Développement d’un algorithme de branch-and-price-and-cut pour le problème de conception de réseau avec coûts fixes et capacités

De nombreux problèmes en transport et en logistique peuvent être formulés comme des modèles de conception de réseau. Ils requièrent généralement de transporter des produits, des passagers ou encore des données dans un réseau afin de satisfaire une certaine demande tout en minimisant les coûts. Dans ce mémoire, nous nous intéressons au problème de conception de réseau avec coûts fixes et capacités. Ce problème consiste à ouvrir un sous-ensemble des liens dans un réseau afin de satisfaire la demande, tout en respectant les contraintes de capacités sur les liens. L'objectif est de minimiser les coûts fixes associés à l'ouverture des liens et les coûts de transport des produits. Nous présentons une méthode exacte pour résoudre ce problème basée sur des techniques utilisées en programmation linéaire en nombres entiers. Notre méthode est une variante de l'algorithme de branch-and-bound, appelée branch-and-price-and-cut, dans laquelle nous exploitons à la fois la génération de colonnes et de coupes pour la résolution d'instances de grande taille, en particulier, celles ayant un grand nombre de produits. En nous comparant à CPLEX, actuellement l'un des meilleurs logiciels d'optimisation mathématique, notre méthode est compétitive sur les instances de taille moyenne et supérieure sur les instances de grande taille ayant un grand nombre de produits, et ce, même si elle n'utilise qu'un seul type d'inégalités valides.

Essays on oil price fluctuations and macroeconomic activity

Dans cette thèse, je me suis intéressé aux effets des fluctuations du prix de pétrole sur l'activité macroéconomique selon la cause sous-jacente ces fluctuations. Les modèles économiques utilisés dans cette thèse sont principalement les modèles d'équilibre général dynamique stochastique (de l'anglais Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium, DSGE) et les modèles Vecteurs Autorégressifs, VAR. Plusieurs études ont examiné les effets des fluctuations du prix de pétrole sur les principaux variables macroéconomiques, mais très peu d'entre elles ont fait spécifiquement le lien entre les effets des fluctuations du prix du pétrole et la l'origine de ces fluctuations. Pourtant, il est largement admis dans les études plus récentes que les augmentations du prix du pétrole peuvent avoir des effets très différents en fonction de la cause sous-jacente de cette augmentation. Ma thèse, structurée en trois chapitres, porte une attention particulière aux sources de fluctuations du prix de pétrole et leurs impacts sur l'activité macroéconomique en général, et en particulier sur l'économie du Canada. Le premier chapitre examine comment les chocs d'offre de pétrole, de demande agrégée, et de demande de précaution de pétrole affectent l'économie du Canada, dans un Modèle d'équilibre Général Dynamique Stochastique estimé. L'estimation est réalisée par la méthode Bayésienne, en utilisant des données trimestrielles canadiennes sur la période 1983Q1 à 2010Q4. Les résultats montrent que les effets dynamiques des fluctuations du prix du pétrole sur les principaux agrégats macro-économiques canadiens varient en fonction de leurs sources. En particulier, une augmentation de 10% du prix réel du pétrole causée par des chocs positifs sur la demande globale étrangère a un effet positif significatif de l'ordre de 0,4% sur le PIB réel du Canada au moment de l'impact et l'effet reste positif sur tous les horizons. En revanche, une augmentation du prix réel du pétrole causée par des chocs négatifs sur l'offre de pétrole ou par des chocs positifs de la demande de pétrole de précaution a un effet négligeable sur le PIB réel du Canada au moment de l'impact, mais provoque une baisse légèrement significative après l'impact. En outre, parmi les chocs pétroliers identifiés, les chocs sur la demande globale étrangère ont été relativement plus important pour expliquer la fluctuation des principaux agrégats macroéconomiques du Canada au cours de la période d'estimation. Le deuxième chapitre utilise un modèle Structurel VAR en Panel pour examiner les liens entre les chocs de demande et d'offre de pétrole et les ajustements de la demande de travail et des salaires dans les industries manufacturières au Canada. Le modèle est estimé sur des données annuelles désagrégées au niveau industriel sur la période de 1975 à 2008. Les principaux résultats suggèrent qu'un choc positif de demande globale a un effet positif sur la demande de travail et les salaires, à court terme et à long terme. Un choc négatif sur l'offre de pétrole a un effet négatif relativement faible au moment de l'impact, mais l'effet devient positif après la première année. En revanche, un choc positif sur la demande précaution de pétrole a un impact négatif à tous les horizons. Les estimations industrie-par-industrie confirment les précédents résultats en panel. En outre, le papier examine comment les effets des différents chocs pétroliers sur la demande travail et les salaires varient en fonction du degré d'exposition commerciale et de l'intensité en énergie dans la production. Il ressort que les industries fortement exposées au commerce international et les industries fortement intensives en énergie sont plus vulnérables aux fluctuations du prix du pétrole causées par des chocs d'offre de pétrole ou des chocs de demande globale. Le dernier chapitre examine les implications en terme de bien-être social de l'introduction des inventaires en pétrole sur le marché mondial à l'aide d'un modèle DSGE de trois pays dont deux pays importateurs de pétrole et un pays exportateur de pétrole. Les gains de bien-être sont mesurés par la variation compensatoire de la consommation sous deux règles de politique monétaire. Les principaux résultats montrent que l'introduction des inventaires en pétrole a des effets négatifs sur le bien-être des consommateurs dans chacun des deux pays importateurs de pétrole, alors qu'il a des effets positifs sur le bien-être des consommateurs dans le pays exportateur de pétrole, quelle que soit la règle de politique monétaire. Par ailleurs, l'inclusion de la dépréciation du taux de change dans les règles de politique monétaire permet de réduire les coûts sociaux pour les pays importateurs de pétrole. Enfin, l'ampleur des effets de bien-être dépend du niveau d'inventaire en pétrole à l'état stationnaire et est principalement expliquée par les chocs sur les inventaires en pétrole.

