Le dauphin et l’astrologue : le Livret des elections universelles des 12 maisons de Pèlerin de Prusse

In 1361, at Hotel St-Pol, the future king of France, Charles the Fifth, received a book entitled Livret des elections universelles des 12 maisons from his astrologer, Pèlerin de Prusse. Written in old French during the translatio studii period, the book contains two books and describes several astrological theories along with precise descriptions of the twelve houses. Charles the Fifth is widely known as Charles the Wise in our present day. This is due to his vast contributions to the Louvre library as well as his impulse of translations from Latin to the French of the auctoritates and his passion for astrology. The significance imparted on astrology prior and during Charles the Fifth’s reign is apparent in Pèlerin de Prusse’s text Traité des elections, commissioned by Charles during a time of political unrest. The defeat of Poitiers, the États of 1356 to 1358 as well as the Jacquerie define the political landscape of 14th century France. Located at Oxford and the Vatican, two copies are extant, and neither have been edited from the original or subjected to detailed examination and study. This master will present a transcription of the first part of the Livret des elections universelles des 12 maisons.

Don't make war, make elections : Franchise extension and violence in XIXth-century Colombia

This paper studies the effect of strengthening democracy, as captured by an increase in voting rights, on the incidence of violent civil conflict in nineteenth-century Colombia. Empirically studying the relationship between democracy and conflict is challenging, not only because of conceptual problems in defining and measuring democracy, but also because political institutions and violence are jointly determined. We take advantage of an experiment of history to examine the impact of one simple, measurable dimension of democracy (the size of the franchise) on con- flict, while at the same time attempting to overcome the identification problem. In 1853, Colombia established universal male suffrage. Using a simple difference-indifferences specification at the municipal level, we find that municipalities where more voters were enfranchised relative to their population experienced fewer violent political battles while the reform was in effect. The results are robust to including a number of additional controls. Moreover, we investigate the potential mechanisms driving the results. In particular, we look at which components of the proportion of new voters in 1853 explain the results, and we examine if results are stronger in places with more political competition and state capacity. We interpret our findings as suggesting that violence in nineteenth-century Colombia was a technology for political elites to compete for the rents from power, and that democracy constituted an alternative way to compete which substituted violence.

Free and Fair? A Challenge for the EU as Georgia and Ukraine gear up for elections. CEPS Commentary, 27 September 2012

In an important test for democracy, Georgia and Ukraine will go to the polls for parliamentary elections on the 1st and 28th of October, respectively. The political leaders of these two Eastern Partnership countries have committed themselves to European values and principles – rhetorically. In reality, the promise of their colour revolutions is unrealised and they have shifted further towards authoritarianism, albeit following different paths in their respective post-revolution periods.

Support for the far right in the 2014 European Parliament Elections: a comparative perspective

The May 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections were characterised by the success of far-right Eurosceptic parties, including the French Front National, UKIP, the Danish People’s Party, the Hungarian Jobbik, the Austrian FPÖ, the True Finns and the Greek Golden Dawn. However, a closer look at the results across Europe indicates that the success of far-right parties in the EP elections is neither a linear nor a clear-cut phenomenon: (1) the far right actually declined in many European countries compared to the 2009 results; (2) some of the countries that have experienced the worst of the economic crisis, including Spain, Portugal and Ireland, did not experience a significant rise in far-right party support; and (3) ‘far right’ is too broad an umbrella term, covering parties that are too different from each other to be grouped in one single party family.

Radical left-wing Euroscepticism in the 2014 elections: a cross-European comparison

This article examines the varied performance of radical left-wing Eurosceptic parties during the 2014 EP elections. While the performance of the radical right during this 'earthquake' election has been widely discussed, little attention has been paid to the radical left. The article examines the result comparatively, and identifies that: (1) across Europe, radical left-wing euroscepticism is limited to few countries, including Greece, Cyprus, France and Portugal; (2) the countries that have experienced the worst of the economic crisis did not experience a significant rise in far right-wing party support but did experience the rise of left-wing euroscepticism; (3) from this sample only Greece experienced the rise of both the radical right and radical left.

The rise of the far right in debtor and creditor European countries: the case of European Parliament elections

While the 2014 European Parliament elections were marked by the rise of far right-wing parties, the different patterns of support that we observe across Europe and across time are not directly related to the economic crisis. Indeed, economic hardship seems neither sufficient nor necessary for the rise of such parties to occur. Using the cross-national results for the 2004, 2009 and 2014 EP elections in order to capture time and country variations, we posit the economy affects the rise of far right-wing parties in more complex ways. Specifically, we compare the experience of high debt countries (the ‘debtors’) and the others (the ‘creditors’) and explore the relationship between far right-wing party success on the one hand, and unemployment, inequality, immigration, globalization and the welfare state on the other hand. Our discussion suggests there might be a trade off between budgetary stability and far right-wing party support, but the choice between Charybdis and Scylla may be avoided if policy makers carefully choose which policies should bear the brunt of the fiscal adjustment.

Risks, costs and labour markets: explaining cross-national patterns of far right party success in European Parliament elections

What is the impact of the economy on cross national variation in far right-wing party support? This paper tests several hypotheses from existing literature on the results of the last three EP elections in all EU member states. We conceptualise the economy affects support because unemployment heightens the risks and costs that the population faces, but this is crucially mediated by labour market institutions. Findings from multiple regression analyses indicate that unemployment, real GDP growth, debt and deficits have no statistically significant effect on far right-wing party support at the national level. By contrast, labour markets influence costs and risks: where unemployment benefits and dismissal regulations are high, unemployment has no effect, but where either one of them is low, unemployment leads to higher far right-wing party support. This explains why unemployment has not led to far right-wing party support in some European countries that experienced the 2008 Eurozone crisis.