Transgender Freedom and the Law: A Liberal-Poststructural Discussion on McNally

In R v McNally, gender deception is found capable of leading to the vitiation of consent to sexual intercourse and, in so doing, places restriction on the freedom of transgendered individuals in favour of cisgendered freedom. This paper seeks to challenge the standing of this decision by adopting a combined methodological approach between Deleuzian post-structuralism and Gewirthian legal idealism. In so doing, we attempt to show that the combination offers a novel and productive approach to contentious decisions, such as that in McNally. Our approach brings together post-structuralist corporeality which conceives of the body as material and productive, and Gewirth’s ‘agent’ to conceptualise the legal body as an entity which can, and should, shape judicial reasoning. It does this by employing the criterion of categorically necessary freedom on institutionalised practical reasoning. These ‘bodies of agents’ can be conceived as the underpinning and justificatory basis for the authority of the law subject to the morally rational Principle of Generic Consistency. This egalitarian condition precedent requires individualisation and the ability to accept self-differentiation in order to return to a status, which can be validly described as “law”. Ultimately, we argue that this theoretical combination responds to a call to problematise the connection made between gender discourse and judicial reasoning, whilst offering the opportunity to further our conceptions of law and broaden the theoretical armoury with which to challenge judicial reasoning in McNally. That is, a ‘good faith’ attempt to further and guarantee transgender freedoms.

The Colour of Electronic Consent

This paper is a translation of the first part of an article published in Cahiers de propriété intellectuelle (2003).

When consent doesn't work: a rights-based case for limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise

Consent's capacity to legitimise actions and claims is limited by conditions such as coercion, which render consent ineffective. A better understanding of the limits to consent's capacity to legitimise can shed light on a variety of applied debates, in political philosophy, bioethics, economics and law. I show that traditional paternalist explanations for limits to consent's capacity to legitimise cannot explain the central intuition that consent is often rendered ineffective when brought about by a rights violation or threatened rights violation. I argue that this intuition is an expression of the same principles of corrective justice that underlie norms of compensation and rectification. I show how these principles can explain and clarify core intuitions about conditions which render consent ineffective, including those concerned with the consenting agent's option set, his mental competence, and available information.

Consent and the use of force: an examination of ‘intervention by invitation’ as a basis for US drone strikes in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen

Drone strikes are becoming a key feature of the United States’ global military response to nonstate actors, and it has been widely adduced that these strikes have been carried out with the consent of the host states in which such non-state actors reside. This article examines the degree to which assertions of consent (or ‘intervention by invitation’), provided as a justification for drone strikes by the United States in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, can be said to accord with international law. First the article provides a broad sketch of the presence of consent in international law. It then analyses in detail the individual elements of consent as provided by Article 20 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles of State Responsibility. These require that consent should be ‘valid’, given by the legitimate government and expressed by an official empowered to do so. These elements will be dealt with individually, and each in turn will be applied to the cases of Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Finally, the article will examine the breadth of the exculpatory power of consent, and the extent to which it can preclude the wrongfulness of acts carried out in contravention of international law other than the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations.

Principles of business law

Contents: 1. Development and overview of the Australian legal system -- 2. An introduction to the law of contract -- 3. Intention -- 4. Consideration -- 5. Capacity -- 6. Genuine consent -- 7. The contents of the contract -- 8. Termination -- 9. Remedies -- 10. The tort of negligence and liability for pure economic loss -- 11. Agency -- 12. Partnerships -- 13. An overview of business organisations -- 14. The day-to-day existence of business corporations -- 15. Trusts.

