Weekly Self-Scheduling, Forward Contracting, and Offering Strategy for a Producer

Within a weekly market horizon, this paper considers a power producer that sells its energy both in the pool and through weekly forward contracts. The paper provides a methodology that allows the producer to derive the self-scheduling of its production units, to select weekly forward contracts, and to obtain the offering strategy for Monday's pool. The proposed technique is based on stochastic programming and allows the producer to maximize its expected profit while controlling the risk of profit variability. A comprehensive case study is used to illustrate the characteristics of the proposed methodology. Appropriate conclusions are finally drawn.

Alterations in vasoconstrictor responses to the endothelium-derived contracting factor uridine adenosine tetraphosphate are region specific in DOCA-salt hypertensive rats

Uridine adenosine tetraphosphate (Up(4)A) has been recently identified as a novel and potent endothelium-derived contracting factor and contains both purine and pyrimidine moieties, which activate purinergic P2X and P2Y receptors. The present study was designed to compare contractile responses to Up(4)A and other nucleotides such as ATP (P2X/P2Y agonist), UTP (P2Y(2)/P2Y(4) agonist), UDP (P2Y(6) agonist), and alpha,beta-methylene ATP (P2X(1) agonist) in different vascular regions [thoracic aorta, basilar, small mesenteric, and femoral arteries] from deoxycorticosterone acetate-salt (DOCA-salt) and control rats. In DOCA-salt rats [vs. control uninephrectomized (Uni) rats]: (1) in thoracic aorta, Up(4)A-, ATP-, and UP-induced contractions were unchanged; (2) in basilar artery, Up(4)A-, ATP-, UTP- and UDP-induced contractions were increased, and expression for P2X(1), but not P2Y(2) or P2Y(6) was decreased; (3) in small mesenteric artery, Up(4)A-induced contraction was decreased and UDP-induced contraction was increased; expression of P2Y(2) and P2X(1) was decreased whereas P2Y(6) expression was increased; (4) in femoral artery, Up(4)A-. UTP-, and UDP-induced contractions were increased, but expression of P2Y(2), P2Y(6) and P2X(1) was unchanged. The alpha,beta-methylene ATP-induced contraction was bell-shaped and the maximal contraction was reached at a lower concentration in basilar and mesenteric arteries from Uni rats, compared to arteries from DOCA-salt rats. These results suggest that Up(4)A-induced contraction is heterogenously affected among various vascular beds in arterial hypertension. P2Y receptor activation may contribute to enhancement of Up(4)A-induced contraction in basilar and femoral arteries. These changes in vascular reactivity to Up(4)A may be adaptive to the vascular alterations produced by hypertension. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.

A Principal-Agent Model of Contracting in Major League Baseball

Traditional economic analyses of the reserve clause in major league baseball view it as having arisen from the superior bargaining of owners compared to players. This article interprets it instead as promoting efficient investment by teams in player development, given the transferability of player skills to other teams. Using a principal-agent framework, the article shows that limited player mobility emerges as part of the optimal contract between players (principals) and teams (agents).

The challenge of contracting for technological information

Contracting to provide technological information (TI) is a significant challenge. TI is an unusual commodity in five ways. (i) TI is difficult to count and value; conventional indicators, such as patents and citations, hardly indicate value. TI is often sold at different prices to different parties. (ii) To value TI, it may be necessary to “give away the secret.” This danger, despite nondisclosure agreements, inhibits efforts to market TI. (iii) To prove its value, TI is often bundled into complete products, such as a computer chip or pharmaceutical product. Efficient exchange, by contrast, would involve merely the raw information. (iv) Sellers’ superior knowledge about TI’s value make buyers wary of overpaying. (v) Inefficient contracts are often designed to secure rents from TI. For example, licensing agreements charge more than marginal cost. These contracting difficulties affect the way TI is produced, encouraging self-reliance. This should be an advantage to large firms. However, small research and development firms spend more per employee than large firms, and nonprofit universities are major producers. Networks of organizational relationships, particularly between universities and industry, are critical in transmitting TI. Implicit barter—money for guidance—is common. Property rights for TI are hard to establish. Patents, quite suitable for better mousetraps, are inadequate for an era when we design better mice. Much TI is not patented, and what is patented sets fuzzy demarcations. New organizational forms are a promising approach to contracting difficulties for TI. Webs of relationships, formal and informal, involving universities, start-up firms, corporate giants, and venture capitalists play a major role in facilitating the production and spread of TI.