The nature of avidyÄ in Buddhism and VedÄ nta

This thesis deals with the nature of ignorance as it was interpreted in the Upani~adic tradition, specifically in Advaita Vedanta, and in early and Mahayana Buddhism , e specially in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. The approach i s a historical and comparative one. It examines the early thoughts of both the upanis.a ds and Buddhism abou t avidya (ignorance), shows how the notion was treated by the more speculative and philosphically oriented schools which base d themselves on the e arly works, and sees how their views differ. The thesis will show that the Vedinta tended to treat avidya as a topic for metaphysical s peculation as t he s chool developed, drifting from its initial e xistential concerns, while the Madhyamika remained in contact with the e xistential concerns evident in the first discourses of the Buddha. The word "notion" has been chosen for use in referring t o avidya, even though it may have non-intellectual and emotional connotations, to avoid more popular a lternatives such as "concept" or "idea". In neither the Upani,ads, Advaita Vedanta, or Buddhism is ignorance merely a concept or an idea. Only in a secondary sense, in texts and speech , does it become one. Avidya has more to do with the lived situation in which man finds himself, with the subjectobject separation in which he f eels he exists, than with i i i intel lect ual constr ucts . Western thought has begun to r ealize the same with concerns such as being in modern ontology, and has chosen to speak about i t i n terms of the question of being . Avidya, however, i s not a 'question' . If q ue stions we r e to be put regarding the nature of a vidya , they would be more of t he sort "What is not avidya?", though e ven here l anguage bestows a status t o i t which avidya does not have. In considering a work of the Eastern tradition, we f ace t he danger of imposing Western concepts on it. Granted t hat avidya is customari ly r endered i n English as ignorance, the ways i n which the East and West view i gno rance di f f er. Pedagogically , the European cultures, grounded in the ancient Greek culture, view ignorance as a l ack or an emptiness. A child is i gnorant o f certain t hings and the purpose o f f ormal education , in f act if not in theory, is to fill him with enough knowledge so that he can cope wit h t he complexities and the e xpectations of s ociety. On another level, we feel t hat study and research will l ead t o the discovery o f solutions, which we now lack , for problems now defying solut i on . The East, on the o t her hand, sees avidya in a d i fferent light.Ignorance isn't a lack, but a presence. Religious and philosophical l iterature directs its efforts not towards acquiring something new, but at removing t.he ideas and opinions that individuals have formed about themselves and the world. When that is fully accomplished, say the sages , t hen Wisdom, which has been obscured by those opinions, will present itself. Nothing new has to be learned, t hough we do have t o 'learn' that much. The growing interest in t he West with Eastern religions and philosophies may, in time, influence our theoretical and practical approaches to education and learning, not only in the established educati onal institutions, but in religious , p sychological, and spiritual activities as well. However, the requirements o f this thesis do no t permit a formulation of revolutionary method or a call to action. It focuses instead on the textual arguments which attempt to convince readers that t he world in which they take themselves to exist is not, in essence, real, on the ways i n which the l imitations of language are disclosed, and on the provisional and limited schemes that are built up to help students see through their ignorance. The metaphysic s are provisional because they act only as spurs and guides. Both the Upanisadic and Buddhist traditions that will be dealt with here stress that language constantly fails to encompass the Real. So even terms s uch as 'the Real', 'Absolute', etc., serve only to lead to a transcendent experience . The sections dealing with the Upanisads and Advaita Vedanta show some of the historical evolution of the notion of avidya, how it was dealt with as maya , and the q uestions that arose as t o its locus. With Gau?apada we see the beginnings of a more abstract treatment of the topic, and , the influence of Buddhism. Though Sankhara' S interest was primarily directed towards constructing a philosophy to help others attain mok~a ( l iberation), he too introduced t echnica l t e rminology not found in the works of his predecessors. His work is impressive , but areas of it are incomplete. Numbers of his followers tried to complete the systematic presentation of his insi ghts . Their work focuses on expl anat i ons of adhyasa (superimposition ) , t he locus and object of ignorance , and the means by which Brahman takes itself to be the jiva and the world. The section on early Buddhism examines avidya in the context o f the four truths, together with dubkha (suffering), the r ole it p l ays in t he chain of dependent c ausation , a nd t he p r oblems that arise with t he doctrine of anatman. With t he doct rines of e arly Buddhism as a base, the Madhyamika elaborated questions that the Buddha had said t e nded not t o edi f ication. One of these had to do with own - being or svabhava. Thi s serves a s a centr e around which a discussion o f i gnorance unfolds, both i ndividual and coll ective ignorance. There follows a treatment of the cessation of ignorance as it is discussed within this school . The final secti on tries to present t he similarities and differences i n the natures o f ignorance i n t he two traditions and discusses the factors responsible for t hem . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Sinha for the time spent II and suggestions made on the section dealing with Sankara and the Advait.a Vedanta oommentators, and Dr. Sprung, who supervised, direoted, corrected and encouraged the thesis as a whole, but especially the section on Madhyamika, and the final comparison.