Ignorance of the law as a defence to rape : the destruction of a maxim

In DPP v Morgan, the House of Lords correctly concluded that an accused who entertained a genuine belief that a woman was consenting to carnal knowledge of her person could not be convicted of the common law crime of rape as such a belief and the requisite mens rea to convict were mutually exclusive of one another. Though England and Wales have resiled from this position by virtue of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1 (b), which allows for conviction upon proof that the accused did not reasonably believe that the complainant was consenting, the Morgan principle has retained its vitality at common law as well as under the various statutory crimes of rape that exist throughout Australia, most notably the provisions of s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Despite a long line of Victorian Court of Appeal decisions which have reaffirmed the Morgan principle, the court has construed s. 37AA(b)(ii) of the Act as leaving open the possibility of an acquittal despite the fact that the accused acted with an awareness that one or more factors that are statutorily deemed as negating consent under s. 36(a)-(g) of the Act were operating at the time of his or her sexual penetration; specifically, the court held that the foregoing factors do not necessarily preclude a jury from finding that the accused acted in the genuine belief that the complainant was consenting. This article endeavours to explain how the accused could be aware of such circumstances at the time of penetration, yet still entertain such a belief. The article ultimately concludes that such an anomaly can only be explained through a combination of the poor drafting of s. 37AA(b)(ii) and the court's apparent refusal to follow the longstanding precept that ignorance of the law is never a defence to a crime, ostensibly prompted by its adherence to the cardinal precept that legislation is not to be construed as superfluous.

The chaotic state of the law of rape in Victoria: a mandate for reform

This article is intended as a final commentary and sequel to two earlier articles in this journal that have examined the arcane and circular wording of s. 37AA of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and its patent incompatibility with ss 36 and 38 of that Act that define the elements of rape. In particular, this article will revisit many of the essential points raised in the first two articles in order to afford readers with an appropriate backdrop against which the Victorian Court of Appeal’s decision in GC v The Queen will be examined. The article concludes with a strenuous recommendation that s. 37AA be repealed or substantially amended in order to comport with ss 36 and 38 as well as the Court of Appeal’s decision in NT v The Queen that significantly reshaped the Morgan principle.

Clinical trials, informed consent, & emergency medicine: A systematic literature review

Background: In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates clinical trials. These regulations address good clinical practices as well as human subject protection (FDA, 2012). One of the most important legal and ethical concerns in clinical trials is informed consent. 21 CFR 50 governs human subjects research. Part 50.24 provides an emergency research exception to the informed consent requirement. Research was conducted to determine the appropriateness of this exception, whether the benefit justifies the exception, and its public health significance.^ Methods: A systematic literature review was conducted and articles were identified from peer-reviewed journals.^ Results: There is some variance in opinions regarding the appropriateness of the exception, but the literature reviewed found the study results of these trials justified the waiver.^ Conclusion: The exception to the informed consent requirement is likely appropriate and justified in emergency research when implemented within the specified guidelines.^

Laws made and past by William Penn: Absolute Proprietary and Governour in Chief of the province of Pennsylvania and territories thereunto belonging, with the advice and consent of the freemen thereof in genrall assembly met at Newcastle...1700....and [as amended] at Philadelphia...1701

Contains one of the few original copies of Penn's laws as first passed and as revised and extended in the following year. During the interval between the two Assemblies, while Penn was absent in England, the first series of laws were found to be impracticable, and new amendments were made for which Penn had no choice but to agree to.

Analytical study of the legal and operational aspects of the Minnesota law entitled "Chemical test for intoxication" - M.S.A. Sec. 169.123. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

Response to Orr and Siegler - collective intentionality and procreative desires: the permissible view on consent to posthumous conception

Orr and Siegler have recently defended a restrictive view concerning posthumous sperm retrieval and conception, which would limit insemination to those cases where the deceased man has provided explicit consent for such a procedure. The restrictive view dominates current law and practice. A permissible view, in contrast, would allow insemination and conception in all but those cases where the posthumous procedure has been explicitly refused, or where there is no reasonable evidence that the deceased person desired children. I describe a phenomenology of procreative desires which supports the permissible view, and which is compatible with requirements concerning the interests of the decedent, concepts of medical infertility, and the welfare of the future child. The account illustrates how our current obsession with individual rights and autonomy can be self-defeating and repressive.