Summary of savings accounts by geographic areas, FSLIC-insured savings and loan associations.

Title varies slightly.

Crop Insurance For Maryland Field Crops And Livestock

Multi-peril crop insurance is a valuable risk management tool which allows you to insure against losses on your farm due to adverse weather conditions, price fluctuations, and unavoidable pests and diseases. It shifts unavoidable production risks to an insurance company for the payment of a fixed amount of premium per acre. This publication assists readers in understanding the basics of the federal crop insurance program.

Essays on Banking Crises

This thesis aims at finding the role of deposit insurance scheme and central bank (CB) in keeping the banking system safe. The thesis also studies the factors associated with long-lasting banking crises. The first essay analyzes the effect of using explicit deposit insurance scheme (EDIS), instead of using implicit deposit insurance scheme (IDIS), on banking crises. The panel data for the period of 1980-2003 includes all countries for which the data on EDIS or IDIS exist. 70% of the countries in the sample are less developed countries (LDCs). About 55% of the countries adopting EDIS also come from LDCs. The major finding is that the using of EDIS increases the crisis probability at a strong significance level. This probability is greater if the EDIS is inefficiently designed allowing higher scope of moral hazard problem. Specifically, the probability is greater if the EDIS provides higher coverage to deposits and if it is less powerful from the legal point of view. This study also finds that the less developed a country is to handle EDIS, the higher the chance of banking crisis. Once the underdevelopment of an economy handling the EDIS is controlled, the EDIS separately is no longer a significant factor of banking crises. The second essay aims at determining whether a country s powerful CB can lessen the instability of the banking sector by minimizing the likelihood of a banking crisis. The data used include indicators of the CB s autonomy for a set of countries over the period of 1980-89. The study finds that in aggregate a more powerful CB lessens the probability of banking crisis. When the CB s authority is disentangled with respect to its responsibilities, the study finds that the longer tenure of CB s chief executive officer and the greater power of CB in assigning interest rate on government loans are necessary for reducing the probability of banking crisis. The study also finds that the probability of crisis reduces more if an autonomous CB can perform its duties in a country with stronger law and order tradition. The costs of long-lasting banking crises are high because both the depositors and the investors lose confidence in the banking system. For a rapid recovery of a crisis, the government very often undertakes one or more crisis resolution policy (CRP) measures. The third essay examines the CRP and other explanatory variables correlated with the durations of banking crises. The major finding is that the CRP measure allowing the regulation forbearance to keep the insolvent banks operative and the public debt relief program are respectively strongly and weakly significant to increase the durations of crises. Some other explanatory variables, which were found by previous studies to be related with the probability of crises to occur, are also correlated with the durations of crises.

Corporate Governance in European Banks: Essays on Bank Ownership

Banks are important as they have a central role in the financial system, where funds are channelled either through financial intermediaries, such as banks, or through financial markets, hence promoting growth in any economy. Recently, we have been reminded of the drawbacks of the central role of banks. The current financial crisis, which started out as a sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US, has become a global financial crisis with substantial impact on the real economy in many countries. Some of the roots to the current financial crisis can be sought in the changing role of banks and in bank corporate governance. Moreover, the substantial revitalising measures taken have been justified by the central role of banks. Not only are banks important, they are also very special. The fact that banks are regulated in conjunction with greater opacity, make bank corporate governance different from corporate governance in non-bank companies. Surprisingly little is, however, known about bank corporate governance, in particularly, in a European setting. Hence, the objective of this doctoral thesis is to provide new insights in this research area by examining banks from 37 different European countries. Each of the three essays included in the doctoral thesis examines a particular aspect of bank corporate governance. In the first essay the interaction between the regulatory environment a bank operates in and its ownership structure is explored. Indicators of the severity of the moral hazard problem induced by the deposit insurance system and implicit too-big-to-fail government guarantee, particular features of deposit insurance systems as well as legal protection of shareholders, legal origin of a country and level of integration to the European community are used in the analysis. The empirical findings confirm previous findings on the link between legal protection of shareholders and ownership structure. Moreover, they show that differences in deposit insurance system features can explain some of the differences in ownership structure across European banks. In the second essay the impact of management and board ownership on the profitability of banks with different strategy is examined. The empirical findings suggest that the efficiency of these two particular corporate governance mechanisms varies with the characteristics of the agency problem faced by the bank. More specifically, management ownership is important in opaque non-traditional banks, whereas board ownership is important in traditional banks, where deposit insurance reduces the monitoring incentives of outsiders. The higher profitability does, however, go together with higher risk. In the third essay the profitability and risk of commercial, savings and cooperative banks are compared. The empirical findings suggest that distinct operational and ownership characteristics rather than only the mere fact that a bank is a commercial, savings or cooperative bank explain the profitability and risk differences. The main insight from the three essays is that a number of different aspects should be addressed simultaneously in order to give the complexity of bank corporate governance justice.