Buddhism and the earth : environmental thought in early Buddhist philosophy

Introduction Fundamental to the philosophy of Buddhism, is the insight that there is "unsatisfactohness" (dukkha) in the world and that it can be eliminated through the practice of the Noble Eight Fold Path. Buddhism also maintains that the world as we experience and entities that exist are bereft of any substantiality. Instead existence is manifest through dependent origination. All things are conditional; nothing is permanent. However, inherent in this dependent existence is the interconnectedness of all beings and their subjection to the cosmic law of karma. Part of cultivating the Eight Fold path includes a deep compassion for all other living things, 'trapped' within this cycle of dependent origination. This compassion or empathy (karuna) is crucial to the Buddhist path to enlightenment. It is this emphasis on karuna that shows itself in Mahayana Buddhism with respect to the theory of the boddhisatva (or Buddha-to-be) since the boddhisatva willingly postpones his/her own enlightenment to help others on the same path. One of the ramifications of the theory of dependent origination is that there is no anthropocentric bias placed on humans over the natural world. Paradoxically the doctrine of non-self becomes an ontology within Buddhism, culminating in the Mayahana realization that a common boundary exists between samsara and nirvana. Essential to this ontology is the life of dharma or a moral life. Ethics is not separated from ontology. As my thesis will show, this basic outlook of Buddhism has implications toward our understanding of the Buddhist world-view with respect to the current human predicament concerning the environment. While humans are the only ones who can 4 attain "Buddhahood", it is because of our ability to understand what it means to follow the Eight fold path and act accordingly. Because of the interconnectedness of all entities {dharmas), there is an ontological necessity to eliminate suffering and 'save the earth' because if we allow the earth to suffer, we ALL suffer. This can be understood as an ethical outlook which can be applied to our interaction with and treatment of the natural environment or environment in the broadest sense, not just trees plants rocks etc. It is an approach to samsara and all within it. It has been argued that there is no ontology in Buddhism due to its doctrine of "non-self". However, it is a goal of this thesis to argue that there does exist an original ontology in Buddhism; that according to it, the nature of Being is essentially neither "Being nor non-being nor not non-being" as illustrated by Nagarjuna. Within this ontology is engrained an ethic or 'right path' (samma marga) that is fundamental to our being and this includes a compassionate relationship to our environment. In this dissertation I endeavour to trace the implications that the Buddhist worldview has for the environmental issues that assail us in our age of technology. I will explore questions such as: can the Buddhist way of thinking help us comprehend and possibly resolve the environmental problems of our day and age? Are there any current environmental theories which are comparable to or share common ground with the classical Buddhist doctrines? I will elucidate some fundamental doctrines of early Buddhism from an environmental perspective as well as identify some comparable modern environmental theories such as deep ecology and general systems theory, that seem to share in the wisdom of classical Buddhism and have much to gain from a deeper appreciation of Buddhism.

L'éveil dans le « Sûtra de Vimalakîrti »

Notre analyse porte sur la notion d’éveil au sein du Sûtra de Vimalakîrti. Premièrement, nous présentons et comparons les modèles d’éveil exposés dans ce texte, soit la figure du bouddha et – surtout – celle du bodhisattva; nous analysons leurs deux grands traits caractéristiques, c’est-à-dire la connaissance transcendante et les méthodes habiles, puis élaborons leur rôle par rapport à l’éveil. Il apparaît d’emblée que la connaissance transcendante est une connaissance non discursive de la réelle nature de toute chose et qu’elle est une condition nécessaire à l’éveil, alors que les méthodes habiles – aussi appelées expédients salvifiques – constituent la myriade de moyens rusés et provisoires conçus et employés par les bouddhas et bodhisattva dans le but d’amener les êtres ignorants à l’éveil et d’ainsi les libérer de l’attachement et de la souffrance. Dans le second chapitre, nous caractérisons l’état de conscience de l’éveillé à l’aide de notions telles la non-dualité, la non-discrimination et la non-pensée, puis présentons la conception de la pratique méditationnelle soutenue dans notre sûtra. Nous montrons que l’état d’éveil est un état de conscience non discriminateur au sein duquel l’identité personnelle et les phénomènes – ou la dualité sujet-objet – sont reconnus comme étant des illusions ou, plus précisément, des constructions mentales et langagières. Ainsi, la méditation apparaît comme étant une méthode habile provisoire dont les buts sont essentiellement la déconstruction du paradigme dualiste de la pensée discursive et la réalisation qu’il n’existe, ultimement et paradoxalement, aucune réelle entrave à l’éveil et aucune pratique méditationnelle nécessaire à l’expérience de l’éveil.

