Judicial Creativity in Constitutional Interpretation

The focus of study in this thesis is on the necessity and extent of judicial creativity in interpreting provisions in certain crucial areas in the Constitution of India. Judicial innovation was essential to adapt the constitutional provisions to modern changed context. Creativity of the Court has been mainly in the creation and introduction of certain new concepts not found in any specific provision of the Constitution which, but were essential for its meaningful interpretation.Independence of the judiciary, basic structure and certain elements of social justice cherished as ideal by the makers of the Constitution are some such concepts infused into the Constitution by the judiciary. The second aspect of creativity lies in the attempt of the Court to construe provisions in the Constitution with a view to upholding and maintaining the concepts so infused into the Constitution. Introduction of those concepts into the Constitution was necessary and is justified. all important features of the Constitution like democratic form of government, federal structure, judicial review, independence of judiciary and rule of law were thus included in the doctrine to prevent their alteration by amendments.As a result of such a construction, the nature of those directive principles itself has changed. They ceased to be mere directives for state action but became mandate for it. If left to legislative or executive will for their implementation, the directives would have remained enforceable as ordinary right.To conclude, notwithstanding the errors committed by the Supreme Court in construing the provisions in the above areas, they stand testimony to its creative and innovative response in interpreting the Constitution. If this trend is continued, it will be possible to achieve through the judicial process, maintenance of independence of the judiciary, avoidance of destruction of the Constitution through the process of amendment and realisation of social justice envisaged in the directive principles. It can be hoped that the Court would maintain its energetic and vibrant mind and rise up to the occasions and extend the same to other areas in future.

Transformaciones y evolución de las fuentes del derecho administrativo colombiano a partir de los tratados de integración

Esta tesis producto del trabajo de investigación se planteo sobre las bases de un derecho administrativo interno creado para resolver los problemas suscitados al interior del Estado en consonancia con los postulados constitucionales, teniendo en cuenta el artículo 4° en que se establece la supremacía de la Constitución y los artículo 9°, 93, 94 y 224 al 227 que ordenan el desarrollo del derecho de integración en el marco de los países Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, por lo que surge la imperiosa necesidad de armonizar el derecho de la integración con el ordenamiento jurídico nacional y en especial con el derecho administrativo quien deberá recepcionar el mencionado ordenamiento supraestatal, alterando las tradicionales concepciones de las fuentes de este derecho interno. Por lo tanto, desde la perspectiva del derecho administrativo comprendido como un derecho legislado que regula las relaciones entre el Estado y los particulares en el que prevalece el “principio de legalidad” de los actos administrativos, se puede intuir que constituye un problema jurídico los impactos derivados de los tratados de integración, donde nos preguntamos sí las categorías de fuentes actuales del derecho administrativo son las adecuadas para abordar la recepción de estas disposiciones Por lo que al explorara las incidencias en el derecho administrativo con ocasión de la recepción del derecho de integración con particular énfasis en la Comunidad Andina, identificamos que uno de los rasgos más distintivos del ordenamiento jurídico andino, como el de otros esquemas de integración, proviene del discutido concepto de supranacionalidad. Dentro de la teoría jurídica contemporánea la comprensión de este término trae una novísima concepción que al mismo tiempo es respetuosa de la soberanía interna de los Estados miembros, la cual permite el surgimiento del nuevo ente común donde es posible la distribución de competencias en la reglamentación de ciertos ámbitos entre autoridades multilaterales y nacionales, conservando su propia autonomía. Este concepto ha permitido que en el ordenamiento comunitario andino, a semejanza de lo que acontece en el derecho interno de los Estados, exista un sistema de control de las normas jurídicas garantizado por una jurisdicción contenciosa-administrativa ejercida a través del Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina. Lo que en definitiva incide en el derecho administrativo interno al encontramos frente a ordenamientos independientes, como lo son los del derecho de integración, en los que se producen, aplican y ejecutan normas según las reglas de juego adoptadas para ese efecto por los Estados miembros, que dependerán del marco del proceso de integración y su armonización con las normas internas. Es por ello, que en el resultado final de esta tesis se constata la aparición de nuevas fuentes de legalidad, donde ya no sólo se contemplará la ley y la jurisprudencia, ésta última posicionada con el devenir del tiempo debido a su pertinencia, como lo podemos contrastar con la expedición del Nuevo Código de Procedimiento Contencioso Administrativo (L. 1437/11) que aún no ha entrado en vigencia, en donde se resalta la importancia del Precedente Judicial a partir de las sentencias de unificación del Consejo de Estado. Pero más allá, de este nuevo reconocimiento legislativo, el sistema de fuentes establecido se verá alterado en su jerarquía con el derecho que nace con ocasión de los tratados de integración, lo que aún no se refleja en este nuevo Código, el cual no prevé la aplicación de las nuevas fuentes de legalidad.

