126 resultados para Endowments
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Countries differ in terms of technological capabilities and complexity of production structures. According to that, countries may follow different development strategies: one based on extracting rents from abundant endowments, such as labor or natural resources, and the other focused on creating rents through intangibles, basically innovation and knowledge accumulation. The present article studies international convergence and divergence, linking structural change with trade and growth through a North South Ricardian model. The analysis focuses on the asymmetries between Latin America and mature and catching up economies. Empirical evidence supports that a shift in the composition of the production structure in favor of R&D intensive sectors allows achieving higher rates of growth in the long term and increases the capacity to respond to demand changes. A virtuous export-led growth requires laggard countries to reduce the technological gap with respect to more advanced ones. Hence, abundance of factor endowments requires to be matched with technological capabilities development for countries to converge in the long term.
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We develop and calibrate a model where differences in factor endowments lead countries to trade intermediate goods, and gains from trade reflect in total factor productivity. We perform several output and growth decompositions, to assess the impact that barriers to trade, as well as changes in terms of trade, have on measured TFP. We find that for very poor economies gains from trade are large, in some cases representing a doubling of GDP. Also, that an improvement in the terms of trade - by allowing the use of a better mix of intermediate inputs in the production process - translates into productivity growth.
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A inconsistência entre a teoria e o comportamento empírico dos agentes no que tange ao mercado privado de pensões tem se mostrado um dos mais resistentes puzzles presentes na literatura econômica. Em modelos de otimização intertemporal de consumo e poupança sob incerteza em relação ao tempo de vida dos agentes, anuidades são ativos dominantes, anulando ou restringindo fortemente a demanda por ativos cujos retornos não estão relacionados à probabilidade de sobrevivência. Na prática, entretanto, consumidores são extremamente céticos em relação às anuidades. Em oposição ao seguro contra longevidade oferecido pelas anuidades, direitos sobre esses ativos - essencialmente ilíquidos - cessam no caso de morte do titular. Nesse sentido, choques não seguráveis de liquidez e a presença de bequest motives foram consideravelmente explorados como possíveis determinantes da baixa demanda verificada. Apesar dos esforços, o puzzle persiste. Este trabalho amplia a dominância teórica das anuidades sobre ativos não contingentes em mercados incompletos; total na ausência de bequest motives, e parcial, quando os agentes se preocupam com possíveis herdeiros. Em linha com a literatura, simulações numéricas atestam que uma parcela considerável do portfolio ótimo dos agentes seria constituída de anuidades mesmo diante de choques de liquidez, bequest motives, e preços não atuarialmente justos. Em relação a um aspecto relativamente negligenciado pela academia, mostramos que o tempo ótimo de conversão de poupança em anuidades está diretamente relacionado à curva salarial dos agentes. Finalmente, indicamos que, caso as preferências dos agentes sejam tais que o nível de consumo ótimo decaia com a idade, a demanda por anuidades torna-se bastante sensível ao sobrepreço (em relação àquele atuarialmente justo) praticado pela indústria, chegando a níveis bem mais compatíveis com a realidade empírica.
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We develop a model of comparative advantage with monopolistic competition, that incorporates heterogeneous firms and endogenous mark-ups. We analyse how these features vary across countries with different factor endowments, and across markets of different size. In this model we can obtain trade gains via two channels. First, when we open the economy, most productive firms start to export their product, then, they demand more producing factors and wages rises, thus, those firms that are less productive will be forced to stop to produce. Second channel is via endogenous mark-ups, when we open the economy, the competition gets ``tougher'', then, mark-ups falls, thus, those firms that are less productive will stop to produce. We also show that comparative advantage works as a ``third channel'' of trade gains, because, all trade gains results are magnified in comparative advantage industry of both countries. We also make a numerical exercise to see how endogenous variables of the model vary when trade costs fall.
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The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.
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In a two-period economy with incomplete markets and possibility of default we consider the two classical ways to enforce the honor of financial commitments: by using utility penalties and by using collateral requirements that borrowers have to fulfill. Firstly, we prove that any equilibrium in an economy with collateral requirements is also equilibrium in a non-collateralized economy where each agent is penalized (rewarded) in his utility if his delivery rate is lower (greater) than the payment rate of the financial market. Secondly, we prove the converse: any equilibrium in an economy with utility penalties is also equilibrium in a collateralized economy. For this to be true the payoff function and initial endowments of the agents must be modified in a quite natural way. Finally, we prove that the equilibrium in the economy with collateral requirements attains the same welfare as in the new economy with utility penalties.
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The present study aims to provide a wide panorama of the endowment funds in Brazil, addressing not only the concept of this kind of fund and its role in the development context of the Brazilian third sector, but also the current legal barriers that hinder the full consolidation of the endowment as an important tool for the sustainable management of nonprofit organizations’ assets. The methodology adopted for this purpose relies on a course that goes from a more abstract approach – the gathering and analysis of the (actual and expected) legislation concerning the endowment funds – and ends with a more concrete one – the study of the demands and challenges faced by a few endowments funds based in the state of São Paulo that were interviewed by the author.
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