Optimal water use: is anyone getting the right incentives in California?

This paper discusses ~he widespread inefficiency in water pricing today and uses the State of California as an example. After solving the Planner' s Problem I conclude that water for irrigation should cost more than for domestic use. The optimal price leveI can be calculated from a correct measure of the true marginal cost of supply.

The need of subsidy for the implementation of photovoltaic solar energy as supporting of decentralized electrical power generation in Brazil

The growing demand for electrical power and the limited capital invested to provide this power is forcing countries like Brazil to search for new alternatives for electrical power generation. The purpose of this paper is to present a technical and economic study on a 15 kW solar plant installed in an isolated community, highlighting the importance of the need for financial subsidy from the government. It evaluates the importance of parameters such as the annual interest rate, specific investment, the marginal cost of expanding the electrical power supply and the government subsidy on amortization time of capital invested. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved.

Modeling amino acid requirements of poultry

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Three Essays in Spatial Economics

This work contributes to the field of spatial economics by embracing three distinct modelling approaches, belonging to different strands of the theoretical literature. In the first chapter I present a theoretical model in which the changes in urban system’s degree of functional specialisation are linked to (i) firms’ organisational choices and firms’ location decisions. The interplay between firms’ internal communication/managing costs (between headquarters and production plants) and the cost of communicating with distant business services providers leads the transition process from an “integrated” urban system where each city hosts every different functions to a “functionally specialised” urban system where each city is either a primary business center (hosting advanced business services providers, a secondary business center or a pure manufacturing city and all this city-types coexist in equilibrium.The second chapter investigates the impact of free trade on welfare in a two-country world modelled as an international Hotelling duopoly with quadratic transport costs and asymmetric countries, where a negative environmental externality is associated with the consumption of the good produced in the smaller country. Countries’ relative sizes as well as the intensity of negative environmental externality affect potential welfare gains of trade liberalisation. The third chapter focuses on the paradox, by which, contrary to theoretical predictions, empirical evidence shows that a decrease in international transport costs causes an increase in foreign direct investments (FDIs). Here we propose an explanation to this apparent puzzle by exploiting an approach which delivers a continuum of Bertrand- Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing. In our setting, two Bertrand firms, supplying a homogeneous good with a convex cost function, enter the market of a foreign country. We show that allowing for a softer price competition may indeed more than offset the standard effect generated by a decrease in trade costs, thereby restoring FDI incentives.

Economic Policies to Address the Environmental Consequences of Global Reuse

This paper summarizes a two-country model that solves for optimal tax rates to achieve efficiency in an economy with international trade in used consumer electronics. If only the developed nation can tax the disposal of e-waste, then the global Pareto Optimum can be obtained by either imposing an import tariff on used consumer electronics or subsidizing the return of e-waste for disposal in the developed country. The global Pareto Optimum can also be obtained by reducing the disposal tax in the developed country to a level below the external marginal cost of disposal should no other policy option be available.

Does high speed rail compete fairly with other transportation modes? Madrid-Barcelona case study

Transportation modes produce many external costs such as congestion, accidents, and environmental impacts (pollution, noise and so on). From the microeconomic theory it is well known that in order to maximize social welfare, transportation modes should internalize the marginal costs they produce. Allocative efficiency is achieved when all transportation modes are priced at their social marginal cost. The objective of this research is to evaluate to what extent different passenger transport modes internalize their social marginal costs. This analysis is important since it affects the competitiveness of the different transport modes for a given OD pair. The case study analyzed is the corridor Madrid-Barcelona in Spain and the different transport modes have been considered (cars, buses, high-speed train and air). The research calculates the marginal social cost per user for each transportation mode, and it compares it with the average fare—allowing for the effect of discriminatory taxes—currently paid by the users. The external costs are calculated according to the guidelines established by the European Union. The gap between the marginal social cost and the price paid by users will provide the extra cost per passenger that each transport mode should have to pay for internalizing the external cost it produces. The research shows that external costs already produced by road and air transport modes are much higher than those produced by rail. However, the results show that road transport already internalizes every external costs it produces because users pay high fuel taxes. In other words, although rail transportation produces lower external costs, road transportation pays more than it should on the basis of the social marginal costs. The results of this work might be of help for Europ ean policy actions to be undertaken in the future.

Application of the agency theory for the analysis of performance-based mechanisms in road management

El WCTR es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte, y aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper develops a model based on agency theory to analyze road management systems (under the different contract forms available today) that employ a mechanism of performance indicators to establish the payment of the agent. The base assumption is that of asymmetric information between the principal (Public Authorities) and the agent (contractor) and the risk aversion of this latter. It is assumed that the principal may only measure the agent?s performance indirectly and by means of certain performance indicators that may be verified by the authorities. In this model there is presumed to be a relation between the efforts made by the agent and the performance level measured by the corresponding indicators, though it is also considered that there may be dispersion between both variables that gives rise to a certain degree of randomness in the contract. An analysis of the optimal contract has been made on the basis of this model and in accordance with a series of parameters that characterize the economic environment and the particular conditions of road infrastructure. As a result of the analysis made, it is considered that an optimal contract should generally combine a fixed component and a payment in accordance with the performance level obtained. The higher the risk aversion of the agent and the greater the marginal cost of public funds, the lower the impact of this performance-based payment. By way of conclusion, the system of performance indicators should be as broad as possible but should not overweight those indicators that encompass greater randomness in their results.