L'algorithme de Branch and Price and Cut pour le problème de conception de réseaux avec coûts fixes et sans capacité

Le problème de conception de réseaux est un problème qui a été beaucoup étudié dans le domaine de la recherche opérationnelle pour ses caractéristiques, et ses applications dans des nombreux domaines tels que le transport, les communications, et la logistique. Nous nous intéressons en particulier dans ce mémoire à résoudre le problème de conception de réseaux avec coûts fixes et sans capacité, en satisfaisant les demandes de tous les produits tout en minimisant la somme des coûts de transport de ces produits et des coûts fixes de conception du réseau. Ce problème se modélise généralement sous la forme d’un programme linéaire en nombres entiers incluant des variables continues. Pour le résoudre, nous avons appliqué la méthode exacte de Branch-and-Bound basée sur une relaxation linéaire du problème avec un critère d’arrêt, tout en exploitant les méthodes de génération de colonnes et de génération de coupes. Nous avons testé la méthode de Branch-and-Price-and-Cut sur 156 instances divisées en cinq groupes de différentes tailles, et nous l’avons comparée à Cplex, l’un des meilleurs solveurs d’optimisation mathématique, ainsi qu’à la méthode de Branch-and- Cut. Notre méthode est compétitive et plus performante sur les instances de grande taille ayant un grand nombre de produits.

The competitive dialogue procedure: Advantages, disadvantages, and its implementation into English and Dutch law

Competitive Dialogue (CD) is a new contract award procedure of the European Community (EC). It is set out in Article 29 of the 'Public Sector Directive' 2004/18/EC. Over the last decades, projects were becoming more and more complex, and the existing EC procedures were no longer suitable to procure those projects. The call for a new procedure resulted in CD. This paper describes how the Directive has been implemented into the laws of two member states: the UK and the Netherlands. In order to implement the Directive, both lawmakers have set up a new and distinct piece of legislation. In each case, large parts of the Directive’s content have been repeated ‘word for word’; only minor parts have been reworded and/or restructured. In the next part of the paper, the CD procedure is examined in different respects. First, an overview is given on the different EC contract award procedures (open, restricted, negotiated, CD) and awarding methods (lowest price and Most Economically Advantageous Tender, MEAT). Second, the applicability of CD is described: Among other limitations, CD can only be applied to public contracts for works, supplies, and services, and this scope of application is further restricted by the exclusion of certain contract types. One such exclusion concerns services concessions. This means that PPP contracts which are set up as services concessions cannot be awarded by CD. The last two parts of the paper pertain to the main features of the CD procedure – from ‘contract notice’ to ‘contract award’ – and the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure. One advantage is that the dialogue allows the complexity of the project to be disentangled and clarified. Other advantages are the stimulation of innovation and creativity. These advantages are set against the procedure’s disadvantages, which include high transaction costs and a perceived hindrance of innovation (due to an ambiguity between transparency and fair competition). It is concluded that all advantages and disadvantages are related to one of three elements: communication, competition, and/or structure of the procedure. Further research is needed to find out how these elements are related.

