Competition and regulation in the banking system of Central America and Mexico: a comparative study

Incluye Bibliografía

The European Central Bank in the age of banking union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/13, 1 October 2013

During the crisis the European Central Bank’s roles have been greatly extended beyond its price stability mandate. In addition to the primary objective of price stability and the secondary objective of supporting EU economic policies, we identify ten new tasks related to monetary policy and financial stability. We argue that there are three main constraints on monetary policy: fiscal dominance, financial repercussions and regional divergences. By assessing the ECB’s tasks in light of these constraints, we highlight a number of synergies between these tasks and the ECB’s primary mandate of price stability. But we highlight major conflicts of interest related to the ECB’s participation in financial assistance programmes. We also underline that the ECB’s government bond purchasing programmes have introduced the concept of ‘monetary policy under conditionality’, which involves major dilemmas. A solution would be a major change towards a US-style system, in which state public debts are small, there are no federal bail-outs for states, the central bank does not purchase state debt and banks do not hold state debt. Such a change is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.

Pathology as the Cornerstone of Human Tissue Banking: European Consensus Expert Group Report

Aside from ethical considerations, the primary requirement for usage of human tissues in basic or translational research is the thorough characterization of tissues. The second, but equally essential, requirement is that tissues be collected, processed, annotated, and preserved in optimal conditions. These requirements put the pathologist at the center of tissue banking activities and of research aimed at discovering new biomarkers. Pathologists not only provide information identifying the specimen but also make decisions on what materials should be biobanked, on the preservation conditions, and on the timeline of events that precede preservation and storage. This central position calls for increased recognition of the role of the pathologist by the biomolecular community and places new demands on the pathologist's workload and scope of scientific activities. These questions were addressed by an Expert Group Meeting of the European Biological and Biomolecular Research Infrastructure (BBMRI). While detailed recommendations are published elsewhere (Bevilacqua et al., Virchows Archivs, 2010, in press), this article outlines the strategic and technological issues identified by the Expert Group and identifies ways forward for better integration of pathology in the current thrust for development of biomarker-based "personalized medicine.

Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank

We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidityneeds as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure(gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bankis insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking industry to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure ofone bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. Weanalyze the coordinating role of the Central Bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification ofthe Too-big-to-fail-policy.

Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility forbanking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated bythe Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macroand microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems areclassified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that theinflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries wherethe Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides,although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them,they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to moresophisticated liabilities as a funding source.The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries.We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulationand supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independentEuropean System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to theESCB.

Evaluation of the integrity of human corneal epithelium maintained in organ-culture during eye banking using Corneamax®

Purpose: Mediums have been developed to conserve corneal endothelium in organ-culture during eye banking. CorneaMax® is used by 25% of Eye Bank in Europe. Only little is known about conservation of corneal epithelium with this medium during banking. Its preservation could be of interest in clinic to cure corneal disease with stem cells deficiency. Therefore, we wanted to examine the integrity of human corneal epithelium maintained in CorneaMax®. Methods: Human corneas, considered unsuitable for transplantation, were obtained from the Eye Bank in Lausanne. Average post-mortem time was 14 hours. Cornoscleral rings were maintained in organ-culture in Corneamax® at 32°C. Samples were formalin-fixed after period ranging from 0 (D0) to 35 days (D35, N=5 for each time points) and stained with H&E. Proliferation and apoptosis were evaluated by immunostaining with antibody against Ki67 and Caspase3 respectively. Results: Corneas, which were not in organ-cultured (D0), showed different morphology, including intact epithelium with 5 to 7 layers, but also completely denuded basement membrane. In two cases, at D0, the epithelium lost its adherence to the basal lamina of the cornea creating a large epithelial sheet. During the two first days, corneas and limbus area lost totally their epithelium, except for some remaining limbal basal cells. From day 2 to day 10, regeneration of the epithelium took place, starting from the limbal region in direction to the central cornea. From day 10 to day 35, corneal epithelium appeared as an atrophic epithelium, consisting of only two cell layers. Proliferation happened in the whole cornea during the 35 days of organ-culture, as shown by Ki67 positive cells. Apoptosis was rarely detected in the corneal epithelium. Conclusions: Corneas maintained in CorneaMax® showed a complete disappearance of the corneal epithelium during the two first days and a conservation of limbal basal cells in the limbal region. These remaining cells allowed a full regeneration of the tissue, leading to an atrophic epithelium, composed of only two cell layers. This atrophic epithelium could be seen in all the organ-cultured corneas during the 35 days of conservation. This study is a first step to develop medium in organ-culture in order to conserve corneal epithelial cells.

Ownership change and banking efficiency in the new EU members

The aim of this study is to analyze how European integration and, especially, changes in ownership, has affected banking efficiency in Central and Eastern European countries which have recently experimented this process more intensely. Using a stochastic frontier approach (SFA) applied to panel data, we have estimated bank efficiency levels in a sample of 189 banks from 12 countries during the period 2000 to 2008 and we have analyzed the influence of some bank characteristics on these efficiency levels. The results show that European integration has significantly improved the cost efficiency of banks in these countries but profit efficiency has significantly decreased. We have found very small differences between different ownership types and only a very small impact of foreign ownership on cost efficiency, showing that the entry of foreign ownership is not enough to explain the significant variations in banking efficiency after the accession.

