Contagion in financial networks: a network theory and agent-based approaches to modeling the spread of risk in financial systems

Esta dissertação estuda a propagação de crises sobre o sistema financeiro. Mais especi- ficamente, busca-se desenvolver modelos que permitam simular como um determinado choque econômico atinge determinados agentes do sistema financeiro e apartir dele se propagam, transformando-se em um problema sistêmico. A dissertação é dividida em dois capítulos,além da introdução. O primeiro capítulo desenvolve um modelo de propa- gação de crises em fundos de investimento baseado em ciência das redes.Combinando dois modelos de propagação em redes financeiras, um simulando a propagação de perdas em redes bipartites de ativos e agentes financeiros e o outro simulando a propagação de perdas em uma rede de investimentos diretos em quotas de outros agentes, desenvolve-se um algoritmo para simular a propagação de perdas através de ambos os mecanismos e utiliza-se este algoritmo para simular uma crise no mercado brasileiro de fundos de investimento. No capítulo 2,desenvolve-se um modelo de simulação baseado em agentes, com agentes financeiros, para simular propagação de um choque que afeta o mercado de operações compromissadas.Criamos também um mercado artificial composto por bancos, hedge funds e fundos de curto prazo e simulamos a propagação de um choque de liquidez sobre um ativo de risco securitizando utilizado para colateralizar operações compromissadas dos bancos.

Financial crises in "successful" emerging economies

Includes bibliography

Regional financial cooperation

Includes bibliography

Liberalization or financial development?

Includes bibliography

Science and technology policy and the National Innovation System in Argentina

Includes bibliography

Strengthening regional financial cooperation

Includes bibliography

The impact of the global financial crisis on Latin America

Includes bibliography

The interrelationship between monetary policy and the interbank money market during the financial crisis

Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus sechs Kapiteln und trägt zur Forschung in den Bereichen der Finanzmarktpolitik und der Geldpolitik bei. Das zweite Kapitel zeigt die Wechselbeziehung zwischen Geldmarktanspannungen und der Stabilität des Finanzsystems auf. Mittels der theoretischen Literatur werden verschiedene Einflussfaktoren einer aggregierten Liquiditätsnachfragefunktion präsentiert. Das dritte Kapitel untersucht den Informationsgehalt der Ergebnisse der Hauptrefinanzierungsgeschäfte für den europäischen Geldmarkt. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich seit der Finanzkrise der Informationsgehalt der Hauptrefinanzierungsgeschäfte in zweierlei Hinsicht verändert hat. Im vierten Kapitel untersuchen wir die Wirksamkeit der Geldpolitik während der Finanzkrise europäische Geldmarktzinssätze zu steuern. Die Ergebnisse deuten auf eine erhebliche Divergenz zwischen den Zinssätzen und den Erwartungen über die zukünftige Geldpolitik hin. Weiterhin finden wir heraus, dass die unkonventionellen Maßnahmen der EZB für einen Rückgang der Euriborsätze von bis zu 60 Basispunkten verantwortlich sind. Das fünfte Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit der Funktionsweise des besonderen geldpolitischen Instrumentariums der Schweizerischen Nationalbank.

Credit-Default-Swaps and the 2008 Financial Crisis: An Inquiry into the Underlying Legal Origins and the European Union’s Regulatory Reforms

