Institutional investors, risk/return and corporate governance : practical lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

The global grown in institutional investors means that firms can no longer ignore their influence in capital markets. However, not all institutional investors have the same motives to influence the firms they invest in. Institution investors' ability to influence management depends on the size of their investment and whether they have any business relations with the firm. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical results show that the proportion of a company's shares held by institutional investors is positively associated with firm governance ratings, risk and profitability. This study shows that a positive association between risk and return is associated with large active institutional ownership, which we interpret as shareholders with sufficient power to pressure management to increase short-term profits.

Convergence in European corporate governance : the audit committee concept

This paper analyses recent corporate governance codes issued by 20 countries for evidence of convergence in corporate governance systems in Europe. The analysis shows that there has been a degree of convergence towards an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance as the audit committee concept is widely accepted in countries with both unitary and two-tier governance systems. Further, the latest audit committee recommendations in countries that have issued several governance codes show a strengthening of the recommendations for an audit committee over time in line with the Anglo-Saxon audit committee concept and convergence with the debate in the US and UK on issues such as the independence and financial expertise of members. However, consistent with the literature on the convergence of European corporate governance systems, at an operational level there is limited consistency in the recommended structure and role of audit committees.

Corporate governance and bankruptcy risk

We examine how firm characteristics, particularly the degree of firm complexity and the firm’s need for specialty knowledge, affect the relationship between corporate governance and the risk of bankruptcy. We find that having larger boards reduces the risk of bankruptcy only for complex firms. Our results also suggest that the proportion of inside directors on the board is inversely associated with the risk of bankruptcy in firms that require more specialist knowledge, and that the reverse is true in technically unsophisticated firms. The results further reveal that the additional explanatory power from corporate governance variables becomes stronger as the time to bankruptcy is increased, implying that although corporate governance variables are important predictors, governance changes are likely to be too late to save a firm on the verge of bankruptcy.

Corporate governance quality, audit fees and non-audit services fees

This paper extends prior research on the relationship between governance quality and auditor remuneration.We examine the influence of audit committee effectiveness (ACE), a proxy for governance quality, on audit fees (AF) and non-audit services fees (NASF) using a new composite measure comprising audit committee independence, expertise, diligence and size. We find that after controlling for board of director characteristics, there is a significant positive association between ACE and AF only for larger clients. Our results indicate that effective audit committees undertake more monitoring which results in wider audit scope and higher audit fees. Contrary to our expectations, we find the association between ACE and NASF to be positive and significant, especially for larger clients. This suggests that larger clients are more likely to purchase non-audit services (NAS) even in the presence of effective audit committees probably due to the complexity of their activities. Overall, our findings support regulatory initiatives aimed at improving corporate governance quality.

The Corporate Governance Effects of Audit Committee

This chapter provides a synthesis and evaluation of empirical research on the governance effects associated with audit committees. Given recent policy recommendations in several countries aimed at strengthening these committees, it is important to establish what research evidence demonstrates about their existing governance contribution. A framework for analyzing the impact of audit committees is described, identifying potential perceived effects which may have led to their adoption and documented effects on aspects of the audit function, on financial reporting quality and on corporate performance. It is also shown that most of the existing research has focused on factors associated with audit committee existence, characteristics, and measures of activity and there is very little evidence on the processes associated with the operation of audit committees and the manner in which they influence organizational behavior. It is clear that there is no automatic relationship between the adoption of audit committee structures or characteristics and the achievement of particular governance effects, and caution may be needed over expectations that greater codification around factors such as audit committee members’ independence and expertise as the means of ‘‘correcting’’ past weaknesses in the arrangements for audit committees. The most fundamental question concerning what difference audit committees make in practice continues to be an important area for research development. For future research we suggest: (1) greater consideration of the organizational and institutional contexts in which audit committees operate; (2) explicit theorization of the processes associated with audit committee operation; (3) complementing extant research methods with field studies; and (4) investigation of unintended as well as expected consequences of audit committees.

Corporate governance in 2010 : what will change?

2010 is expected to see the publication of a new UK Code on Corporate Governance, replacing the Combined Code. Why is a new code being issued? What significant changes are proposed? WIll it change the corporate governance world?

