On the nucleolus of 2 x 2 assignment games

[spa] En este artículo hallamos fórmulas para el nucleolo de juegos de asignación arbitrarios con dos compradores y dos vendedores. Se analizan cinco casos distintos, dependiendo de las entradas en la matriz de asignación. Los resultados se extienden a los casos de juegos de asignación de tipo 2 x m o m x 2.

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

[cat] En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignació, es presenta una axiomàtica del nucleolus com l´unica solució que compleix les propietats de consistència respecte del joc derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva cardinalitat. Com a conseqüència obtenim una caracterització geomètrica del nucleolus mitjançant una propietat de bisecció més forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel (Maschler et al, 1979).

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

Diffusionless first-order phase transitions in systems with frozen configurational degrees of freedom

We consider systems that can be described in terms of two kinds of degree of freedom. The corresponding ordering modes may, under certain conditions, be coupled to each other. We may thus assume that the primary ordering mode gives rise to a diffusionless first-order phase transition. The change of its thermodynamic properties as a function of the secondary-ordering-mode state is then analyzed. Two specific examples are discussed. First, we study a three-state Potts model in a binary system. Using mean-field techniques, we obtain the phase diagram and different properties of the system as a function of the distribution of atoms on the different lattice sites. In the second case, the properties of a displacive structural phase transition of martensitic type in a binary alloy are studied as a function of atomic order. Because of the directional character of the martensitic-transition mechanism, we find only a very weak dependence of the entropy on atomic order. Experimental results are found to be in quite good agreement with theoretical predictions.

Influence of configurational atomic order on the relative stability of bcc and close-packed structures in Cu-based alloys

We present a study of the influence of atomic order on the relative stability of the bcc and the 18R martensitic structures in a Cu2.96Al0.92Be0.12 crystal. Calorimetric measurements have shown that disorder increases the stability of the 18R phase, contrary to what happens in Cu-Zn-Al alloys for which it is the bcc phase that is stabilized by disordering the system. This different behavior has been explained in terms of a model recently reported. We have also proved that the entropy change at the martensitic transition is independent of the state of atomic order of the crystal, as predicted theoretically. Our results suggest that differences in the vibrational spectrum of the crystal due to different states of atomic order must be equal in the bcc and in the close-packed phases.

Damage spreading transition in glasses: A probe for the ruggedness of the configurational landscape

We consider damage spreading transitions in the framework of mode-coupling theory. This theory describes relaxation processes in glasses in the mean-field approximation which are known to be characterized by the presence of an exponentially large number of metastable states. For systems evolving under identical but arbitrarily correlated noises, we demonstrate that there exists a critical temperature T0 which separates two different dynamical regimes depending on whether damage spreads or not in the asymptotic long-time limit. This transition exists for generic noise correlations such that the zero damage solution is stable at high temperatures, being minimal for maximal noise correlations. Although this dynamical transition depends on the type of noise correlations, we show that the asymptotic damage has the good properties of a dynamical order parameter, such as (i) independence of the initial damage; (ii) independence of the class of initial condition; and (iii) stability of the transition in the presence of asymmetric interactions which violate detailed balance. For maximally correlated noises we suggest that damage spreading occurs due to the presence of a divergent number of saddle points (as well as metastable states) in the thermodynamic limit consequence of the ruggedness of the free-energy landscape which characterizes the glassy state. These results are then compared to extensive numerical simulations of a mean-field glass model (the Bernasconi model) with Monte Carlo heat-bath dynamics. The freedom of choosing arbitrary noise correlations for Langevin dynamics makes damage spreading an interesting tool to probe the ruggedness of the configurational landscape.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative