To ISDS or not to ISDS: A question of legitimacy in dispute resolution

Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) has gained prominence in recent years with an explosion in the number of investor claims against states. While the evolution of this type of arbitration was expected, its focus and context was not. Investors are currently bringing actions against developed states in unanticipated policy areas. Greece, facing actions from investors challenging its debt haircut and Spain, battling investor challenges to its revamped energy policy are examples of the use of arbitration as a political as well as a dispute resolution tool. It is for this reason why the proposal for the inclusion of ISDS in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has caused so much heated discussion. This paper examines the recent evolution and likely trajectory of investor state dispute settlement, reflecting on consequences for perceptions of arbitration and its links with politics and economics.

Dispute resolution outside of courts: procedural justice and decision acceptance among users of ombuds services in the UK

Attitudes towards legal authorities based on theories of procedural justice have been explored extensively in the criminal and civil justice systems. This has provided considerable empirical evidence concerning the importance of trust and legitimacy in generating cooperation, compliance and decision acceptance. However, not enough attention has been paid to attitudes towards institutions of informal dispute resolution. This paper asks whether the theory of procedural justice applies to the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) context, focusing on ombuds services. What are the predictors of perceptions of procedural justice during the process of dealing with an ombuds, and what factors shape outcome acceptance? These questions are analyzed using a sample of recent ombuds users. The results indicate that outcome favorability is highly correlated with perceived procedural justice, and both predict decision acceptance.

Are the financial services external complaints resolution schemes subject to judicial review?

In Australia seven schemes (apart from the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal) provide alternative dispute resolution services for complaints brought by consumers against financial services industry members. Recently the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the decisions of one scheme were amenable to judicial review at the suit of a financial services provider member and the Supreme Court of Victoria has since taken a similar approach. This article examines the juristic basis for such a challenge and contends that judicial review is not available, either at common law or under statutory provisions. This is particularly the case since Financial Industry Complaints Service Ltd v Deakin Financial Services Pty Ltd (2006) 157 FCR 229; 60 ACSR 372 decided that the jurisdiction of a scheme is derived from a contract made with its members. The article goes on to contend that the schemes are required to give procedural fairness and that equitable remedies are available if that duty is breached.

Litigating law of the sea disputes using the UNCLOS Dispute Settlement System

The interpretation and application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) may be the source of many disputes. UNCLOS introduced an à la carte menu for dispute settlement with a number of options for international dispute resolution, including a compulsory procedure entailing binding decisions. While drafting this ambitious and complex system of dispute settlement, the drafters had to negotiate many delicate compromises to secure a system for the uniform interpretation of the Convention. The aim of this paper r is to explore why litigation using the UNCLOS dispute settlement system is, or is not, a preferred mode of settlement for law of the sea disputes.

Analysis of construction dispute review boards

The construction industry has long been burdened with inherent adversarial relationships among the parties and the resulting disputes. Dispute review boards (DRBs) have emerged as alternatives to settle construction-related disputes outside courts. Although DRBs have found support in some quarters of the construction industry, the quantitative assessment of the impact of DRBs has not been adequately addressed. This paper presents the results of a research project undertaken to assess the impact of DRBs on the construction program of a large-scale highway agency. Three dimensions of DRB impact were assessed: (1) influence on project cost and schedule performance, (2) effectiveness of DRBs in preventing and resolving construction disputes, and (3) costs of DRB implementation. The analyses encompass data from approximately 3,000 projects extending over a 10-year period (2000–2009). Quantitative measures of performance were developed and analyzed for each category. Projects that used DRBs faced reduced costs and schedule growth (6.88 and 12.92%, respectively) when compared to non-DRB projects (11.53 and 28.96%). DRBs were also found to be effective in avoiding and settling disputes; the number of arbitration cases reduced consistently after DRB implementation, and DRBs have a success rate of 97% in settling disputes for which DRBs were used. Moreover, costs of DRBs were found to comprise a relatively small fraction (i.e., approximately 0.3%) of total project budgets. It was concluded that DRBs were effective dispute prevention and resolution alternatives with no significant adverse effects on project performance.

