Global restructuring and its effects on occupations: towards a new division of labor?

The following contribution considers whether global restructuring creates new forms of the division of labor. On the basis of empirical data from a comparative project in 14 European countries, the author supports the hypothesis that in addition to the ongoing process of the internationalization of work, there are ‘hidden’ effects at the local level. From the perspective of three occupational clusters, dynamics can be observed which have differing impacts on the occupational groups. Thus, there is a simultaneous process of restructuring and redefining skills, labor processes and the working organization which forms the daily reality of working men and women.

Effect of European Sovereign debt crisis on banks’ stock market performances: application to Portuguese data

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Sovereign debt and CRAs: Where does the power lie?

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Restructuring Biotecnol

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The tight grip of a debt based global economy: A study on banking regulation and the implementation of the Basel II Accord in Portugal

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Contingent convertible debt: The case study of Banco Comercial Português

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Oi merger with Portugal Telecom: A strategic partnership

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on the recovering from the financial crisis: Equity returns of the banking sector

This paper analyses, through a dynamic panel data model, the impact of the Financial and the European Debt crisis on the equity returns of the banking system. The model is also extended to specifically investigate the impact on countries who received rescue packages. The sample under analysis considers eleven countries from January 2006 to June 2013. The main conclusion is that there was in fact a structural change in banks’ excess returns due to the outbreak of the European Debt Crisis, when stock markets were still recovering from the Financial Crisis of 2008.

The effectiveness of the “Processo Especial de Revitalização” as an instrument of corporate restructuring in the context of the current economic crisis

This work project intends to evaluate the effectiveness of the Portuguese Government’s strategy to promote the orderly deleveraging of the corporate sector in the context of the current economic crisis. The recommendations of the Troika and the commitments assumed under the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Government in 2011 required the creation of formal processes to avoid disorderly deleveraging. Conclusions and recommendations were drawn based on past experiences of large-scale corporate restructuring strategies in other countries and on the analysis of financial and statistical data on companies applying for “Programa Especial de Revitalização”.

Financial stress and sovereign debt composition

"Published online: 19 Oct 2015"

Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets

We analyse the implications of optimal taxation for the stochastic behaviour of debt. We show that when a government pursues an optimal fiscal policy under complete markets, the value of debt has the same or less persistence than other variables in the economy and it declines in response to shocks that cause the deficit to increase. By contrast, under incomplete markets debt shows more persistence than other variables and it increases in response to shocks that cause a higher deficit. Data for US government debt reveals diametrically opposite results from those of complete markets and is much more supportive of bond market incompleteness.

Fiscal insurance and debt management in OECD economies

Assuming the role of debt management is to provide hedging against fiscal shocks we consider three questions: i) what indicators can be used to assess the performance of debt management? ii) how well have historical debt management policies performed? and iii) how is that performance affected by variations in debt issuance? We consider these questions using OECD data on the market value of government debt between 1970 and 2000. Motivated by both the optimal taxation literature and broad considerations of debt stability we propose a range of performance indicators for debt management. We evaluate these using Monte Carlo analysis and find that those based on the relative persistence of debt perform best. Calculating these measures for OECD data provides only limited evidence that debt management has helped insulate policy against unexpected fiscal shocks. We also find that the degree of fiscal insurance achieved is not well connected to cross country variations in debt issuance patterns. Given the limited volatility observed in the yield curve the relatively small dispersion of debt management practices across countries makes little difference to the realised degree of fiscal insurance.

In Search of a theory of debt management

A growing literature integrates theories of debt management into models of optimal fiscal policy. One promising theory argues that the composition of government debt should be chosen so that fluctuations in the market value of debt offset changes in expected future deficits. This complete market approach to debt management is valid even when the government only issues non-contingent bonds. A number of authors conclude from this approach that governments should issue long term debt and invest in short term assets. We argue that the conclusions of this approach are too fragile to serve as a basis for policy recommendations. This is because bonds at different maturities have highly correlated returns, causing the determination of the optimal portfolio to be ill-conditioned. To make this point concrete we examine the implications of this approach to debt management in various models, both analytically and using numerical methods calibrated to the US economy. We find the complete market approach recommends asset positions which are huge multiples of GDP. Introducing persistent shocks or capital accumulation only worsens this problem. Increasing the volatility of interest rates through habits partly reduces the size of these simulations we find no presumption that governments should issue long term debt ? policy recommendations can be easily reversed through small perturbations in the specification of shocks or small variations in the maturity of bonds issued. We further extend the literature by removing the assumption that governments every period costlessly repurchase all outstanding debt. This exacerbates the size of the required positions, worsens their volatility and in some cases produces instability in debt holdings. We conclude that it is very difficult to insulate fiscal policy from shocks by using the complete markets approach to debt management. Given the limited variability of the yield curve using maturities is a poor way to substitute for state contingent debt. The result is the positions recommended by this approach conflict with a number of features that we believe are important in making bond markets incomplete e.g allowing for transaction costs, liquidity effects, etc.. Until these features are all fully incorporated we remain in search of a theory of debt management capable of providing robust policy insights.

Discretionary Policy in a Monetary Union with Sovereign Debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policy- makers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fi scal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with signifi cant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.