International Law as a Source of Constitutional Law

This article has the purpose to prove that the Customary International Law and the Conventional International Law are sources of Constitutional Law. First, it analyses the matter of the relations between International Law and National or Domestic law according with the theories dualism and monist and international decisions. Then, it studies the reception and the hierarchy of International Customary and Conventional Law to Domestic Law including Constitution. This matter has been studied according with several Constitutions and the international doctrine. Then, it considers the constitutional regulations about international law in the Constitution of the Republic of Colombia. The general conclusion is that International Law is incorporated in domestic law according with the Constitution of each country. But every state has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of International Law, and it may not invoke provisions in its Constitutions or its Laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty. Accordingly, state practice and decided cases have established this provision, and the same rule is established in articles 27 and 46 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties of 1969.

The rights to a hearing and to a lawful judge in the spanish constitutional system

Right to Audience and Right to a Lawful Judge are presumed to be two of the most important guaranties for the rule of law. Both liberties are established in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 as “fundamental rights”, and they are included as a part of a most generic right: the right to due process of law. Along this text, I will try to show its content and significance, according to the sentences of the Spanish “Tribunal Constitucional”, passed through more than 25 years.

Constitutional judges (guarantee of the Constitution and responsibility)

My aim in this paper is to propose a reflection on the position and the importance that the constitutional judge has in the legal systems of contemporary constitutionalism. The figure of the judge responsible of protecting the Constitution is a key institution, without which we cannot understand the laws of constitutional democracies, their current lines of development, and the guarantee of rights and freedoms that constitute the normative core of these systems. Moreover, the reflection on the exercise of the powers of the judge, its scope and its justification is an important part of contemporary legal discussion, still relevant, albeit not exclusively - in the field of legal philosophy. The object of attention of my reflection is the judge who has the power of judicial review, in a scheme of defense of the Constitution, regardless the specific ways of this defense.

The French Constitutional Council as the Rottweiler of the Republican Ideal in the Language Field: Does Jurisprudence Really Reflect Reality? EDAP 03/2012, 2012

France is known for being a champion of individual rights as well as for its overt hostility to any form of group rights. Linguistic pluralism in the public sphere is rejected for fear of babelization and Balkanization of the country. Over recent decades the Conseil Constitutionnel (CC) has, together with the Conseil d’État, remained arguably the strongest defender of this Jacobin ideal in France. In this article, I will discuss the role of France’s restrictive language policy through the prism of the CC’s jurisprudence. Overall, I will argue that the CC made reference to the (Jacobin) state-nation concept, a concept that is discussed in the first part of the paper, in order to fight the revival of regional languages in France over recent decades. The clause making French the official language in 1992 was functional to this policy. The intriguing aspect is that in France the CC managed to standardise France’s policy vis-à-vis regional and minority languages through its jurisprudence; an issue discussed in the second part of the paper. But in those regions with a stronger tradition of identity, particularly in the French overseas territories, the third part of the paper argues, normative reality has increasingly become under pressure. Therefore, a discrepancy between the ‘law in courts’ and the compliance with these decisions (‘law in action’) has been emerging over recent years. Amid some signs of opening of France to minorities, this contradiction delineates a trend that might well continue in future.

Whatever works: proportionality as a constitutional doctrine

In The Global Model of Constitutional Rights Kai Möller claims that the proportionality test is underlain by an expansive moral right to autonomy. This putative right protects everything that advances one’s self-conception. It may of course be limited when balanced against other considerations such as the rights of others. But it always creates a duty on the state to justify the limitation. Möller further contends that the practice of proportionality can best be understood as protecting the right to autonomy. This review article summarizes the main tenets of Möller’s theory and criticizes them on two counts. First, it disputes the existence of a general right to autonomy; such a right places an unacceptably heavy burden on others. Second, it argues that we do not need to invoke a right to autonomy to explain and justify the main features of the practice of proportionality. Like other constitutional doctrines, proportionality is defensible, if it is grounded in pragmatic –mainly epistemic and institutional- considerations about how to increase overall rights compliance. These considerations are independent of any substantive theory of rights.

After the referendum: options for a constitutional convention

Whatever the result of Scotland’s independence referendum, careful constitutional thinking will be needed. If Scots vote Yes, Scotland will need a new constitution and the rest of the UK will have to rethink its governing structures. Even in the event of a No vote, everyone agrees that the shape of the Union will need to change over the coming years. This paper examines how such constitution-making should take place. It sets out the options, gathers evidence from around the world on how those options might work, and weighs the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. It concludes that constitutional proposals in the UK should best be developed by a convention comprising a mixture of ordinary members of the public and politicians; these proposals should be put to a referendum. This approach, the paper argues, offers the best route to high-quality debate, stronger democratic engagement, and, ultimately, deeper legitimacy for our governing structures.