Experimental duopolies under price guarantees

In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs (‘aggressive’ and ‘soft’ price-beating and price-matching) are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy. Our results show that PGs may lead close to the collusive outcome, depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the ‘aggressive’ price-beating type.

Scoring rules and competitive behavior in best value construction auctions

This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior of bidders in Best Value or multi-attribute construction auctions, where both the (dollar) bid and technical non-price criteria are scored according to a scoring rule. From a sample of Spanish construction auctions with a variety of bid scoring rules, it is found that bidders are influenced by the auction rules in significant and predictable ways. The bid score weighting, bid scoring formula and abnormally low bid criterion are variables likely to influence the competitiveness of bidders in terms of both their aggressive/conservative bidding and concentration/dispersion of bids. Revealing the influence of the bid scoring rules and their magnitude on bidders’ competitive behavior opens the door for the engineer to condition bidder competitive behavior in such a way as to provide the balance needed to achieve the owner’s desired strategic outcomes.

Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principIe which we call the implementation principIe. This principIe provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competi tive contracting situations, firms in choosing their contracting strategies can restrict attention, without loss of generality, to contract catalogs. Second, we establish a competi tive taxation principIe. This principIe, a refinement of the implementation principIe, provides a complete characterization of all implementable nonlinear pricing schedules in terms of product-price catalogs and allows us to reduce any game played over nonlinear pricing schedules to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs. Third, using the competitive taxation principIe and a recent result due to Reny (1999) on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, we demonstrate the existence of a N ash equilibrium for the mixed extension of the nonlinear pricing game.

The role of consumer's risk aversion on price rigidity

This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal firms' reaction to the consumers' behavior, even if firms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that firms' competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy. We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ineflicient time-varying cost shocks faced by the firms, e.g. the ones regarding to inefficient equilibrium output leveIs under fiexible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive firms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize the price uncertainty and fi attract more customers fi.'

Effect of price and in-store promotion on sales: a study of distinct regions in an emerging market

Increasing competition caused by globalization, high growth of some emerging markets and stagnation of developed economies motivate Consumer Packaged Goods (CPGs) manufacturers to drive their attention to emerging markets. These companies are expected to adapt their marketing activities to the particularities of these markets in order to succeed. In a country classified as emerging market, regions are not alike and some contrasts can be identified. In addition, divergences of marketing variables effect can also be observed in the different retail formats. The retail formats in emerging markets can be segregated in chain self-service and traditional full-service. Thus, understanding the effectiveness of marketing mix not only in country aggregated level data can be an important contribution. Inasmuch as companies aim to generate profits from emerging markets, price is an important marketing variable in the process of creating competitive advantage. Along with price, promotional variables such as in-store displays and price cut are often viewed as temporary incentives to increase short-term sales. Managers defend the usage of promotions as being the most reliable and fastest manner to increase sales and then short-term profits. However, some authors alert about sales promotions disadvantages; mainly in the long-term. This study investigates the effect of price and in-store promotions on sales volume in different regions within an emerging market. The database used is at SKU level for juice, being segregated in the Brazilian northeast and southeast regions and corresponding to the period from January 2011 to January 2013. The methodological approach is descriptive quantitative involving validation tests, application of multivariate and temporal series analysis method. The Vector-Autoregressive (VAR) model was used to perform the analysis. Results suggest similar price sensitivity in the northeast and southeast region and greater in-store promotion sensitivity in the northeast. Price reductions show negative results in the long-term (persistent sales in six months) and in-store promotion, positive results. In-store promotion shows no significant influence on sales in chain self-service stores while price demonstrates no relevant impact on sales in traditional full-service stores. Hence, this study contributes to the business environment for companies wishing to manage price and sales promotions for consumer brands in regions with different features within an emerging market. As a theoretical contribution, this study fills an academic gap providing a dedicated price and sales promotion study to contrast regions in an emerging market.

Optimal contract pricing of distributed generation under a competitive framework

A bilevel programming approach for the optimal contract pricing of distributed generation (DG) in distribution networks is presented. The outer optimization problem corresponds to the owner of the DG who must decide the contract price that would maximize his profits. The inner optimization problem corresponds to the distribution company (DisCo), which procures the minimization of the payments incurred in attending the expected demand while satisfying network constraints. The meet the expected demand the DisCo can purchase energy either form the transmission network through the substations or form the DG units within its network. The inner optimization problem is substituted by its Karush- Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, turning the bilevel programming problem into an equivalent single-level nonlinear programming problem which is solved using commercially available software. © 2010 IEEE.

Is price dispersion always an indication of price discrimination?