After the 2008 financial crisis, the financial innovation product Credit-Default-Swap (CDS) was widely blamed as the main cause of this crisis. CDS is one type of over-the-counter (OTC) traded derivatives. Before the crisis, the trading of CDS was very popular among the financial institutions. But meanwhile, excessive speculative CDSs transactions in a legal environment of scant regulation accumulated huge risks in the financial system. This dissertation is divided into three parts. In Part I, we discussed the primers of the CDSs and its market development, then we analyzed in detail the roles CDSs had played in this crisis based on economic studies. It is advanced that CDSs not just promoted the eruption of the crisis in 2007 but also exacerbated it in 2008. In part II, we asked ourselves what are the legal origins of this crisis in relation with CDSs, as we believe that financial instruments could only function, positive or negative, under certain legal institutional environment. After an in-depth inquiry, we observed that at least three traditional legal doctrines were eroded or circumvented by OTC derivatives. It is argued that the malfunction of these doctrines, on the one hand, facilitated the proliferation of speculative CDSs transactions; on the other hand, eroded the original risk-control legal mechanism. Therefore, the 2008 crisis could escalate rapidly into a global financial tsunami, which was out of control of the regulators. In Part III, we focused on the European Union’s regulatory reform towards the OTC derivatives market. In specific, EU introduced mandatory central counterparty clearing obligation for qualified OTC derivatives, and requires that all OTC derivatives shall be reported to a trade repository. It is observable that EU’s approach in re-regulating the derivatives market is different with the traditional administrative regulation, but aiming at constructing a new market infrastructure for OTC derivatives.

Democratization and Financial Reform in Taiwan: The Political Economy of Bad-Loan Creation

This study shows that many bad loans now burdening Taiwan's financial institutions are interrelated with the society's democratization which started in the late 1980s. Democratization made the local factions and business groups more independent from the Kuomintang government. They acquired more political influence than under the authoritarian regime. These changes induced them to manage their owned financial institutions more arbitrarily and to intervene more frequently in the state-affiliated financial institutions. Moreover they interfered in financial reform and compelled the government to allow many more new banks than it had originally planned. As a result the financial system became more competitive and the qualities of loans deteriorated. Some local factions and business groups exacerbated the situation by establishing banks in order to funnel funds to themselves, sometimes illegally. Thus many bad loans were created as the side effect of democratization.

Transformation of the Financial Sector in Indonesia

Introduction : The source and deployment of finance are central issues in economic development. Since 1966, when the Soeharto Administration was inaugurated, Indonesian economic development has relied on funds in the form of aid from international organizations and foreign countries. After the 1990s, a further abundant inflow of capital sustained a rapid economic development. Foreign funding was the basis of Indonesian economic growth. This paper will describe the mechanism for allocating funds in the Indonesian economy. It will identify the problems this mechanism generated in the Indonesian experience, and it will attempt to explain why there was a collapse of the financial system in the wake of the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997. History of the Indonesian Financial system The year 1966 saw the emergence of commercial banks in Indonesia. It can be said that before 1966 a financial system hardly existed, a fact commonly attributed to economic disruptions like the consecutive runs of fiscal deficit and hyperinflation under the Soekarno Administration. After 1996, with the inauguration of Soeharto, a regulatory system of financial legislation, e.g. central banking law and banking regulation, was introduced and implemented, and the banking sector that is the basis of the current financial system in Indonesia was built up. 　　　The Indonesian financial structure was significantly altered at the first financial reform of 1983. Between 1966 and 1982, the banking sector consisted of Bank Indonesia (the Central Bank) and the state-owned banks. There was also a system for distributing the abundant public revenue derived from the soaring oil price of the 1970s. The public finance distribution function, incorporated in Indonesian financial system, changed after the successive financial reforms of 1983 and 1988, when there was a move away from the monopoly-market style dominated by state-owned banks (which was a system of public finance distribution that operated at the discretion of the government) towards a modern market mechanism. The five phases of development The Indonesian financial system developed in five phases between 1966 and the present time. The first period (1966-72) was its formative period, the second (1973-82) its policy based finance period under soaring oil prices, the third (1983-91) its financial-reform period, the fourth (1992-97) its period of expansion, and the fifth (1998-) its period of financial restructuring. The first section of this paper summarizes the financial policies operative during each of the periods identified above. In the second section changes to the financial sector in response to policies are examined, and an analysis of these changes shows that an important development of the financial sector occurred during the financial reform period. In the third section the focus of analysis shifts from the general financial sector to particular commercial banks’ performances. In the third section changes in commercial banks’ lending and fund-raising behaviour after the 1990s are analysed by comparing several banking groups in terms of their ownership and foundation time. The last section summarizes the foregoing analyses and examines the problems that remain in the Indonesian financial sector, which is still undergoing restructuring.

