Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods

We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. When preferences are strict, Gale's top trading cycle algorithm finds the unique core allocation. When preferences are not necessarily strict, we use an exogenous profile of tie-breakers to resolve any ties in individuals' preferences and apply Gale's top trading cycle algorithm for the resulting profile of strict preferences. We provide a foundation of these simple extensions of Gale's top trading cycle algorithm from strict preferences to weak preferences. We show that Gale's top trading cycle algorithm with fixed tie-breaking is characterized by individual rationality, strategy-proofness, weak efficiency, non-bossiness, and consistency. Our result supports the common practice in applications to break ties in weak preferences using some fixed exogenous criteria and then to use a 'good and simple' rule for the resulting strict preferences. This reinforces the market-based approach even in the presence of indifferences because always competitive allocations are chosen.

Explaining the 'health check' of the Common Agricultural Policy: budgetary politics, globalisation and paradigm change revisited

Three potential explanations of past reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) can be identified in the literature: a budget constraint, pressure from General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) negotiations or commitments and a paradigm shift emphasising agriculture’s provision of public goods. This discussion on the driving forces of CAP reform links to broader theoretical questions on the role of budgetary politics, globalisation of public policy and paradigm shift in explaining policy change. In this article, the Health Check reforms of 2007/2008 are assessed. They were probably more ambitious than first supposed, although it was a watered-down package agreed by ministers in November 2008. We conclude that the Health Check was not primarily driven by budget concerns or by the supposed switch from the state-assisted to the multifunctional policy paradigm. The European Commission’s wish to adopt an offensive negotiating stance in the closing phases of the Doha Round was a more likely explanatory factor. The shape and purpose of the CAP post-2013 is contested with divergent views among the Member States.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Latin American South-South integration and cooperation: from a regional public goods perspective

Includes bibliography

A multi-regional view on aging societies accounting for the existence of non-tradable goods

This thesis assesses the question, whether accounting for non-tradable goods sectors in a calibrated Auerbach-Kotlikoff multi-regional overlapping-generations-model significantly affects this model’s results when simulating the economic impact of demographic change. Non-tradable goods constitute a major part of up to 80 percent of GDP of modern economies. At the same time, multi-regional overlapping-generations-models presented by literature on demographic change so far ignored their existence and counterfactually assumed perfect tradability between model regions. Moreover, this thesis introduces the assumption of an increasing preference share for non-tradable goods of old generations. This fact-based as-sumption is also not part of models in relevant literature. rnThese obvious simplifications of common models vis-à-vis reality notwithstanding, this thesis concludes that differences in results between a model featuring non-tradable goods and a common model with perfect tradability are very small. In other words, the common simplifi-cation of ignoring non-tradable goods is unlikely to lead to significant distortions in model results. rnIn order to ensure that differences in results between the ‘new’ model, featuring both non-tradable and tradable goods, and the common model solely reflect deviations due to the more realistic structure of the ‘new’ model, both models are calibrated to match exactly the same benchmark data and thus do not show deviations in their respective baseline steady states.rnA variation analysis performed in this thesis suggests that differences between the common model and a model with non-tradable goods can theoretically be large, but only if the bench-mark tradable goods sector is assumed to be unrealistically small.rnFinally, this thesis analyzes potential real exchange rate effects of demographic change, which could occur due to regional price differences of non-tradable goods. However, results show that shifts in real exchange rate based on these price differences are negligible.rn

Exploring intra-commonwealth goods and services trade

A background paper for the Commonwealth Secretariat by Anirudh Shingal and Mohammad Razzaque: Existing work examining the trade effect of commonwealth membership does not account for sample selection, unobserved heterogeneity and multilateral resistance in estimation, leading to biased estimates. Our analyses improve on all these fronts. Unlike earlier work, we also consider services trade and assemble a much larger sample of trading partners (242 x 242, over 1995-2010). Commonwealth membership is found to increase goods exports by 18.5-33.2% and services exports by 42.8% in our results, ceteris paribus and on average. Our analyses on the determinants of intra-commonwealth trade suggest the positive role of common language (only for goods trade) and colonial relationships as well as the negative impact of geography, thereby confirming that commonwealth member states are not natural trading partners for each other. Finally, being one of Australia, Canada or the UK is associated with 98.2% greater merchandise trade than the commonwealth average; however, a similar effect is not observed for services trade.

The Arms Trade Treaty and the Control of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. IES WORKING PAPER 1/2013

This paper seeks to delineate some preliminary factors and working methods that could work in favour of establishing a workable international export control regime for dual-use goods and technologies. Drawing on the work initiated by various United Nations initiatives and the Wassenaar Agreement, but specifically looking at the European Union export regime model, this working paper asks if and how a similar model could be adopted at the international level. Far from suggesting that the EU regime should of could be adopted on a global basis or that the regime is full-proof, the authors acknowledge that EU regulations are seen as among the most stringent of frameworks on dual-use goods and technologies available. Accordingly, this paper asks what elements of the EU’s control regime could be of international benefit after the ATT negotiations and how it could be adopted on a more international basis. Indeed, any future ATT control mechanism for dual-use items will have to draw on existing arms transfers and control regimes. It does this through an analysis of the ATT and the current discourse on dual-use goods and technologies in the negotiations, an stocktaking of the strengths and weaknesses of the EU’s export control regime and by asking what elements of the EU’s regime could be utilised for international control mechanisms after a future ATT is negotiated.

The Principle of Common Concern and Climate Change

Effective policies combating global warming and incentivising reduction of greenhouse gases face fundamental collective action problems. States defending short term interests avoid international commitments and seek to benefit from measures combating global warming taken elsewhere. The paper explores the potential of Common Concern as an emerging principle of international law, in particular international environmental law, in addressing collective action problems and the global commons. It expounds the contours of the principle, its relationship to common heritage of mankind, to shared and differentiated responsibility and to public goods. It explores its potential to provide the foundations not only for international cooperation, but also to justify, and delimitate at the same time, unilateral action at home and deploying extraterritorial effects in addressing the challenges of global warming and climate change mitigation. As unilateral measures mainly translate into measures of trade policy, the principle of Common Concern is inherently linked and limited by existing legal disciplines in particular of the law of the World Trade Organization.

Common And Endangered Species: How Does Society Allocate Support For Their Conservation

Examines how society allocates support for species’ conservation when numbers involved are large and resources are limited. Rational behaviour suggests that species in urgent need of conservation will receive more support than those species that are common. However, we demonstrate that in the absence of balanced knowledge common species will receive support more than they would otherwise receive despite society placing high existence values on all species. Twenty four species, both common and endangered and some with a restricted distribution, are examined. We demonstrate that balanced information is vital in order to direct more support for species that are endangered than those that are not. Implications for conservation stemming from the findings are discussed.