Essays on Banking Crises

This thesis aims at finding the role of deposit insurance scheme and central bank (CB) in keeping the banking system safe. The thesis also studies the factors associated with long-lasting banking crises. The first essay analyzes the effect of using explicit deposit insurance scheme (EDIS), instead of using implicit deposit insurance scheme (IDIS), on banking crises. The panel data for the period of 1980-2003 includes all countries for which the data on EDIS or IDIS exist. 70% of the countries in the sample are less developed countries (LDCs). About 55% of the countries adopting EDIS also come from LDCs. The major finding is that the using of EDIS increases the crisis probability at a strong significance level. This probability is greater if the EDIS is inefficiently designed allowing higher scope of moral hazard problem. Specifically, the probability is greater if the EDIS provides higher coverage to deposits and if it is less powerful from the legal point of view. This study also finds that the less developed a country is to handle EDIS, the higher the chance of banking crisis. Once the underdevelopment of an economy handling the EDIS is controlled, the EDIS separately is no longer a significant factor of banking crises. The second essay aims at determining whether a country s powerful CB can lessen the instability of the banking sector by minimizing the likelihood of a banking crisis. The data used include indicators of the CB s autonomy for a set of countries over the period of 1980-89. The study finds that in aggregate a more powerful CB lessens the probability of banking crisis. When the CB s authority is disentangled with respect to its responsibilities, the study finds that the longer tenure of CB s chief executive officer and the greater power of CB in assigning interest rate on government loans are necessary for reducing the probability of banking crisis. The study also finds that the probability of crisis reduces more if an autonomous CB can perform its duties in a country with stronger law and order tradition. The costs of long-lasting banking crises are high because both the depositors and the investors lose confidence in the banking system. For a rapid recovery of a crisis, the government very often undertakes one or more crisis resolution policy (CRP) measures. The third essay examines the CRP and other explanatory variables correlated with the durations of banking crises. The major finding is that the CRP measure allowing the regulation forbearance to keep the insolvent banks operative and the public debt relief program are respectively strongly and weakly significant to increase the durations of crises. Some other explanatory variables, which were found by previous studies to be related with the probability of crises to occur, are also correlated with the durations of crises.

Choosing the Lesser of Two Evils: Explaining Multinational Banking Groups’ Push for Supranational Oversight in the EU

European Union Series

A study of the co-operative banking system in kerala

The co-operative credit structure in a state set up consists of 3 tiers — Primary Societies at the base, District Co-operative Banks at the middle and State Cooperative Bank at the top. But, some societies at the primary level are governed by, in addition to Co-operative Societies Act, the Banking Regulation Act. Thus they are under dual control. In addition, they are working under the direct purview of Reserve Bank of India. The scope of this study is restricted to such Primary Societies, District Co-operative Banks and State Co-operative Bank. For the evaluation of the working of Co-operative Banks, the board of directors and staff were interviewed with the help of pre-constructed and pre-tested interview schedules. However, the share holders and customers were not interviewed mainly because almost all respondents were reluctant to provide copies of an exhaustive list of share holders and non-share holder customers, for the purpose of maintaining secrecy. This being an individual work, it was found physically and financially very difficult to extend the study so as to cover the share holders and non-share holder customers. Limitations of time were also responsible for restricting this study. The period of study was restricted to 1980-'81 to 1983-'84 as the data relating to earlier periods were firstly not available from all banks and secondly the prior data was considered out of date for the purpose of the study.

Receivable Management in Non Banking Finance Companies with Special Reference to Vehicle Financing

In the absence of entry barrier or regulatory restrictions, Non Banking Financial Companies frantically grew and accessed the public deposit without any regulatory control. The deposit of NBFCs grew from Rs. 41.9 crore in 1971 to 53116.0 crore in 1997. This growth was the result of a combined effect of increase in the number of NBFCs and increase in the amount of deposits. The deposits amazed as above was invested in various assets especially that in motor vehicles by these asset financing NBFCs. Various tactics were adopted by these NBFCs and their agents for recovering the receivable outstanding from such assets. Both central government and RBI were concerned about the protection of depositors‘ interest and various committees were set up to frame a comprehensive regulation for the functioning of these NBFCs.

Modeling the monetary policy reaction function of the colombian central bank

This paper proposes a simple Ordered Probit model to analyse the monetary policy reaction function of the Colombian Central Bank. There is evidence that the reaction function is asymmetric, in the sense that the Bank increases the Bank rate when the gap between observed inflation and the inflation target (lagged once) is positive, but it does not reduce the Bank rate when the gap is negative. This behaviour suggests that the Bank is more interested in fulfilling the announced inflation target rather than in reducing inflation excessively. The forecasting performance of the model, both within and beyond the estimation period, appears to be particularly good.

Efectos en los mercados financieros internacionales de la derogatoria en 1999 de la Ley Glass Steagall de los EE.UU. (Tema Central)

Actualmente la profunda crisis del sistema financiero internacional, similar a la que vivió Estados Unidos en los años treinta, es el punto más importante de discusión en todo el mundo. Por ello, se consideró importante realizar un análisis de la Ley Glass Steagall Act, promulgada en el año 1933, justamente como una salida a la crisis financiera estadounidense, de aquella época, precisando cuáles son sus principales características, y sobre todo los efectos que su derogatoria (en 1999) trajo consigo en el sistema financiero mundial, pues como veremos, para muchos la actual crisis es producto de la inadecuada mezcla de regulación y libertad que se produjo con la promulgación de la Ley Gramm Leach Bliley Act, mediante la cual los bancos comerciales empezaron a incursionar en operaciones bursátiles, actividades que anteriormente estaban vetadas, y por tanto existían garantías suficientes para los depositantes.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

An incomplete step toward a banking union. CEPS Commentary, 5 July 2012

In this Commentary, Daniel Gros applauds the decision taken by Europe’s leaders at the eurozone summit at the end of June to transfer responsibility for banking supervision in the eurozone to the European Central Bank. It represents explicit recognition of the important fact that problems might originate at the national level, but, owing to monetary union, they can quickly threaten the stability of the entire eurozone banking system. In his view, the next small, incremental step, although one not yet officially acknowledged, will necessarily be the creation of a common bank rescue fund.