An analysis of dispute review boards and settlement mediation as used in the Australian construction industry

If there is a silver lining to the adversarial, dispute-prone nature of the building and construction industry, it can be found in the concomitant rise of innovative dispute resolution mechanisms. Time, cost and relationship concerns have meant that the formal adversarial system holds little appeal for disputing parties. As these alternative forms of dispute avoidance/resolution have matured in Australia over the last 20 years, attention has turned to the key characteristics of each process and their suitability to the building and construction industry. This article considers the role of dispute review boards (DRBs) and mediation as two alternative methods for avoiding/resolving disputes in the construction industry. Criteria are established for evaluating the efficacy of these procedures and their sensitivity to the needs of construction industry disputants. The ultimate conclusion reached is that DRBs represent a powerful, yet underutilised dispute resolution tool in Australia, and possess many industry-specific advantages that more traditional forms of alternative dispute resolution (particularly mediation) do not provide.

Analysis of construction dispute review boards

This paper presents the results of a research project undertaken to assess the impact of DRBs on the construction program of a large scale highway agency. Three dimensions of DRB impact were assessed: (1)influence on project cost and schedule performance, (2) effectiveness of DRBs in preventing and resolving construction disputes, and (3) costs of DRB implementation. The analyses encompass data from approximately 3,000 projects extending over a 10 year period (2000-2009).

Lock the gate: Fracking, investor-state dispute settlement, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership

There has been much debate about the relationship between international trade, the environment, biodiversity protection, and climate change.The Obama Administration has pushed such issues into sharp relief, with its advocacy for sweeping international trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. There has been much public concern about the impact of the mega-trade deals upon the protection of the environment. In particular, there has been a debate about whether the Trans-Pacific Partnership will promote dirty fracking. Will the Trans-Pacific Partnership transform the Pacific Rim into a Gasland?There has been a particular focus upon investor-state dispute settlement being used by unconventional mining companies. Investor-state dispute settlement is a mechanism which enables foreign investors to seek compensation from national governments at international arbitration tribunals. In her prescient 2009 book, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance, Kyla Tienhaara foresaw the rise of investor-state dispute resolution of environmental matters. She observed:'Over the last decade there has been an explosive increase of cases investment arbitration. This is significant in terms of not only the number of disputes that have arisen and the number of states that have been involved, but also the novel types of dispute that have emerged. Rather than solely involving straightforward incidences of nationalization or breach of contract, modern disputes often revolve around public policy measures and implicate sensitive issues such as access to drinking water, development on sacred indigenous sites and the protection of biodiversity.'In her study, Kyla Tienhaara observed that investment agreements, foreign investment contracts and investment arbitration had significant implications for the protection for the protection of the environment. She concluded that arbitrators have made it clear that they can, and will, award compensation to investors that claim to have been harmed by environmental regulation. She also found that some of the cases suggest that the mere threat of arbitration is sufficient to chill environmental policy development. Tienhaara was equally concerned by the possibility that a government may use the threat of arbitration as an excuse or cover for its failure to improve environmental regulation. In her view, it is evident that arbitrators have expropriated certain fundamental aspects of environmental governance from states. Tienhaara held: As a result, environmental regulation has become riskier, more expensive, and less democratic, especially in developing countries. This article provides a comparative analysis of the battles over fracking, investment, trade, and the environment in a number of key jurisdictions including the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Part 1 focuses upon the United States. Part 2 examines the dispute between the Lone Pine Resources Inc. and the Government of Canada over a fracking moratorium in Quebec. Part 3 charts the rise of the Lock the Gate Alliance in Australia, and its demands for a moratorium in respect of coal seam gas and unconventional mining. Part 4 focuses upon parallel developments in New Zealand. This article concludes that Pacific Rim countries should withdraw from investor-state dispute settlement procedures, because of the threat posed to environmental regulation in respect of air, land, and water.