The role of working memory capacity in multiple-cue probability learning

Multiple-cue probability learning (MCPL) involves learning to predict a criterion when outcome feedback is provided for multiple cues. A great deal of research suggests that working memory capacity (WMC) is involved in a wide range of tasks that draw on higher level cognitive processes. In three experiments, we examined the role of WMC in MCPL by introducing measures of working memory capacity, as well as other task manipulations. While individual differences in WMC positively predicted performance in some kinds of multiple-cue tasks, performance on other tasks was entirely unrelated to these differences. Performance on tasks that contained negative cues was correlated with working memory capacity, as well as measures of explicit knowledge obtained in the learning process. When the relevant cues predicted positively, however, WMC became irrelevant. The results are discussed in terms of controlled and automatic processes in learning and judgement. © 2011 The Experimental Psychology Society.

Encouraging children to think counterfactually enhances blocking in a causal learning task

According to a higher order reasoning account, inferential reasoning processes underpin the widely observed cue competition effect of blocking in causal learning. The inference required for blocking has been described as modus tollens (if p then q, not q therefore not p). Young children are known to have difficulties with this type of inference, but research with adults suggests that this inference is easier if participants think counterfactually. In this study, 100 children (51 five-year-olds and 49 six- to seven-year-olds) were assigned to two types of pretraining groups. The counterfactual group observed demonstrations of cues paired with outcomes and answered questions about what the outcome would have been if the causal status of cues had been different, whereas the factual group answered factual questions about the same demonstrations. Children then completed a causal learning task. Counterfactual pretraining enhanced levels of blocking as well as modus tollens reasoning but only for the younger children. These findings provide new evidence for an important role for inferential reasoning in causal learning.

When does information about causal structure improve statistical reasoning?

Base rate neglect on the mammography problem can be overcome by explicitly presenting a causal basis for the typically vague false-positive statistic. One account of this causal facilitation effect is that people make probabilistic judgements over intuitive causal models parameterized with the evidence in the problem. Poorly defined or difficult-to-map evidence interferes with this process, leading to errors in statistical reasoning. To assess whether the construction of parameterized causal representations is an intuitive or deliberative process, in Experiment 1 we combined a secondary load paradigm with manipulations of the presence or absence of an alternative cause in typical statistical reasoning problems. We found limited effects of a secondary load, no evidence that information about an alternative cause improves statistical reasoning, but some evidence that it reduces base rate neglect errors. In Experiments 2 and 3 where we did not impose a load, we observed causal facilitation effects. The amount of Bayesian responding in the causal conditions was impervious to the presence of a load (Experiment 1) and to the precise statistical information that was presented (Experiment 3). However, we found less Bayesian responding in the causal condition than previously reported. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings and the suggestion that there may be population effects in the accuracy of statistical reasoning.

Whose statistical reasoning is improved by information about causal structure?

People often struggle when making Bayesian probabilistic estimates on the basis of competing sources of statistical evidence. Recently, Krynski and Tenenbaum (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136, 430–450, 2007) proposed that a causal Bayesian framework accounts for peoples’ errors in Bayesian reasoning and showed that, by clarifying the causal relations among the pieces of evidence, judgments on a classic statistical reasoning problem could be significantly improved. We aimed to understand whose statistical reasoning is facilitated by the causal structure intervention. In Experiment 1, although we observed causal facilitation effects overall, the effect was confined to participants high in numeracy. We did not find an overall facilitation effect in Experiment 2 but did replicate the earlier interaction between numerical ability and the presence or absence of causal content. This effect held when we controlled for general cognitive ability and thinking disposition. Our results suggest that clarifying causal structure facilitates Bayesian judgments, but only for participants with sufficient understanding of basic concepts in probability and statistics.

The Engine of Thought Is a Hybrid: Roles of Associative and Structured Knowledge in Reasoning

Across a range of domains in psychology different theories assume different mental representations of knowledge. For example, in the literature on category-based inductive reasoning, certain theories (e.g., Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2008) assume that the knowledge upon which inductive inferences are based is associative, whereas others (e.g., Heit & Rubinstein, 1994; Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, López, & Shafir, 1990) assume that knowledge is structured. In this article we investigate whether associative and structured knowledge underlie inductive reasoning to different degrees under different processing conditions. We develop a measure of knowledge about the degree of association between categories and show that it dissociates from measures of structured knowledge. In Experiment 1 participants rated the strength of inductive arguments whose categories were either taxonomically or causally related. A measure of associative strength predicted reasoning when people had to respond fast, whereas causal and taxonomic knowledge explained inference strength when people responded slowly. In Experiment 2, we also manipulated whether the causal link between the categories was predictive or diagnostic. Participants preferred predictive to diagnostic arguments except when they responded under cognitive load. In Experiment 3, using an open-ended induction paradigm, people generated and evaluated their own conclusion categories. Inductive strength was predicted by associative strength under heavy cognitive load, whereas an index of structured knowledge was more predictive of inductive strength under minimal cognitive load. Together these results suggest that associative and structured models of reasoning apply best under different processing conditions and that the application of structured knowledge in reasoning is often effortful.