The asset/liability structure of the Philippine banks and non-bank financial institutions in 2000s : a preliminary study for financial access analyses

Based on the consolidated statements data of the universal/commercial banks (UKbank) and non-bank financial institutions with quasi-banking licenses, this paper presents a keen necessity of obtaining data in detail on both sides (assets and liabilities) of their financial conditions and further analyses. Those would bring more adequate assessments on the Philippine financial system, especially with regard to each financial subsector's financing/lending preferences and behavior. The paper also presents a possibility that the skewed locational and operational distribution exists in the non-UKbank financial subsectors. It suggests there may be a significant deviation from the authorities' (the BSP, SEC and others) intended/anticipated financial system in the banking/non-bank financial institutions' real operations.

Secularism, Sharia, and the Turkish Financial Markets

The financial markets in Turkey provide a laboratory to help resolve these competing views. Islamic law or Sharia contains a number of proscriptions that directly affect financial practices. The payment and receipt of interest is prohibited; so are most kinds of commercial insurance. These interpretations provided the impetus in the Islamic world for the creation of a class of banks that sought to offer Sharia compliant services. The first Islamic Banks in Turkey began operations in the 1980s. Their entry was initially tepid, in no small part because of secularist principles. Islamic financial institutions could not overtly advertise their religious orientation. The country had no “Islamic” banks, only finance houses. They were not Sharia compliant but “interest-free.” Moreover, the government left them in an uncertain regulatory status and subjected them to restrictions on growth. In this environment, the Islamic banks remained a peripheral part of the financial system. With the election of the AKP in 2002, however, the environment for Islamic banks in Turkey changed. Limitations on branch networks and capital raising were lifted. The government removed restrictions on the issuance of Sharia compliant bonds. Officials from the Islamic banks were appointed to the highest levels of government. This Article does several things. First, it examines principles of Islam that affect banking practices, with a particular emphasis on deposit insurance and credit cards. Second, the Article discusses the emergence of secularism in Turkey and the introduction of Islamic banks into the Turkish financial markets. The Article then examine their evolution, with particular emphasis on the changes implemented by the AKP. Finally, the Article examines the impact of these reforms, and what that impact says about Islamic influence in Turkey.

Europe between financial repression and regulatory capture. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/08, July 2014

From the Introduction. In the long shadow of the euro-area crisis, the relationship between governments and their banks has been brought to the the centre of the policy debate in Europe by the implementation of regulatory reforms, the risks associated with financial fragmentation, and the fight to sustain the flow of credit to governments and corporates. The attempt to interpret the patterns of pressure and influence running between governments and their financial system has led commentators to rediscover and give new life to concepts originating from academic debates of the 1970s such as “regulatory capture” and “financial repression”. Government agencies have been frequently described as being at the mercy of the financial sector, often allowing financial interests to hijack political, regulatory and supervisory processes in order to favouring their own private interests over the public good1. An opposite view has instead pointed the finger at governments, which have often been portrayed as subverting markets and abusing the financial system to their benefit, either in order to secure better financing conditions to overcome their own financial difficulties, or with the objective of directing credit to certain sectors of the economy, “repressing” the free functioning of financial markets and potentially the private interests of some of its participants2

The G20 financial reform agenda. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2014/11, September 2014

Five years ago, the declarations of the G20 in landmark leaders’ summits in London and Pittsburgh listed specific commitments on financial regulatory reform. When measured against these declarations, as opposed to the surrounding rhetorical hype, most (though not all) commitments have been met to a substantial degree. However, the effectiveness of these reforms in making global finance more stable is not so far proven. This uncertainty on impact mirrors the absence of an analytical consensus on the 2007-08 financial crisis itself. In addition, unintended consequences of the reforms are appearing gradually, even as their initial implementation is still unfinished. At a broader level, the G20 has established neither an adequate institutional infrastructure nor a consistent policy vision for a globally integrated financial system. This shortcoming justifies increasing concerns about economically harmful market fragmentation. One key aim should be to make international regulatory bodies more representative of the rapidly-changing geography of global finance, not only in terms of their membership but also of their leadership and location.