Fraud detection in the banking sector : a multi-agent approach

Fraud is an increasing phenomenon as shown in many surveys carried out by leading international consulting companies in the last years. Despite the evolution of electronic payments and hacking techniques there is still a strong human component in fraud schemes. Conflict of interest in particular is the main contributing factor to the success of internal fraud. In such cases anomaly detection tools are not always the best instruments, since the fraud schemes are based on faking documents in a context dominated by lack of controls, and the perpetrators are those ones who should control possible irregularities. In the banking sector audit team experts can count only on their experience, whistle blowing and the reports sent by their inspectors. The Fraud Interactive Decision Expert System (FIDES), which is the core of this research, is a multi-agent system built to support auditors in evaluating suspicious behaviours and to speed up the evaluation process in order to detect or prevent fraud schemes. The system combines Think-map, Delphi method and Attack trees and it has been built around audit team experts and their needs. The output of FIDES is an attack tree, a tree-based diagram to ”systematically categorize the different ways in which a system can be attacked”. Once the attack tree is built, auditors can choose the path they perceive as more suitable and decide whether or not to start the investigation. The system is meant for use in the future to retrieve old cases in order to match them with new ones and find similarities. The retrieving features of the system will be useful to simplify the risk management phase, since similar countermeasures adopted for past cases might be useful for present ones. Even though FIDES has been built with the banking sector in mind, it can be applied in all those organisations, like insurance companies or public organizations, where anti-fraud activity is based on a central anti-fraud unit and a reporting system.

Choosing the Lesser of Two Evils: Explaining Multinational Banking Groups’ Push for Supranational Oversight in the EU

European Union Series

A study of the co-operative banking system in kerala

The co-operative credit structure in a state set up consists of 3 tiers — Primary Societies at the base, District Co-operative Banks at the middle and State Cooperative Bank at the top. But, some societies at the primary level are governed by, in addition to Co-operative Societies Act, the Banking Regulation Act. Thus they are under dual control. In addition, they are working under the direct purview of Reserve Bank of India. The scope of this study is restricted to such Primary Societies, District Co-operative Banks and State Co-operative Bank. For the evaluation of the working of Co-operative Banks, the board of directors and staff were interviewed with the help of pre-constructed and pre-tested interview schedules. However, the share holders and customers were not interviewed mainly because almost all respondents were reluctant to provide copies of an exhaustive list of share holders and non-share holder customers, for the purpose of maintaining secrecy. This being an individual work, it was found physically and financially very difficult to extend the study so as to cover the share holders and non-share holder customers. Limitations of time were also responsible for restricting this study. The period of study was restricted to 1980-'81 to 1983-'84 as the data relating to earlier periods were firstly not available from all banks and secondly the prior data was considered out of date for the purpose of the study.

Receivable Management in Non Banking Finance Companies with Special Reference to Vehicle Financing

In the absence of entry barrier or regulatory restrictions, Non Banking Financial Companies frantically grew and accessed the public deposit without any regulatory control. The deposit of NBFCs grew from Rs. 41.9 crore in 1971 to 53116.0 crore in 1997. This growth was the result of a combined effect of increase in the number of NBFCs and increase in the amount of deposits. The deposits amazed as above was invested in various assets especially that in motor vehicles by these asset financing NBFCs. Various tactics were adopted by these NBFCs and their agents for recovering the receivable outstanding from such assets. Both central government and RBI were concerned about the protection of depositors‘ interest and various committees were set up to frame a comprehensive regulation for the functioning of these NBFCs.

Modeling the monetary policy reaction function of the colombian central bank

This paper proposes a simple Ordered Probit model to analyse the monetary policy reaction function of the Colombian Central Bank. There is evidence that the reaction function is asymmetric, in the sense that the Bank increases the Bank rate when the gap between observed inflation and the inflation target (lagged once) is positive, but it does not reduce the Bank rate when the gap is negative. This behaviour suggests that the Bank is more interested in fulfilling the announced inflation target rather than in reducing inflation excessively. The forecasting performance of the model, both within and beyond the estimation period, appears to be particularly good.

Efectos en los mercados financieros internacionales de la derogatoria en 1999 de la Ley Glass Steagall de los EE.UU. (Tema Central)

Actualmente la profunda crisis del sistema financiero internacional, similar a la que vivió Estados Unidos en los años treinta, es el punto más importante de discusión en todo el mundo. Por ello, se consideró importante realizar un análisis de la Ley Glass Steagall Act, promulgada en el año 1933, justamente como una salida a la crisis financiera estadounidense, de aquella época, precisando cuáles son sus principales características, y sobre todo los efectos que su derogatoria (en 1999) trajo consigo en el sistema financiero mundial, pues como veremos, para muchos la actual crisis es producto de la inadecuada mezcla de regulación y libertad que se produjo con la promulgación de la Ley Gramm Leach Bliley Act, mediante la cual los bancos comerciales empezaron a incursionar en operaciones bursátiles, actividades que anteriormente estaban vetadas, y por tanto existían garantías suficientes para los depositantes.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

An incomplete step toward a banking union. CEPS Commentary, 5 July 2012

In this Commentary, Daniel Gros applauds the decision taken by Europe’s leaders at the eurozone summit at the end of June to transfer responsibility for banking supervision in the eurozone to the European Central Bank. It represents explicit recognition of the important fact that problems might originate at the national level, but, owing to monetary union, they can quickly threaten the stability of the entire eurozone banking system. In his view, the next small, incremental step, although one not yet officially acknowledged, will necessarily be the creation of a common bank rescue fund.