Temporal and statistical information in causal structure learning

Three experiments examined children’s and adults’ abilities to use statistical and temporal information to distinguish between common cause and causal chain structures. In Experiment 1, participants were provided with conditional probability information and/or temporal information and asked to infer the causal structure of a three-variable mechanical system that operated probabilistically. Participants of all ages preferentially relied on the temporal pattern of events in their inferences, even if this conflicted with statistical information. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants observed a series of interventions on the system, which in these experiments operated deterministically. In Experiment 2, participants found it easier to use temporal pattern information than statistical information provided as a result of interventions. In Experiment 3, in which no temporal pattern information was provided, children from 6-7 years, but not younger children, were able to use intervention information to make causal chain judgments, although they had difficulty when the structure was a common cause. The findings suggest that participants, and children in particular, may find it more difficult to use statistical information than temporal pattern information because of its demands on information processing resources. However, there may also be an inherent preference for temporal information.

Logic Brightens My Day: Evidence for Implicit Sensitivity to Logical Validity.

A key assumption of dual process theory is that reasoning is an explicit, effortful, deliberative process. The present study offers evidence for an implicit, possibly intuitive component of reasoning. Participants were shown sentences embedded in logically valid or invalid arguments. Participants were not asked to reason but instead rated the sentences for liking (Experiment 1) and physical brightness (Experiments 2-3). Sentences that followed logically from preceding sentences were judged to be more likable and brighter. Two other factors thought to be linked to implicit processing-sentence believability and facial expression-had similar effects on liking and brightness ratings. The authors conclude that sensitivity to logical structure was implicit, occurring potentially automatically and outside of awareness. They discuss the results within a fluency misattribution framework and make reference to the literature on discourse comprehension. 

Do people have insight into their face recognition abilities?

Diagnosis of developmental or congenital prosopagnosia (CP) involves self-report of everyday face recognition difficulties, which are corroborated with poor performance on behavioural tests. This approach requires accurate self-evaluation. We examine the extent to which typical adults have insight into their face recognition abilities across four studies involving nearly 300 participants. The studies used five tests of face recognition ability: two that tap into the ability to learn and recognise previously unfamiliar faces (the Cambridge Face Memory Test, CFMT, Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006 and a newly devised test based on the CFMT but where the study phases involve watching short movies rather than viewing static faces – the CFMT-Films) and three that tap face matching (Benton Facial Recognition Test, BFRT, Benton, Sivan, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1983; and two recently devised sequential face matching tests). Self-reported ability was measured with the 15-item Kennerknecht et al. (2008) questionnaire; two single-item questions assessing face recognition ability; and a new 77-item meta-cognition questionnaire). Overall, we find that adults with typical face recognition abilities have only modest insight into their ability to recognise faces on behavioural tests. In a fifth study, we assess self-reported face recognition ability in people with CP and find that some people who expect to perform poorly on behavioural tests of face recognition do indeed perform poorly. However, it is not yet clear whether individuals within this group of poor performers have greater levels of insight (i.e., into their degree of impairment) than those with more typical levels of performance.

More than just a problem with faces: Altered body perception in a group of congenital prosopagnosics

It has been estimated that one out of forty people in the general population suffer from congenital prosopagnosia (CP), a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by difficulty identifying people by their faces. CP involves impairment in recognising faces, although the perception of non-face stimuli may also be impaired. Given that social interaction does not only depend on face processing, but also the processing of bodies, it is of theoretical importance to ascertain whether CP is also characterised by body perception impairments. Here, we tested eleven CPs and eleven matched control participants on the Body Identity Recognition Task (BIRT), a forced-choice match-to-sample task, using stimuli that require processing of body, not clothing, specific features. Results indicated that the group of CPs was as accurate as controls on the BIRT, which is in line with the lack of body perception complaints by CPs. However the CPs were slower than controls, and when accuracy and response times were combined into inverse efficiency scores (IES), the group of CPs were impaired, suggesting that the CPs could be using more effortful cognitive mechanisms to be as accurate as controls. In conclusion, our findings demonstrate CP may not generally be limited to face processing difficulties, but may also extend to body perception

Face matching impairment in developmental prosopagnosia

Developmental prosopagnosia (DP) is commonly referred to as ‘face blindness’, a term that implies a perceptual basis to the condition. However, DP presents as a deficit in face recognition and is diagnosed using memory-based tasks. Here, we test face identification ability in six people with DP, who are severely impaired on face memory tasks, using tasks that do not rely on memory. First, we compared DP to control participants on a standardised test of unfamiliar face matching using facial images taken on the same day and under standardised studio conditions (Glasgow Face Matching Test; GFMT). DP participants did not differ from normative accuracy scores on the GFMT. Second, we tested face matching performance on a test created using images that were sourced from the Internet and so vary substantially due to changes in viewing conditions and in a person’s appearance (Local Heroes Test; LHT). DP participants show significantly poorer matching accuracy on the LHT relative to control participants, for both unfamiliar and familiar face matching. Interestingly, this deficit is specific to ‘match’ trials, suggesting that people with DP may have particular difficulty in matching images of the same person that contain natural day-to-day variations in appearance. We discuss these results in the broader context of individual differences in face matching ability.