Bank Run Risk and Optimal Reserves

We characterize the optimal reserves, and the generated probability of a bank run, as a function of the penalty imposed by the central bank, the probability of depositors’ liquidity needs, and the return on outside investment opportunities.

Elements of Decision under Uncertainty with Applications

This work presents the basic elements for the analysis of decision under uncertainty: Expected Utility Theory and its citicisms and risk aversion and its measurement. The concepts of certainty equivalent, risk premium, absolute risk aversion and relative risk aversion, and the "more risk averse than" relation are discussed. The work is completed with several applications of decision making under uncertainty to different economic problems: investment in risky assets and portfolio selection, risk sharing, investment to reduce risk, insurance, taxes and income underreporting, deposit insurance and the value of information.

Credit Unions: A Theoretical and Empirical Overview

In 2009 there were over 49,330 credit unions across 98 countries with more than 184 million members and approximately $1,354 billion in assets. There is a great diversity within the credit union movement across these countries. This reflects the various economic, historic and cultural contexts within which credit unions operate. This paper traces the evolution of the credit union movement. It examines credit union objectives, and considers issues relating to efficiency, technology adoption, product diversification, merger, failure and demutualization. The regulatory environment within which credit unions operate is also explored under the themes of interest rate regulation, common bond requirements, taxation, deposit insurance and capital regulation. The overview also considers demutualization and the costs and benefits to credit unions of altering their organizational form.

Bank Failures of the 1990s::An Exploratory Analysis

Past research has frequently attributed the incidence of bank failures to macroeconomic cycles and/or downturns in the regional economy. More recent analyses have suggested that the incidence and severity of bank failures can be linked to governance failures, which may be preventable through more stringent disclosure and auditing requirements. Using data on bank failures during the years 1991 to 1997, for the US, Canada, the UK and Germany, this study examines the relationship between institutional characteristics of national legal and auditing systems and the incidence of bank failures. In the second part of our analysis we then examined the relationship between the same institutional variables and the severity of bank failures.
The first part of our study notes a significant correlation between the law and order tradition (‘rule of law’) of a national legal system and the incidence of bank failures. Nations which were assigned high 'rule of law’ scores by country risk guides appear to have been less likely to experience bank failures. Another variable which appears to impact on bank failure rates is the ‘risk of contract repudiation’. Countries with a greater ‘risk of contract repudiation’ appear to be more likely to experience bank failures. We suggest that this may be due to a greater ex ante protection of stakeholders in countries where contract enforcement is more stringent.
The results of the second part of our study are less clear cut. However, there appears to be a significant correlation between the amount paid out by national deposit insurers (our proxy for the severity of bank failures) and the macroeconomic variable 'GDP change'. Here our findings follow the conventional wisdom; with greater amounts of deposit insurance funds being paid during economic downturns (i.e. low or negative GDP 'growth' correlates with high amounts of deposit insurance being paid out). A less pronounced relationship with the severity of bank failures can also be established for the institutional variables ' accounting standards' as well as 'risk of contract repudiation'. Countries with more stringent ‘accounting standards’ and a low ‘risk of contract repudiation’ appear to have been less prone to severe bank failures.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

The challenges of Europe's fourfold union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/13, 16 August 2012

Five years after the first tremors in Europe’s banking system, what makes the crisis unique is the absence of a democratically accountable decision-making framework; there is an 'executive deficit' that compounds Europe’s democratic deficit. The author argues that the only way to resolve the crisis successfully is a sustained effort to achieve a 'fourfold union' agenda: banking union, fiscal union, competitiveness union and political union. Progress must be made in parallel on each of the four components. In particular, successful progress towards banking union requires a combination of short term action, including the establishment of a temporary resolution authority to identify undercapitalised banks and to restructure them, and longer-term measures, including the creation of permanent authorities for supervision, resolution and deposit insurance.

Enriching information to prevent bank runs

Sequential service in the banking sector, as modeled by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), is a barrier to full insurance and potential source of financial fragility against which deposit insurance is infeasible (Wallace, 1988). In this paper, we pursue a different perspective, viewing the sequence of contacts as opportunities to extract information through a larger message space with commitment to richer promises. As we show, if preferences satisfy a separating property then the desired elimination of dominated strategies (Green and Lin, 2003) occurs even when shocks are correlated. In this manner the sequential service promotes stability.

Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro

A reação da autoridade bancária frente a uma crise é de fundamental importância para a sua contenção. No Brasil, durante a crise do subprime, em 2008, observou-se a ocorrência de uma crise de liquidez em alguns bancos que levou o Banco Central a autorizar uma linha especial de captação de depósitos com limite muito superior ao habitual, denominado Depósito a Prazo com Garantia Especial (DPGE). Estes fatos propiciaram uma oportunidade de observar a reação dos depositantes frente a um choque exógeno ao sistema financeiro nacional para, em seguida, explorar a captação exógena de recursos devido à ampliação nos limites dos depósitos assegurados, com cobertura do Fundo Garantidor de Crédito (FGC). Além disso, analisou-se o efeito do DPGE sobre o crédito, considerando que depósitos assegurados e não-assegurados não são substitutos perfeitos e um aumento na oferta de depósitos assegurados deveria aumentar a oferta de crédito do mercado, como um todo. A estratégia empírica utilizada permitiu reconhecer os bancos emissores de DPGE, separando-os por outros fatores relacionados aos fundamentos bancários (tamanho, liquidez, qualidade dos ativos e retorno) e analisar os efeitos do DPGE nas taxas de juros praticadas na captação de depósitos a prazo, em geral. A base de dados utilizada também permitiu observar o comportamento desses bancos e a estratégia por eles utilizada na origem e destinação de tais recursos. Tomados em conjunto, os resultados encontrados são consistentes com a ideia de que depositantes migram seus recursos para a segurança durante a crise, na chamada “fuga para a qualidade” e retornam quando lhes dão a garantia necessária. Também é coerente com a teoria que diz que a substituição imperfeita entre depósitos assegurados e depósitos não-assegurados afeta a restrição de financiamentos dos bancos. O resultado deste estudo revela a importância da atuação da autoridade reguladora frente a situações críticas, bem como os efeitos no mercado causados pela permanência de um produto desenhado para uma situação específica.

Secularism, Sharia, and the Turkish Financial Markets

The financial markets in Turkey provide a laboratory to help resolve these competing views. Islamic law or Sharia contains a number of proscriptions that directly affect financial practices. The payment and receipt of interest is prohibited; so are most kinds of commercial insurance. These interpretations provided the impetus in the Islamic world for the creation of a class of banks that sought to offer Sharia compliant services. The first Islamic Banks in Turkey began operations in the 1980s. Their entry was initially tepid, in no small part because of secularist principles. Islamic financial institutions could not overtly advertise their religious orientation. The country had no “Islamic” banks, only finance houses. They were not Sharia compliant but “interest-free.” Moreover, the government left them in an uncertain regulatory status and subjected them to restrictions on growth. In this environment, the Islamic banks remained a peripheral part of the financial system. With the election of the AKP in 2002, however, the environment for Islamic banks in Turkey changed. Limitations on branch networks and capital raising were lifted. The government removed restrictions on the issuance of Sharia compliant bonds. Officials from the Islamic banks were appointed to the highest levels of government. This Article does several things. First, it examines principles of Islam that affect banking practices, with a particular emphasis on deposit insurance and credit cards. Second, the Article discusses the emergence of secularism in Turkey and the introduction of Islamic banks into the Turkish financial markets. The Article then examine their evolution, with particular emphasis on the changes implemented by the AKP. Finally, the Article examines the impact of these reforms, and what that impact says about Islamic influence in Turkey.

A Copernican Turn for Banking Union. CEPS Policy Brief No. 290, 14 May 2013

Despite apparent consensus that the creation of a ‘Banking Union’ is essential for the survival of the euro, progress is painfully slow. The Single Supervisory Mechanism may not be ready before the middle of next year, the Single Resolution Mechanism may require a laborious change of the EU Treaty and common deposit insurance has been postponed into the indefinite future. Any real progress has been prevented by the protracted fights over which government will be the payer of last resort when banks fail because of past bad loans. In this Policy Brief, Thomas Mayer suggests that a radically new approach is needed if there is any prospect of moving beyond this impasse to reach full Banking Union. Instead of trying to move from common bank supervision over to resolution and then on to deposit insurance, he argues that policy-makers should go backwards and start with deposit insurance, move from there to resolution, and end with supervision.

A Viable Alternative to Basel III Prudential Capital Rules. CEPS Policy Brief No. 291, May 2013

Stefano Micossi argues in this paper that the Basel framework for bank prudential requirements is deeply flawed and that the Basel III revision has failed to correct these flaws, making the system even more complicated, opaque and open to manipulation. In practice, he finds that the present system does not offer regulators and financial markets a reliable capital standard for banks and its divergent implementation in the main jurisdictions of the European Union and the United States has broken the market into special fiefdoms governed by national regulators in response to untoward special interests. The time is ripe to stop tinkering with minor adjustment and revisions in order to rescue the system, because the system cannot be rescued. In response to the current situation, Micossi calls for abandoning reference to risk-weighted assets calculated by banks with their internal risk management models for the determination of banks’ prudential capital, together with the preoccupation with the asset side of banks in correcting for risk exposure. He suggests that the alternative may be provided by a combination of a straight capital ratio and a properly designed deposit insurance system. It is a logical, complete and much less distortive alternative; it would serve better the cause of financial stability as well as the interest of the banks in clear, transparent and level playing field.