It has been established for a long time that there is significant dispersion in prices charged for seemingly homogeneous goods. This may happen in competitive markets because the world is not frictionless, and certainly in other markets where price discrimination is carried out by firms with oligopolistic power. This paper is the first survey of the economic literature on price dispersion that addresses the following three key issues: i) its characteristics as a result of optimizing search behavior; ii) its relevance as a reflection of price discrimination and its consequences for social welfare and policy intervention; and iii) the empirical evidence of price dispersion. By contributing to a better understanding of price dispersion, this survey may help in the design and implementation of competition and anti-trust policies

Non-Linear Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Markets

This thesis is dedicated to the analysis of non-linear pricing in oligopoly. Non-linear pricing is a fairly predominant practice in most real markets, mostly characterized by some amount of competition. The sophistication of pricing practices has increased in the latest decades due to the technological advances that have allowed companies to gather more and more data on consumers preferences. The first essay of the thesis highlights the main characteristics of oligopolistic non-linear pricing. Non-linear pricing is a special case of price discrimination. The theory of price discrimination has to be modified in presence of oligopoly: in particular, a crucial role is played by the competitive externality that implies that product differentiation is closely related to the possibility of discriminating. The essay reviews the theory of competitive non-linear pricing by starting from its foundations, mechanism design under common agency. The different approaches to model non-linear pricing are then reviewed. In particular, the difference between price and quantity competition is highlighted. Finally, the close link between non-linear pricing and the recent developments in the theory of vertical differentiation is explored. The second essay shows how the effects of non-linear pricing are determined by the relationship between the demand and the technological structure of the market. The chapter focuses on a model in which firms supply a homogeneous product in two different sizes. Information about consumers' reservation prices is incomplete and the production technology is characterized by size economies. The model provides insights on the size of the products that one finds in the market. Four equilibrium regions are identified depending on the relative intensity of size economies with respect to consumers' evaluation of the good. Regions for which the product is supplied in a single unit or in several different sizes or in only a very large one. Both the private and social desirability of non-linear pricing varies across different equilibrium regions. The third essay considers the broadband internet market. Non discriminatory issues seem the core of the recent debate on the opportunity or not of regulating the internet. One of the main questions posed is whether the telecom companies, owning the networks constituting the internet, should be allowed to offer quality-contingent contracts to content providers. The aim of this essay is to analyze the issue through a stylized two-sided market model of the web that highlights the effects of such a discrimination over quality, prices and participation to the internet of providers and final users. An overall welfare comparison is proposed, concluding that the final effects of regulation crucially depend on both the technology and preferences of agents.

The EU power sector needs long-term price signals. CEPS Special Report No. 135/April 2016

By 2030, half of the EU’s electricity demand will be covered by renewables and will need to be accompanied by flexible conventional back-up resources. Due to the high upfront costs inherent to renewables and the progressively lower running times associated with back-up capacity, the cost of capital will have a proportionately greater impact on total costs than today. This report examines how electricity markets can be designed to provide long-term price signals, thereby reducing the cost of capital for these technologies and allowing for a more efficient transition. It finds that current market arrangements are unable to provide long-term price signals. To address this issue, we argue that a system for long-term contracts with a regulated counterparty could be implemented. A centralised system where capacity or energy or a combination of both is contracted, could be introduced for conventional and renewable capacity, based on a regional adequacy assessment and with a competitive bidding system in place to ensure cost-effectiveness. Member states face a number of legislative barriers while implementing these types of systems, however, which could be reduced by merging legislation and setting EU framework rules for the design of these contractual agreements.

Price stabilization and the risk-averse firm

An analytically simple and tractable approach to firm-level welfare analysis of complete and partial mean-preserving price stabilization for producers with general risk-averse preferences facing a stochastic technology is developed. Necessary and sufficient conditions for price stabilization to be welfare enhancing are derived under different assumptions of the producer's preferences and the producer's technology. Existing stabilization results for the risk-averse firm are shown to be corollaries of these more general results.

Attainment of competitive advantage by the exporter-importer dyad:the role of export offering and import objectives

Although experience shows that the exporter and importer jointly contribute towards the attainment of competitive advantage, past studies have separately examined export-related characteristics or import barriers. This article identifies a subset of critical factors that illustrate how the exporter–importer (E-I) dyad creates and maintains competitive advantage. Based on a sample of Greek importers, a path analytic model was developed that empirically demonstrates that product technology sophistication (PTS), product and service quality and importer strategic objectives are important for the attainment of competitive advantage while price competitiveness and trust upon the exporter are not.