Legitimacy in question : elite-mass relations, constitutional reform and Canadian democracy /

During the 1980s and 1990s, Canadian political authority orientations underwent a significant transformation. Canadians are no longer deferential towards their political elites. Instead, they are autonomous, challenging, and increasingly participatory, and this continuing trend has brought the procedural legitimacy of the Canadian political process into question. The following study of elite-mass relations within Canadian democracy attempts to provide insight into the meaning of this change and how it should be addressed. An attitudinalbehavioural analysis ofthe electorate presents evidence that popular cynicism and alienation is rooted more deeply in a dissatisfaction with political institutions and traditions than with politicians. A structural analysis of the elected political elite reveals the failure of consociational traditions to provide effective representation as well as the minimal impact which the aforementioned orientation shift has had upon this elite. An event-decisional analysis, or case study, ofelite-mass relations in the arena of constitutional politics augments these complementary profiles and illustrates how the transformed electorate has significantly restricted the elected political elite's role in constitutional reform. The study concludes that the lack ofresponsiveness, representativeness, and inclusiveness ofCanada's elected political elite, political institutions, and political traditions has substantially eroded the procedural legitimacy of Canadian democracy during the 1980s and 1990s. Remedying these three deficiencies in the political system, which are the objects of increasing public demand, may restore legitimacy, but the likelihood that such reforms will be adopted is presently uncertain in the face of formidable difficulties and obstacles.

Photograph - Colin Campbell and Helen Stanley Smith with Judge Campbell, 1910.

A photograph of Colin Campbell and Helen Stanley Smith sitting in a horse buggy in front of the Campbell home. Judge Campbell is saddled on a horse behind the buggy. There are two other unidentified females sitting on the porch of the Campbell home on Church Street.

General Legitimacy of Judicial Review and the Fundamental Basis of Constitutional Law

Four questions dominate normative contemporary constitutional theroy: What is the purpose of a constitution? What makes a constitution legitimate? What kinds of arguments are legitimate within the process of constitutional interpretation? What can make judicial review of legislation legitimate in principle? The main purpose of this text is to provide one general answer to the last question. The secondary purpose is to show how this answer may bear upon our understanding of the fundamental basis of constitutional law. These two purposes should suggest particular answers to the first three questions.

Canada’s Unfathomable Unwritten Constitutional Principles

Since the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, Canadians courts have become bolder in the law-making entreprise, and have recently resorted to unwritten constitutional principles in an unprecedented fashion. In 1997, in Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, the Supreme Court of Canada found constitutional justification for the independence of provincially appointed judges in the underlying, unwritten principles of the Canadian Constitution. In 1998, in Reference re Secession of Quebec, the Court went even further in articulating those principles, and held that they have a substantive content which imposes significant limitations on government action. The author considers what the courts' recourse to unwritten principles means for the administrative process. More specifically, he looks at two important areas of uncertainty relating to those principles: their ambiguous normative force and their interrelatedness. He goes on to question the legitimacy of judicial review based on unwritten constitutional principles, and to critize the courts'recourse to such principles in decisions applying the principle of judicial independence to the issue of the remuneration of judges.

Frequency of Chromosome Healing and Interstitial Telomeres in 40 Cases of Constitutional Abnormalities.

Human telomeres play a major role in stabilizing chromosome ends and preventing fusions. Chromosomes bearing a broken end are rescued by the acquisition of a new telomeric cap without any subtelomeric sequences being present at the breakpoint, a process referred to as chromosome healing. Conversely, a loss of telomeric function or integrity can lead to the presence of interstitial telomeres at the junction site in translocations or ring chromosomes. In order to determine the frequency at which interstitial telomeres or chromosome healing events are observed in target chromosome abnormalities, we conducted a retrospective FISH study using pan-telomeric and chromosome-specific subtelomeric probes on archival material from 40 cases of terminal deletions, translocations or ring chromosomes. Of the 19 terminal deletions investigated, 17 were negative for the subtelomeric probe specific to the deleted arm despite being positive for the pan-telomeric probe. These 17 cases were thus considered as been rescued through chromosome healing, suggesting that this process is frequent in terminal deletions. In addition, as two of these cases were inherited from a parent bearing the same deletion, chromosomes healed by this process are thus stable through mitosis and meiosis. Regarding the 13 cases of translocations and eight ring chromosomes, four and two cases respectively demonstrated pan-telomeric sequences at the interstitial junction point. Furthermore, two cases of translocations and one ring chromosome had both interstitial pan-telomeres and subtelomeres, whereas two other cases of ring chromosomes and one case of translocation only showed interstitial subtelomeres. Therefore, interstitial (sub)telomeric sequences in translocations and ring chromosomes are more common than previously thought, as we found a frequency of 43% in this study. Moreover, our results illustrate the necessity of performing FISH with both subtelomeric and pan-telomeric probes when investigating these rearrangements, as the breakpoints can be either in the distal part of the pan-telomeres, or in between the two types of sequences.

Évolution du droit et de la fonction de juger dans la tradition juridique occidentale : une étude sociohistorique de l’indépendance judiciaire

Dans sa thèse, l’auteure analyse la fonction du système judiciaire dans le système juridique selon une double perspective historique et sociologique. Cette approche possède un potentiel euristique important, car elle révèle que la place réservée à la production judiciaire du droit se modifie au gré de la conception que se fait la société de l’origine et de la légitimité du droit. Grâce à la méthodologie proposée par la théorie des systèmes, il est possible d’analyser le phénomène de la montée en puissance des juges dans sa dimension scientifique, en substituant une interprétation sociologique à celle, traditionnelle, formulée par la science politique. Grâce à une réappropriation de la justice par la science juridique, la production judiciaire du droit peut être étudiée dans une perspective systémique. Celle-ci démontre la situation névralgique occupée par la fonction de juger dans le système juridique. Par le biais d’un retour aux sources de la fonction de juger, l’auteur identifie les stratégies empruntées par les titulaires de cette fonction pour maintenir et légitimer leur position dans l’organisation du système juridique. La thèse démontre que le discours judiciaire de la Cour suprême du Canada sur la norme d’indépendance judiciaire homologue la théorie de la place centrale du système judiciaire dans le système juridique. La thèse conclut enfin que des conditions sociologiques sont nécessaires pour assurer l’indépendance judiciaire et garantir la primauté du droit. Ces conditions sont la différenciation sociale, une structure de programme juridique conditionnelle et la limitation de la responsabilité des juges pour l’impact de leurs décisions dans le système social.

Triangulation of rights, balancing of interests : exploring the tensions between freedom of conscience and freedom of religion in comparative constitutional law

La liberté de religion, souvent reconnue comme étant la « première liberté » dans de nombreuses traditions juridiques, reflète également les différentes conceptions de la place de l’individu et de la communauté dans la société. Notre étude analysera les modèles constitutionnels canadien, américain et européen de liberté de religion et conscience. Dans un premier chapitre, nous examinerons les conceptions théoriques de la religion dans les sciences sociales ainsi les approches juridiques afin de mieux cerner comment la religion est conçue et de plus, comprendre les diverses influences sur sa conceptualisation. Dans un second et troisième chapitre, nous tenterons d’une part, de qualifier la relation entre la liberté de conscience et la liberté de religion au Canada en nous livrant à une analyse approfondie des deux libertés et d’autre part, d’identifier les questions qui demeurent irrésolues. Dans le chapitre final, nous observerons comment la liberté de conscience a été interprétée dans les contextes américain et dans l’Union Européenne, par le biais de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’Homme. Notre hypothèse est que l’on peut arriver à une meilleure compréhension de la relation entre les libertés de conscience et religion en clarifiant les conceptions théoriques de la religion et de la conscience en droit constitutionnel comparé.

The right to be forgotten under European Law: a Constitutional debate

Cet article met en lumière la perspective européenne sur un des plus importants défis que l’Internet et le Web 2.0 présente pour la vie privée et le droit à la protection des données. L’auteur y soulève des problématiques liées à la mémoire numérique et distingue à partir de plusieurs cas où les individus seraient intéressés de réclamer l'oubli tant dans les réseaux sociaux, les journaux officiels des gouvernements et dans les bibliothèques médiatiques numériques. Il trace l’histoire de l’identification du droit à l’oubli dont les fondements ont été définis par les agences françaises, italiennes et espagnoles de protection des données. En conclusion, il pose son regard sur un nouveau cadre européen de la protection des données comprenant le droit individuel à voir leurs données supprimées lorsqu’elles ne sont plus nécessaires à des fins légitimes.

The Constitutional basis of aboriginal rights

Aboriginal rights are rights held by aboriginal peoples, not by virtue of Crown grant, legislation or treaty, but “by reason of the fact that aboriginal peoples were once independent, self-governing entities in possession of most of the lands now making up Canada.” It is, of course, the presence of aboriginal peoples in North America before the arrival of the Europeans that distinguishes them from other minority groups in Canada, and explains why their rights have special legal status. However, the extent to which those rights had survived European settlement was in considerable doubt until as late as 1973, which was when the Supreme Court of Canada decided the Calder case.2 In that case, six of the seven judges held that the Nishga people of British Columbia possessed aboriginal rights to their lands that had survived European settlement. The actual outcome of the case was inconclusive, because the six judges split evenly on the question whether the rights had been validly extinguished or not. However, the recognition of the rights was significant, and caught the attention of the Government of Canada, which began to negotiate treaties (now called land claims agreements) with First Nations in those parts of the country that were without treaties. That resumed a policy that had been abandoned in the 1920s, when the last numbered treaty was entered into.