Institutional investors, risk/performance and corporate governance

Modern portfolio theory suggests that investors minimize risk for a given level of expected return by carefully choosing the proportions of various assets. This study sets out to determine the role of the institutional investor in monitoring risk and firm performance. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical study shows a positive association between firm-specific risk, risk-management policy, and performance for firms with increasing institutional shareholdings. The study also finds that the significance of this association depends on the institutional investor's ability to influence management, which in turn depends on the size of ownership and whether the investee firm does not have potential business dealings with the investor. We also find that when firms are financially distressed, institutional investors engage in promoting short-term performance or exit rather than support long-term value creation. The results are robust while controlling the potential for endogeneity and using sensitivity tests to control for variants of performance and risk. These findings add to the growing body of literature examining institutional ownership and the importance of understanding the role of risk-management in the risk and return relation.

Applying metaethical and normative claims of moral relativism to (shareholder and stakeholder) models of corporate governance

There has, in recent decades, been considerable scholarship regarding the moral aspects of corporate governance,and differences in corporate governance practices around the world have been widely documented and investigated. In such a context, the claims associated with moral relativism are relevant. The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed consideration of how the metaethical and normative claims of moral relativism in particular can be applied to corporate governance. This objective is achieved, firstly, by reviewing what is meant by metaethical moral relativism and identifying two ways in which the metaethical claim can be assessed. The possibility of a single, morally superior model of corporate governance is subsequently considered through an analysis of prominent works justifying the shareholder and stakeholder approaches, together with a consideration of academic agreement in this area. The paper then draws on the work of Wong (Moral relativity, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1984, A companion to ethics, Blackwell, Malden, 1993, Natural moralities: A defense of pluralistic relativism,Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), firstly in providing an argument supporting metaethical moral relativism and secondly regarding values of tolerance and/or accommodation that can contribute to the normative claim. The paper concludes by proposing an argument that it is morally wrong to impose a model of corporate governance where there are differences in moral judgements relevant to corporate governance, or to interfere with a model in similar circumstances, and closes with consideration of the argument’s implications.

Corporate governance convergence and moral relativism

Research question / issue This paper frames the debate on corporate governance convergence in terms of the morality underlying corporate governance models. The claims and arguments of moral relativism are presented to provide theoretical structure to the moral aspects of corporate governance convergence, and ultimately the normative question of whether convergence should occur. Research findings / insights: The morality underlying different models of corporate governance has largely been ignored in the corporate governance convergence literature. A range of moral philosophies and principles that underlie the dominant corporate governance models are identified. This leads to a consideration of the claims and arguments of moral relativism relating to corporate governance. A research agenda around the claims of Descriptive and Metaethical moral relativism, and which ultimately informs the associated normative argument, is then suggested. Theoretical / Academic implications The application of moral relativism to the debate on corporate governance convergence presents a theoretical structure to the analysis and consideration of its moral aspects. This structure lends itself to further research, both empirical and conceptual. Practitioner / Policy implications The claims and arguments of moral relativism provide a means of analysing calls that are made for a culturally or nationally ‘appropriate’ model of corporate governance. This can assist in providing direction for corporate governance reforms and is of particular relevance for developing countries which have inherited Western corporate governance models through colonialism.

The ethics of corporate governance: A (South)African perspective

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to review the developments in South African corporate governance since the end of apartheid, with a view to identifying themes and points of convergence and/or divergence with other models. Design/methodology/approach – The paper presents a critical review of South African corporate governance in the context of political and economic developments. Where relevant, aspects of corporate governance theory (in particular the stakeholder and shareholder debate) are considered in the South African context. Findings – South African corporate governance can be seen to broadly follow Anglo‐American examples with the notable exception of the stakeholder approach of the two King reports. This approach emphasises the responsibilities of companies to various stakeholders and encourages stakeholder engagement as an integral element of company strategy. There has not, however, been any substantial incorporation of stakeholder interests into formal corporate governance structures such as board structure and financial reporting. Practical implications – The ongoing consideration of corporate governance developments in South Africa is important for its continued development in the country and the region. Originality/value – A review of South African corporate governance is timely given the probable release of the third King report in 2009, together with new company legislation.

Theorising South Africa's corporate governance

South Africa’s principal corporate governance report aspires to an ‘inclusive’ approach to corporate governance, in which companies are clearly advised to consider the interests of a variety of stakeholders. Yet, in common with many other countries, there is little discussion of the theoretical foundations and assumptions implicit in the recommended approach to corporate governance. The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of corporate governance and the corporate environment in South Africa in terms of existing theory and models of corporate governance, and to provide a critique based on a consideration of traditional African values and the socio-economic necessities of post-apartheid South Africa. The result is the identification of an incompatibility between the current corporate environment in South Africa and the given exposition of African values. Some prospects for change are then identified.