Analysis of the Optimal Sharing of Construction Risk in Public Procurement Contracts

This paper discusses a model based on the agency theory to analyze the optimal transfer of construction risk in public works contracts. The base assumption is that of a contract between a principal (public authority) and an agent (firm), where the payment mechanism is linear and contains an incentive mechanism to enhance the effort of the agent to reduce construction costs. A theoretical model is proposed starting from a cost function with a random component and assuming that both the public authority and the firm are risk averse. The main outcome of the paper is that the optimal transfer of construction risk will be lower when the variance of errors in cost forecast, the risk aversion of the firm and the marginal cost of public funds are larger, while the optimal transfer of construction risk will grow when the variance of errors in cost monitoring and the risk aversion of the public authority are larger

The evolution of begging: Signaling and sibling competition

In many species, young solicit food from their parents, which respond by feeding them. Because of the difference in genetic make-up between parents and their offspring and the consequent conflict, this interaction is often studied as a paradigm for the evolution of communication. Existent theoretical models demonstrate that chick signaling and parent responding can be stable if solicitation is a costly signal. The marginal cost of producing stronger signals allows the system to converge to an equilibrium: young beg with intensity that reflects their need, and parents use this information to maximize their own inclusive fitness. However, we show that there is another equilibrium where chicks do not beg and parents’ provisioning effort is optimal with respect to the statistically probable distribution of chicks’ states. Expected fitness for parents and offspring at the nonsignaling equilibrium is higher than at the signaling equilibrium. Because nonsignaling is stable and it is likely to be the ancestral condition, we would like to know how natural systems evolved from nonsignaling to signaling. We suggest that begging may have evolved through direct sibling fighting before the establishment of a parental response, that is, that nonsignaling squabbling leads to signaling. In multiple-offspring broods, young following a condition-dependent strategy in the contest for resources provide information about their condition. Parents can use this information even though it is not an adaptation for communication, and evolution will lead the system to the signaling equilibrium. This interpretation implies that signaling evolved in multiple-offspring broods, but given that signaling is evolutionarily stable, it would also be favored in species which secondarily evolved single-chick broods.

The challenge of contracting for technological information

Contracting to provide technological information (TI) is a significant challenge. TI is an unusual commodity in five ways. (i) TI is difficult to count and value; conventional indicators, such as patents and citations, hardly indicate value. TI is often sold at different prices to different parties. (ii) To value TI, it may be necessary to “give away the secret.” This danger, despite nondisclosure agreements, inhibits efforts to market TI. (iii) To prove its value, TI is often bundled into complete products, such as a computer chip or pharmaceutical product. Efficient exchange, by contrast, would involve merely the raw information. (iv) Sellers’ superior knowledge about TI’s value make buyers wary of overpaying. (v) Inefficient contracts are often designed to secure rents from TI. For example, licensing agreements charge more than marginal cost. These contracting difficulties affect the way TI is produced, encouraging self-reliance. This should be an advantage to large firms. However, small research and development firms spend more per employee than large firms, and nonprofit universities are major producers. Networks of organizational relationships, particularly between universities and industry, are critical in transmitting TI. Implicit barter—money for guidance—is common. Property rights for TI are hard to establish. Patents, quite suitable for better mousetraps, are inadequate for an era when we design better mice. Much TI is not patented, and what is patented sets fuzzy demarcations. New organizational forms are a promising approach to contracting difficulties for TI. Webs of relationships, formal and informal, involving universities, start-up firms, corporate giants, and venture capitalists play a major role in facilitating the production and spread of TI.

The Economics of EU Railway Reform. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 8/2004

The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.

Optimal price regulation in a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods

In this paper we investigate the trade-off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermediate good somewhere between the marginal cost and the monopoly price. We utilize a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods. Investment in innovation is required to produce a new intermediate good. Marginal cost pricing deters innovation, while monopoly pricing maximizes innovation and economic growth at the cost of some static inefficiency. We demonstrate the existence of a second-best price above the marginal cost but below the monopoly price, which maximizes consumer welfare. Simulation results suggest that substantial reductions in consumption, production, growth, and welfare occur where regulators focus on static efficiency issues by setting prices at or near marginal cost.

