996 resultados para Federal-provincial relations
Resumo:
Item 1037-A.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
Published also as thesis (Ph. D.)--Johns Hopkins University, 1929.
Resumo:
"September, 1932."
Resumo:
Revised through December 31, 1975.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
"AB 1710 (Burton) - To make California Fair Employment Practices Act applicable to discrimination on account of age."
Resumo:
"GAO-04-758."
Resumo:
"November 24, 1981"--Pt. 3.
Resumo:
"B-223880"--P. [1].
Resumo:
The recent reforms of German federalism (Reform I) have established a new framework for Bund–Länder co-operation on EU policy. These seek to safeguard Germany's ability to co-operate in Europe by disentangling the joint roles and responsibilities bound up within the complex arrangements of the EU policy-making system, defined as a multiple framework of joint decisions, or doppelte Politikverflechtung. Whilst on the surface, the reforms enacted may be read as a success for the Länder in their bid to secure autonomy on European issues, closer analysis reveals that these changes may in fact hamper the Länder agenda on European issues, closing off new opportunities for influence.
Resumo:
O objetivo principal do trabalho ?? analisar a estrutura de comando e delega????o e as formas de disputa de poder existentes no Minist??rio da Fazenda, considerado o mais t??cnico e o mais importante do Governo Federal. Enfatizando a tem??tica das rela????es entre burocracia e pol??tica no sistema presidencialista brasileiro, o presente estudo procura entender a l??gica pol??tica que orienta as a????es do alto escal??o do Minist??rio da Fazenda no mandato do presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
Resumo:
The search for political determinants of intergovernmental fiscal relations has shaped much of the recent literature on the economic viability of federalism. This study assesses the explanatory power of two competing views about intergovernmental transfers; one emphasizing the traditional neoclassical approach to federal-subnational fiscal relations and the other suggesting that transfers are contingent on the political fortunes and current political vulnerability of each level of government. The author tests these models using data from Argentina, a federation exhibiting one of the most decentralised fiscal systems in the world and severe imbalances in the territorial distribution of legislative and economic resources. It is shown that overrespresented provinces ruled by governors who belong to opposition parties can bring into play their political overrepresentation to attract shares of federal transfers beyond social welfare criteria and to shield themselves from unwanted reforms to increase fiscal co-responsibilty. This finding suggests that decision makers in federal countries must pay close heed to the need to synchronize institutional reforms and fiscal adjustment.
Resumo:
This paper explores an overlooked issue in the literature on federations and federalism: the relationship between federalism and democracy. Starting from the assumption that federalism per se is not enough to guarantee cooperative intergovernmental dynamics between different levels of governments, this article analyzes how democracy reinforces cooperative intergovernmental relations under a federal design. Drawing from empirical evidence of federations in the making – Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa and Spain – this article shows that in countries where the federal design was built under democratization, namely Brazil, Spain and South Africa, intergovernmental dynamics evolved under an increasingly cooperative mode of interaction.
Resumo:
The global economic and financial crisis is a challenge for all governments, but particularly for federal states because divided and/or shared territorial powers make federations susceptible to coordination problems in fiscal policy making. This article explores the effects of the ongoing crisis on federal relations. Three kinds of problems that may become the cause of federal tensions and conflicts are evoked: opportunism of subgovernments, centralisation and erosion of solidarity among members of the federation. Our analysis of fiscal policies and federal conflicts of 11 federations between 2007 and the present reveals three kinds of coordination problems: shirking in the use of federal government grants, rent-seeking in equalisation payments, and over-borrowing and over-spending. Our results show that shirking remained limited to few cases and occurred only in the first part of the crisis. However, rent-seeking and over-borrowing and over-spending led to a reduction of solidarity among subgovernments and to increased regulation of the fiscal discretion of the members of the federation. Subsequently, tensions in federal relations increased - although only in one case did this challenged the federal order.