Central Banks in Times of Crisis: The FED vs. the ECB. CEPS Policy Brief No. 276, 11 July 2012,

Different economic and financial structures require different crisis responses. Different crises also require different tools and resources. The first ‘stage’ of the financial crisis (2007-09) was similar on both sides of the Atlantic, and the response was also quite similar. The second stage of the crisis is unique to the euro area. Increasing financial disintegration within the region has forced the ECB to become the central counterparty for the entire cross-border banking market and to intervene in the sovereign bond market of some stressed countries. The actions undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB), however, have not always represented the best response, in terms of effectiveness, consistency and transparency. This is especially true for the Securities Markets Programme (SMP): by de facto imposing its absolute seniority during the Greek PSI (private sector involvement), the ECB has probably killed its future effectiveness.

The roadmap to banking union: a call for consistency. CEPS Commentary, 30 August 2012

The proposal to move to a full banking union in the eurozone means a radical regime shift for the EU, since the European Central Bank will supervise the eurozone banks and effectively end ‘home country rule’. But how this is implemented raises a number of questions and needs close monitoring, explains CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary.

Banking Union: A Federal Model for the European Union with Prompt Corrective Action. CEPS Policy Brief No. 282, 18 September 2012

The European Commission has published its proposals for the transfer of supervisory responsibilities to the European Central Bank (ECB),1 under Article 127(6) of the TFEU, providing a comprehensive and courageous ‘first step’ towards a European banking Union, the other steps being European deposit insurance and resolution procedures. However, on a number of issues the Commission’s chosen path raises questions that should be brought out in the open and fully recognized before final deliberation by the Council.

The fiscal implications of a banking union. Bruegel Policy Brief 2012/02 [3?], September 2012

Systemic banking crises are a threat to all countries whatever their development level. They can entail major fiscal costs that can undermine the sustainability of public finances. More than anywhere else, however, a number of euro-area countries have been affected by a lethal negative feedback loop between banking and sovereign risk, followed by disintegration of the financial system, real economic fragmentation and the exposure of the European Central Bank. Recognising the systemic dimension of the problem, the Euro-Area Summit of June 2012 called for the creation of a banking union with common supervision and the possibility for the European Stability Mechanism to recapitalise banks directly.

Europe's single supervisory mechanism and the long journey towards banking union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/16, 4 October 2012

Problems in the banking system are at the core of the current crisis. The establishment of a banking union is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for eventual crisis resolution that respects the integrity of the euro. The European Commission’s proposal for the establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism and related reform of the European Banking Authority (EBA) do not and cannot create a fully-fledged banking union, but represent a broadly adequate step on the basis of the leaders’ declaration of 29 June 2012 and of the decision to use Article 127(6) of the treaty as legal basis. The proposal rightly endows the European Central Bank (ECB) with broad authority over banks within the supervisory mechanism’s geographical perimeter; however, the status of non-euro area member states willing to participate in this mechanism, and the governance and decision-making processes of the ECB in this respect, call for further elaboration. Further adjustments are also desirable in the proposed reform of the EBA, even though they must probably retain a stopgap character pending the more substantial review planned in 2014.

Monetary policy and banking supervision: coordination instead of separation. CEPS Policy Brief No. 286, 12 December 2012

Introduction. Following the June 2012 European Council decision to place the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM) within the European Central Bank, the general presumption in the policy discussions has been that there should be ‘Chinese walls’ between the supervisory and monetary policy arms of the ECB. The current legislative proposal, in fact, is explicit on this account. On the contrary, however, this paper finds that there is no need to impose a strict separation between these two functions. The authors argue, in fact, that a strict separation of supervision and monetary policy is not even desirable during a financial crisis when the systemic stability of the financial system represents the biggest threat to a monetary policy that aims at price stability. In their view, the key problem hampering the ECB today is that it lacks detailed information on the state of health of the banking system, which is often highly confidential. Chinese walls would not solve this problem. Moreover, in light of the fact that the new, proposed Supervisory Board will be composed to a large extent of representatives of the same institutions that also dominate the Governing Council, the paper finds that it does not make sense to have Chinese walls between two boards with largely overlapping memberships. In addition, it recommends that some members of the Supervisory Boards should be “independents” in order to reduce the tendency of supervisors to unduly delay the recognition of losses.

Balkanisation of banking damages international trade and UK GDP

Balkanisation is a way to describe the breakdown of cross-border banking, as nervous lenders retreat in particular from the more troubled parts of the Eurozone or at least try to isolate operations within national boundaries. It is increasing at the Bank level, however the senior policy makers consider this a negative trend – Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, has talked of the need to “repair this financial fragmentation” and Mark Carney, head of global regulatory body the Financial Stability Board, [and now Governor of the Bank of England] has warned that deglobalising finance will hurt growth and jobs by “reducing financial capacity and systemic resilience”. In this article I would like to examine the impact of banking balkanisation on international trade and provide some initial thoughts about remedies for excessive risk in a banking non-balkanising world.