The time-course of lexical activation in Japanese morphographic word recognition: Evidence for a character-driven processing model

This lexical decision study with eye tracking of Japanese two-kanji-character words investigated the order in which a whole two-character word and its morphographic constituents are activated in the course of lexical access, the relative contributions of the left and the right characters in lexical decision, the depth to which semantic radicals are processed, and how nonlinguistic factors affect lexical processes. Mixed-effects regression analyses of response times and subgaze durations (i.e., first-pass fixation time spent on each of the two characters) revealed joint contributions of morphographic units at all levels of the linguistic structure with the magnitude and the direction of the lexical effects modulated by readers’ locus of attention in a left-to-right preferred processing path. During the early time frame, character effects were larger in magnitude and more robust than radical and whole-word effects, regardless of the font size and the type of nonwords. Extending previous radical-based and character-based models, we propose a task/decision-sensitive character-driven processing model with a level-skipping assumption: Connections from the feature level bypass the lower radical level and link up directly to the higher character level.

L’épistémologie de Marcel Proust dans À la recherche du temps perdu : littérature et savoirs en 1900 : une pensée de l’imprévisible

La somme romanesque que représente À la recherche du temps perdu se constitue au prix d’une « recherche » qui est à prendre au pied de la lettre, et qui instaure le sujet connaissant en savant-chercheur face à son objet de savoir. Proust fait en effet du « savoir » la condition même du talent, et fait entreprendre à son héros une exploration qui se présente en priorité comme étant une quête de savoirs. Ce travail se situe dans le sillage de l’épistémocritique qui étudie l’inscription dans le texte littéraire des savoirs en général, tout en insistant sur les savoirs qui relèvent de la science. Notre but est de dégager la posture épistémique qui caractérise le narrateur de la Recherche face aux divers savoirs qu’il récolte au cours de ses observations. Le parcours cognitif du narrateur est examiné suivant les quatre grandes étapes de sa recherche, que nous redéfinissons en termes de paradigmes : le paradigme de l’Exploration, qui définit une « épistémologie de l’observateur » ; le paradigme de la Communication, qui définit une « épistémologie de l’homme social » et une « épistémologie de l’homme moderne » ; le paradigme de l’Introspection, qui prépare à l’élaboration d’une « épistémologie du personnage intérieur » ; et enfin, le paradigme de la Vocation, qui rassemble les réponses trouvées par le narrateur à la plupart des questionnements qui auront jalonné son parcours cognitif. Ce dernier paradigme se présente sous la forme d’une « épistémologie de la création », d’une « épistémologie du réel » et d’une « épistémologie du hasard ». Car en dépit d’une démarche qui apparaît soumise aux médiations culturelles, la recherche du héros proustien se présente comme une « pensée de l’imprévisible » : fortement déterminée par la recherche cognitive du protagoniste, elle demeure pourtant irréductible à cette seule recherche. Nous dégageons, pour terminer, le statut réservé à la science et aux savoirs positifs en regard de la découverte de la vocation, mais aussi par rapport à l’élaboration d’une théorie de la création littéraire : ces deux grands domaines du savoir sont-ils considérés par Proust comme inconciliables avec une priorité évidente de l’un sur l’autre ou, au contraire, participent-ils tous deux d’une manière égale à la connaissance et à la création artistique ?

Gender stereotyping and decision processes: extending and reversing the gender bias in fame judgements

M. R. Banaji and A. G. Greenwald (1995) demonstrated a gender bias in fame judgments—that is, an increase in judged fame due to prior processing that was larger for male than for female names. They suggested that participants shift criteria between judging men and women, using the more liberal criterion for judging men. This "criterion-shift" account appeared problematic for a number of reasons. In this article, 3 experiments are reported that were designed to evaluate the criterion-shift account of the gender bias in the false-fame effect against a distribution-shift account. The results were consistent with the criterion-shift account, and they helped to define more precisely the situations in which people may be ready to shift their response criterion on an item-by-item basis. In addition, the results were incompatible with an interpretation of the criterion shift as an artifact of the experimental situation in the experiments reported by M. R. Banaji and A. G. Greenwald. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)

Habituation and dishabituation to speech and office noise

The authors examined whether background noise can be habituated to in the laboratory by using memory for prose tasks in 3 experiments. Experiment 1 showed that background speech can be habituated to after 20 min exposure and that meaning and repetition had no effect on the degree of habituation seen. Experiment 2 showed that office noise without speech can also be habituated to. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that a 5-min period of quiet, but not a change in voice, was sufficient to partially restore the disruptive effects of the background noise previously habituated to. These results are interpreted in light of current theories regarding the effects of background noise and habituation; practical implications for office planning are discussed.