849 resultados para Co_operative and private granite Quarries,
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We present and experimentally test a theoretical model of majority threshold determination as a function of voters’ risk preferences. The experimental results confirm the theoretical prediction of a positive correlation between the voter's risk aversion and the corresponding preferred majority threshold. Furthermore, the experimental results show that a voter's preferred majority threshold negatively relates to the voter's confidence about how others will vote. Moreover, in a treatment in which individuals receive a private signal about others’ voting behaviour, the confidence-related motivation of behaviour loses ground to the signal's strength.
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We used the fabrics of two granite plutons and U/Pb (SHRIMP) zircon ages to constrain the tectonic evolution of the E-trending Patos shear zone (Borborema Province, NE Brazil). The pre-tectonic Teixeira batholith consists of an amphibole leucogranite locally with aegirine-augite. Zircons from a syenogranite yielded crystallization ages of 591 +/- 5 Ma. The batholith fabrics were determined by anisotropy of magnetic susceptibility (AMS) and mineral shape preferred orientation. The fabrics support pre-transcurrent batholith emplacement, as evidenced by: (i) magmatic/magnetic fabrics in low susceptibility (<0.35 mSI) leucogranites highly discordant to the regional host rock structure, and (ii) concordant magnetic fabrics restricted to high susceptibility (>1 mSI) corridors connected to shear zones branching off from Patos. One of these satellite shear zones controlled the syntectonic emplacement of the Serra Redonda pluton, which yields a crystallization age of 576 +/- 3 Ma. This late shearing event marks the peak regional deformation that, south of Patos, was coupled to crustal shortening nearly perpendicular to the shear belt. The chronology of the deformational events indicates that the major shear zones of the eastern Borborema are late structures active after the crustal blocks amalgamated. (C) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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The questlon of the crowding-out of private !nvestment by public expenditure, public investment in particular , ln the Brazilian economy has been discussed more in ideological terrns than on empirical grounds. The present paper tries to avoid the limitation of previous studies by estlmatlng an equation for private investment whlch makes it possible to evaluate the effect of economic policies on prlvate investment. The private lnvestment equation was deduced modifylng the optimal flexible accelerator medel (OFAM) incorporating some channels through which public expendlture influences privateinvestment. The OFAM consists in adding adjustment costs to the neoclassical theory of investrnent. The investment fuction deduced is quite general and has the following explanatory variables: relative prices (user cost of capitaljimput prices ratios), real interest rates, real product, public expenditures and lagged private stock of capital. The model was estimated for private manufacturing industry data. The procedure adopted in estimating the model was to begin with a model as general as possible and apply restrictions to the model ' s parameters and test their statistical significance. A complete diagnostic testing was also made in order to test the stability of estirnated equations. This procedure avoids ' the shortcomings of estimating a model with a apriori restrictions on its parameters , which may lead to model misspecification. The main findings of the present study were: the increase in public expenditure, at least in the long run, has in general a positive expectation effect on private investment greater than its crowding-out effect on priva te investment owing to the simultaneous rise in interst rates; a change in economlc policy, such as that one of Geisel administration, may have an important effect on private lnvestment; and reI ative prices are relevant in determining the leveI of desired stock of capital and private investrnent.
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The problem of decision making, its mechanisms and consequences is the very core of management, it is virtually impossible to separate the act of manage from this knowledge area. As defined by Herbert Simon – "decision making" as though it were synonymous with "managing". A decision is a selection made by an individual regarding a choice of a conclusion about a situation. This represents a course of behavior pertaining to what must be done or what must not be done. A decision is the point at which plans, policies and objectives are translated into concrete actions. Our behavior during decisive moments is closely linked with our brain dominance profile. Over the years, our decision-making processes develop a consistent pattern, which can be described as a decision-making style. Our style is grounded in our preferences, which arise from our brain dominance characteristics […]. The importance of understanding the impact of our thinking preferences and how to improve the effectiveness as a leader of organizations are the main justifications for this thesis; the main problem addressed is the behavioral profile diversity in a selective Master’s cohort formed by students from several different countries. The research methodology approach has been quantitative, through questionnaire administration using the HBDI (Herrmann Brain Dominance Instrument), a validated framework developed by William "Ned" Herrmann when he was the leader of General Electric's Crotonville facility. This questionnaire has been administered in hundreds of thousands professional, enabling the possibility to establish correlations between a certain group and several historical databases. The selected group of analysis is the first cohort (23 students) from the CIM (Corporate International Master's), a joint program between Georgetown University (USA), ESADE (Spain) and FGV (Brazil). Besides decision preferences, the obtained profile enables the discussion on leadership style, heuristic's pitfalls and a base to compare with future cohorts. The fundamental research question is: how diverse is the dominant decision-making profile for the CIM students?
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This paper uses general equilibrium simulations to explore the role ofresidential mobility in shaping the impact of different types of private school voucher policies. In particular, general vouchers available to all residents in the state are compared to vouchers specifically targeted to either underprivileged school districts or underprivileged households. The simulations are derived from a three-community mo deI of low, middle and high income school districts (calibrated to New York data), where each school district is composed of multiple types of neighborhoods that may vary in house quality as well as the leveI of neighborhood extemalities. Households that differ in both their income and in the ability leveI of their children choose between school districts, between neighborhoods within their school district, and between the local public school or a menu of private school altematives.Local public school quality within a district is endogenously determined bya combination of the average peer quality of public school attending children as well as local property and state income tax supported spending. Financial support (above a required state minimum) is set by local majority rule. Finally, there exists the potential for a private school market composed of competitive schools that face production technologies similar to those ofpublic schools but who set tuition and admissions policies to maximize profits. In tbis model, it is demonstrated that school district targeted vouchers are similar in their impact to non-targeted vouchers but vastIy different from vouchers targeted to low income households. Furthermore, strong migration effects are shown to significantly improve the likely equity consequences of voucher programs.
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A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor (δ). For the infinite horizon case a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized and shown to achieve first best as δ → 1. The optimal contract when δ << 1 is partially characterized. Incentives are optimally provided with a combination of efficiency wages and the threat of termination, which will exhibit memory over the whole history of realizations. Finally, Tournaments are shown to provide an alternative solution to the problem.
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography