Federal tax reform : a review of the federal tax reform compromise and its implications for Illinois.

At head of title: Tax report.

Tariff, or, Rates of duties payable on goods, wares and merchandise, imported into the United States of America : on and after the first day of January, 1840, until the thirtieth day of June, 1842, inclusive, in conformity with the Compromise Act : also, the rates of duties imposed by the Tariff Law of 1832, together with many important laws, circulars, and decisions of the Treasury Department, relating to commerce and the revenue, and much useful information to merchants, masters of vessels, and others /

Goldsmiths'-Kress no. 31474.26.

Webster and Hayne's speeches in the United States Senate, on Mr. Foot's resolution of January, 1830. Also, Daniel Webster's speech, in the United States Senate, March 7, 1850, on the slavery compromise ...

Mode of access: Internet.

History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850,

Imprint of v. 4: New York and London, Macmillan Company.

Should I share this? : support awareness of social sharing practice that might compromise online privacy and reputation

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Minimal instrumentation may compromise failure diagnosis with an ecological interface

Interfaces designed according to ecological interface design (EID) display higher-order relations and properties of a work domain so that adaptive operator problem solving can be better supported under unanticipated system conditions. Previous empirical studies of EID have assumed that the raw data required to derive and communicate higher-order information would be available and reliable. The present research examines the relative advantages of an EID interface over a conventional piping-and-instrumentation diagram (PID) when instrumentation is maximally or only minimally adequate. Results show an interaction between interface and the adequacy of the instrumentation. Failure diagnosis performance with the EID interface with maximally adequate instrumentation is best overall. Performance with the EID interface drops more drastically from maximally to minimally adequate instrumentation than does performance with the PID interface, to the point where the EID interface with minimally adequate instrumentation supports nonsignificantly worse performance than does the equivalent PID interface. Actual or potential applications of this research include design of instrumentation and displays for complex industrial processes.

Accountability, organisational learning and risks to patient safety in England: conflict or compromise?

This article examines the current risk regulation regime, within the English National Health Service (NHS), by investigating the two, sometimes conflicting, approaches to risk embodied within the field of policies towards patient safety. The first approach focuses on promoting accountability and is built on legal principles surrounding negligence and competence. The second approach focuses on promoting learning from previous mistakes and near-misses, and is built on the development of a ‘safety culture’. Previous work has drawn attention to problems associated with risk-based regulation when faced with the dual imperatives of accountability and organisational learning. The article develops this by considering whether the NHS patient safety regime demonstrates the coexistence of two different risk regulation regimes, or merely one regime with contradictory elements. It uses the heuristic device of ‘institutional logics’ to examine the coexistence of and interrelationship between ‘organisational learning’ and ‘accountability’ logics driving risk regulation in health care.

Defense against node compromise in sensor network security

Recent advances in electronic and computer technologies lead to wide-spread deployment of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). WSNs have wide range applications, including military sensing and tracking, environment monitoring, smart environments, etc. Many WSNs have mission-critical tasks, such as military applications. Thus, the security issues in WSNs are kept in the foreground among research areas. Compared with other wireless networks, such as ad hoc, and cellular networks, security in WSNs is more complicated due to the constrained capabilities of sensor nodes and the properties of the deployment, such as large scale, hostile environment, etc. Security issues mainly come from attacks. In general, the attacks in WSNs can be classified as external attacks and internal attacks. In an external attack, the attacking node is not an authorized participant of the sensor network. Cryptography and other security methods can prevent some of external attacks. However, node compromise, the major and unique problem that leads to internal attacks, will eliminate all the efforts to prevent attacks. Knowing the probability of node compromise will help systems to detect and defend against it. Although there are some approaches that can be used to detect and defend against node compromise, few of them have the ability to estimate the probability of node compromise. Hence, we develop basic uniform, basic gradient, intelligent uniform and intelligent gradient models for node compromise distribution in order to adapt to different application environments by using probability theory. These models allow systems to estimate the probability of node compromise. Applying these models in system security designs can improve system security and decrease the overheads nearly in every security area. Moreover, based on these models, we design a novel secure routing algorithm to defend against the routing security issue that comes from the nodes that have already been compromised but have not been detected by the node compromise detecting mechanism. The routing paths in our algorithm detour those nodes which have already been detected as compromised nodes or have larger probabilities of being compromised. Simulation results show that our algorithm is effective to protect routing paths from node compromise whether detected or not.

Defense Against Node Compromise in Sensor Network Security

Recent advances in electronic and computer technologies lead to wide-spread deployment of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). WSNs have wide range applications, including military sensing and tracking, environment monitoring, smart environments, etc. Many WSNs have mission-critical tasks, such as military applications. Thus, the security issues in WSNs are kept in the foreground among research areas. Compared with other wireless networks, such as ad hoc, and cellular networks, security in WSNs is more complicated due to the constrained capabilities of sensor nodes and the properties of the deployment, such as large scale, hostile environment, etc. Security issues mainly come from attacks. In general, the attacks in WSNs can be classified as external attacks and internal attacks. In an external attack, the attacking node is not an authorized participant of the sensor network. Cryptography and other security methods can prevent some of external attacks. However, node compromise, the major and unique problem that leads to internal attacks, will eliminate all the efforts to prevent attacks. Knowing the probability of node compromise will help systems to detect and defend against it. Although there are some approaches that can be used to detect and defend against node compromise, few of them have the ability to estimate the probability of node compromise. Hence, we develop basic uniform, basic gradient, intelligent uniform and intelligent gradient models for node compromise distribution in order to adapt to different application environments by using probability theory. These models allow systems to estimate the probability of node compromise. Applying these models in system security designs can improve system security and decrease the overheads nearly in every security area. Moreover, based on these models, we design a novel secure routing algorithm to defend against the routing security issue that comes from the nodes that have already been compromised but have not been detected by the node compromise detecting mechanism. The routing paths in our algorithm detour those nodes which have already been detected as compromised nodes or have larger probabilities of being compromised. Simulation results show that our algorithm is effective to protect routing paths from node compromise whether detected or not.

Bella Abzug at Women's Caucus Press Conference explaining compromise with Carter's people

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

Accommodation as Compromise: Turning Hard Cases into Easier Ones

Recent developments seem to present a stark choice: either we protect religious liberty or we allow discrimination. But do we have to choose? In this talk, Chad Flanders tries to present a way out of current conflicts between religious liberty and laws against discrimination.