La notion d'enseignement parfait (yuanjiao) dans la pensée de Mou Zongsan (1909-1995)

Personnage central du néoconfucianisme contemporain, Mou Zongsan (1909-1995) a écrit un nombre impressionnant de livres philosophiques. Loin d’ignorer les penseurs d’autres courants, il les intègre à ses théories pour en utiliser les forces. Ainsi, il s’intéresse au concept d’enseignement parfait (yuanjiao圓教). Cette notion fut introduite par l’école bouddhique Tiantai (Tiantai天台). Après une classification de tous les enseignements bouddhiques, il fut conclu que l’enseignement parfait consiste en un enseignement complet reflétant parfaitement l’intention ultime du Bouddha. Mou considère quatre critères pour déterminer quelle doctrine est conforme à cette idée : la préservation de tout ce qui existe, la possibilité pour tous d’atteindre l’illumination, englober tout sans distinction et utiliser un langage qu’il qualifie de non analytique. Dans cette étude, nous allons examiner l’utilisation faite par Mou du concept d’enseignement parfait. Il démontre la nécessité pour l’être humain d’avoir un esprit qui saisit à la fois la sphère phénoménale et nouménale. De cette façon, tout ce qui compose la réalité, pur et impur, est conservé. Il emprunte ensuite le concept du summum bonum kantien, c’est-à-dire le ratio proportionnel entre la vertu et le bonheur, et le révise à l’aide de l’enseignement parfait. Le résultat est tout à fait étonnant : l’être humain possède l’intuition intellectuelle, normalement réservé à Dieu chez Kant, et est ainsi responsable de son propre bonheur grâce à l’accomplissement d’actions morales. Cependant, le bouddhisme ne fournirait pas le cadre théorique idéal pour la notion très importante du summum bonum puisque l’aspect moral n’y serait pas assez développé. Mou affirme que, malgré leur origine bouddhique, les critères qui définissent un enseignement parfait peuvent être appliqués à d’autres courants de pensée. Il propose donc le confucianiste Wang Longxi王龍溪 (Wang Ji王畿 1498- 1583), dont les théories correspondent aux caractéristiques de l’enseignement parfait, pour établir un concept du summum bonum novateur.

The Purely Reflected Self

Belief in the concept of the self causes suffering. Unfortunately, although conceptual constructions like this may help to define our goal—the casting off of the belief in the self—this is a much more difficult thing to actualize and attain in daily practice. Our building blocks can form a neat tower, and we can climb to the top and gaze at the horizon, but they will topple, leaving us once again over our heads in the hedgerow. Buddha describes his teachings as a raft to ford the river of suffering in order to reach the far off bank of enlightenment: as one does not take the raft after crossing the river, so we must not lean on his teachings to make our way through life. So I intend here to abandon the raft for other accounts of existence written by other thinkers, and in this my purpose is twofold: First, in reading other interpretations we can gain new tools with which to study the architecture of the concept of the self, and second, in studying the history of the concept of self as it progresses through history we can better understand the non-inherentness of this problematic construct. I intend to examine the philosophies of self in the Chinese and European traditions, and their subsequent deconstructive traditions in order to achieve this goal.

Deborah Walker : recent painting

Artworks exhibited : Life 2008 - BKK 2008 - The Oracle 2008 - The Revolution 2008 - The Little Dog 2008 - Modern 2008 - The Unifier 2008 - Love 2008 - Mother 2008 - Shiva 2008 - Homage 2008 - The Beauty 2008 - Apollo 2008 - Troy 2008 - Suvarnabhumi (the plane) 2008 - Uncle Basil 2008 - The Daughter 2008 - Gods of War 2008 - The Trojans 2008 - Le Grand pere 2008 - Albert -  I Remember The Beach 2007 - I Remember The Beach II - My Cosmic Lady 2008 - On The Avenue - Space Pervades a Jar Drawings : Cyberman - Minatour - Fishlady - Italy - