forest amenities) contributes to economic efficiency and improvements in non-market forest benefits. Finally, we consider policy options available to a regulator seeking to achieve improvements in efficiency including anti-sprawl policies (impact fees and density controls) and forest policies such a yield tax. Numerical simulations illustrate our analytical results.

Future lending income and security value

I test the Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen hypothesis that security prices incorporate expected future securities lending income. To determine whether institutional investors anticipate gains from future lending of securities, I examine their trading behavior around loan-fee increases. The evidence suggests that institutions buy shares in response to an increase in lending fees, and that this could explain the premium associated with high- lending-fee stocks. Expected future lending income affects stock prices, although the effect seems to be attenuated by the negative information that arises from short selling.

Human Capital, the Structure of Production, and Growth

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate payment systems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees (MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificial lowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but it will however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of sale terminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

Platform pricing and consumer foresight: The case of airports

Airports have become platforms that derive revenues from both aeronautical and commercial activities. The demand for these services is characterized by a one-way complementarity in that only air travelers can purchase retail goods at the airport terminals. We analyze a model of optimal airport behavior in which this one-way complementarity is subject to consumer foresight, i.e., consumers may not anticipate in full the ex post retail surplus when purchasing a flight ticket. An airport sets landing fees, and, in addition, also chooses the retail market structure by selecting the number of retail concessions to be awarded. We find that, with perfectly myopic consumers, the airport chooses to attract more passengers via low landing fees, and also sets the minimum possible number of retailers in order to increase the concessions’ revenues, from which it obtains the largest share of profits. However, even a very small amount of anticipation of the consumer surplus from retail activities changes significantly the airport’s choices: the optimal airport policy is dependent on the degree of differentiation in the retail market. When consumers instead have perfect foresight, the airport establishes a very competitive retail market, where consumers enjoy a large surplus. This attracts passengers and it is exploited by the airport by charging higher landing fees, which then constitute the largest share of its profits. Overall, the airport’s profits are maximal when consumers have perfect foresight. Keywords: two-sided markets, platform pricing, one-way demand complementarity, consumer foresight. JEL classification: L1, L2, L93.

Incumbent audit firm-provided tax services and the clients with low financial reporting quality

This study investigates whether incumbent audit firm-provided tax services enhance or impair the likelihood of acknowledging client companies’ low financial reporting quality. In particular, we examine the association between tax-related fees and the likelihood of timely restatements, and internal control weakness disclosures among a sample of US companies that all have misstatements in financial information. The empirical findings indicate that companies paying higher tax-related fees are less likely to disclose SOX 404 internal control weakness disclosures, implying that underlying control problems are unacknowledged when incumbent audit firm provided tax-related fees are higher. However, the findings suggest that just providing both audit and tax-related services does not have an impact on audit quality per se, but rather it is the magnitude of the tax-related fees in particular that counts. We also find some evidence suggesting that companies paying higher tax-related fees have higher likelihood of restatement lags, whereas companies paying smaller tax-related fees to their audit firm restate financial statements in a timelier manner. Overall, the findings suggest that audit scrutiny of client companies with low quality financial reporting is weaker when the magnitude of tax-related fees is higher.

The effect of environmentally differentiated port fees to shipping companies’ environmental investments

The pressure has grown to develop cost-effective emission reduction strategies in the Baltic Sea. The forthcoming stringent regulations of the International Maritime Organization for reducing harmful emissions of shipping in the Baltic Sea are causing increasing expenses for the operators. A market-based attitude towards pricing of economic incentives could be seen as a new approach for a successful application for the additional emission reduction of nitrogen oxides (NOx). In this study the aim is to understand the phenomenon of environmentally differentiated port fees and its effects on shipping companies’ emission reduction investments. The goal is to examine empirically the real-life effects of the possible environmental differentiated port fee system and the effect of environmentally differentiated port fees on NOx reduction investments in the Baltic Sea. The research approach of this study is nomothetical. In this study research questions are answered by analyzing the broad database of the Baltic Sea fleet. Also the framework of theory is confirmed and plays an important role in analyzing the research problem. Existing investment costs of NOx emission reduction technology to ship owners are estimated and compared to investment costs with granted discounts added to the cash flows. The statistical analysis in this study is descriptive. The major statistic examination of this study is the calculation of the net present values of investments with different port fee scenarios. This is done to investigate if the NOx technology investments could be economically reasonable. Based on calculations it is clear that the effect of environmentally differentiated port fees is not adequate to compensate the total investment costs for NOx reduction. If the investment decision is made only with profitability considerations, sources will prefer to emission abatement as long as incomes from the given subsidy exceeds their abatement costs. Despite of the results, evidence was found that shipping companies are nevertheless willing to invest on voluntary emission abatement technology. In that case, investment decision could be made with criteria of, for example, sustainable strategy or brand image. Combined fairway and port fee system or governmental regulations and recommendation could also function as additional incentives to compensate the investment costs. Also, the results imply that the use of NPV is not necessarily the best method to evaluate environmental investments. If the calculations would be done with more environmental methods the results would probably be different.

By-laws of the municipal council of the United Counties of Lincoln and Welland, 1852

By-laws included are numbers 31-34 and deal with school issues, raising funds for the municipality, payment of fees, and remuneration to the sheriff of the municipality.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.