Modeling the economic losses from pressure ulcers among hospitalized patients in Australia

The objective of this study was to predict the number of cases of pressure ulcer, the bed days lost, and the economic value of these losses at Australian public hospitals. All adults (>= 18 years of age) with a minimum stay of 1 night and discharged from selected clinical units from all Australian public hospitals in 2001-02 were included in the study. The main outcome measures were the number of cases of pressure ulcer, bed days lost to pressure ulcer, and economic value of these losses. We predict a median of 95,695 cases of pressure ulcer with a median of 398,432 bed days lost, incurring median opportunity costs of AU$285 M. The number of cases, and so costs, were greatest in New South Wales and lowest in Australian Capitol Territory. We conclude that pressure ulcers represent a serious clinical and economic problem for a resource-constrained public hospital system. The most cost-effective, risk-reducing interventions should be pursued up to a point where the marginal benefit of prevention is equalized with marginal cost. By preventing pressure ulcers, public hospitals can improve efficiency and the quality of the patient's experience and health outcome.

The separation of hydrogen and carbon monoxide using polymer membranes

This work studies the development of polymer membranes for the separation of hydrogen and carbon monoxide from a syngas produced by the partial oxidation of natural gas. The CO product is then used for the large scale manufacture of acetic acid by reaction with methanol. A method of economic evaluation has been developed for the process as a whole and a comparison is made between separation of the H2/CO mixture by a membrane system and the conventional method of cryogenic distillation. Costs are based on bids obtained from suppliers for several different specifications for the purity of the CO fed to the acetic acid reactor. When the purity of the CO is set at that obtained by cryogenic distillation it is shown that the membrane separator offers only a marginal cost advantage. Cost parameters for the membrane separation systems have been defined in terms of effective selectivity and cost permeability. These new parameters, obtained from an analysis of the bids, are then used in a procedure which defines the optimum degree of separation and recovery of carbon monoxide for a minimum cost of manufacture of acetic acid. It is shown that a significant cost reduction is achieved with a membrane separator at the optimum process conditions. A method of "targeting" the properties of new membranes has been developed. This involves defining the properties for new (hypothetical -yet to be developed) membranes such that their use for the hydrogen/carbon monoxide separation will produce a reduced cost of acetic acid manufacture. The use of the targeting method is illustrated in the development of new membranes for the separation of hydrogen and carbon monoxide. The selection of polymeric materials for new membranes is based on molecular design methods which predict the polymer properties from the molecular groups making up the polymer molecule. Two approaches have been used. One method develops the analogy between gas solubility in liquids and that in polymers. The UNIFAC group contribution method is then used to predict gas solubility in liquids. In the second method the polymer Permachor number, developed by Salame, has been correlated with hydrogen and carbon monoxide permeabilities. These correlations are used to predict the permeabilities of gases through polymers. Materials have been tested for hydrogen and carbon monoxide permeabilities and improvements in expected economic performance have been achieved.

Pricing-to-market for UK export sector

This thesis investigates the pricing-to-market (PTM) behaviour of the UK export sector. Unlike previous studies, this study econometrically tests for seasonal unit roots in the export prices prior to estimating PTM behaviour. Prior studies have seasonally adjusted the data automatically. This study’s results show that monthly export prices contain very little seasonal unit roots implying that there is a loss of information in the data generating process of the series when estimating PTM using seasonally-adjusted data. Prior studies have also ignored the econometric properties of the data despite the existence of ARCH effects in such data. The standard approach has been to estimate PTM models using Ordinary Least Square (OLS). For this reason, both EGARCH and GJR-EGARCH (hereafter GJR) estimation methods are used to estimate both a standard and an Error Correction model (ECM) of PTM. The results indicate that PTM behaviour varies across UK sectors. The variables used in the PTM models are co-integrated and an ECM is a valid representation of pricing behaviour. The study also finds that the price adjustment is slower when the analysis is performed on real prices, i.e., data that are adjusted for inflation. There is strong evidence of auto-regressive condition heteroscedasticity (ARCH) effects – meaning that the PTM parameter estimates of prior studies have been ineffectively estimated. Surprisingly, there is very little evidence of asymmetry. This suggests that exporters appear to PTM at a relatively constant rate. This finding might also explain the failure of prior studies to find evidence of asymmetric exposure in foreign exchange (FX) rates. This study also provides a cross sectional analysis to explain the implications of the observed PTM of producers’ marginal cost, market share and product differentiation. The cross-sectional regressions are estimated using OLS, Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) and Logit estimations. Overall, the results suggest that market share affects PTM positively.Exporters with smaller market share are more likely to operate PTM. Alternatively, product differentiation is negatively associated with PTM. So industries with highly differentiated products are less likely to adjust their prices. However, marginal costs seem not to be significantly associated with PTM. Exporters perform PTM to limit the FX rate effect pass-through to their foreign customers, but they also avoided exploiting PTM to the full, since to do so can substantially reduce their profits.