Corporate Governance in the 21st Century: Japan's Gradual Transformation

The 'lost' decade of economic stagnation in Japan during the 1990s has become a 'found decade' for regulatory and institutional reform. With nearly all areas of the 'law in the books' reviewed, revised and rewritten, the Japanese legal system is no longer the system that foreign commentators felt they were finally starting to understand by the 1980s. Nowhere is this more evident than in corporate governance. Corporate and securities legislation has been comprehensively revamped over 1993-2007, creating a more flexible and transparent regime for shareholders and managers. Financial markets law and regulatory institutions have changed, too, creating a new context for Japan's 'main banks' as alternative or additional outside monitors of managerial performance in borrowing firms. Even the legislation surrounding labour regulations has been amended, reinforcing the lifelong security privileges for elite employee-stakeholders, yet also hastening the growth of other atypical employment relationships. But how do such legislative reforms affecting key players in Japanese firms, covering areas central to the design of Japanese capitlaism, play out in the 'law in action'? Overall, this book argues that a significant gradual transformation has occurred. Although this is evident also in other advanced industrialised democracies, such as Germany, Japan reveals especially complex interactions in the various fields that sometimes emphasise different ways of achieving such transformation.

Introduction: Japan’s gradual transformation in corporate governance

Japan has recovered from a ‘lost decade’ of economic stagnation over the 1990s. Anyway, it has been a ‘found decade’ for civil and criminal justice law reform, especially in corporate and securities law. Yet, have liberalisation and globalisation in those fields led to major changes in the ‘law in action’? Does this represent ‘Americanisation’ of Japan’s corporate governance system, focusing on shareholders rather than other key stakeholders such as ‘main banks’, core employees, and partners within diffuse corporate groups (keiretsu)? This version of our introductory chapter explains how our forthcoming book argues for a more complex ‘gradual transformation’. Such shifts are also found in many other post-industrial economies, but Japan appears to give greater emphasis given to certain modes of achieving change. The book brings together contributions from academics and practitioners from Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. An early chapter introduces methodology for effective cross-country comparisons and for evaluating the burgeoning but divergent literature on Japanese corporate governance. The concluding chapter compares continuities and changes in Japan’s largest companies now and two decades ago. Other chapters cover ‘lifelong employment’, main banks, the untold story of closely-held companies, the limited uptake of the Committee-based governance form, and the procedural, substantive and FDI policy dimensions of takeovers law and practice.

Corporate governance and law reform in Japan: From the lost decade to the end of history?

Japan is in the midst of massive law reform. Mired in ongoing recession since the early 1990s, Japan has been implementing a new regulatory blueprint to kickstart a sluggish economy through structural change. A key element to this reform process is a rethink of corporate governance and its stakeholder relations. With a patchwork of legislative initiatives in areas as diverse as corporate law, finance, labour relations, consumer protection, public administration and civil justice, this new model is beginning to take shape. But to what extent does this model represent a break from the past? Some commentators are breathlessly predicting the "Americanisation" of Japanese law. They see the triumph of Western-style capitalism - the "End of History", to borrow the words of Francis Fukuyama - with its emphasis on market-based, arms-length transactions. Others are more cautious, advancing the view that there new reforms are merely "creative twists" on what is a uniquely (although slowly evolving) strand of Japanese capitalism. This paper takes issue with both interpretations. It argues that the new reforms merely follow Japan's long tradition of 'adopting and adapting' foreign models to suit domestic purposes. They are neither the wholesale importation of "Anglo-Saxon" regulatory principles nor a thin veneer over a 'uniquely unique' form of Confucian cultural capitalism. Rather, they represent a specific and largely political solution (conservative reformism) to a current economic problem (recession). The larger themes of this paper are 'change' and 'continuity'. 'Change' suggests evolution to something identifiable; 'continuity' suggests adhering to an existing state of affairs. Although notionally opposites, 'change' and 'continuity' have something in common - they both suggest some form of predictability and coherence in regulatory reform. Our paper, by contrast, submits that Japanese corporate governance reform or, indeed, law reform more generally in Japan, is context-specific, multi-layered (with different dimensions not necessarily pulling all in the same direction for example, in relations with key outside suppliers), and therefore more random or 'chaotic'.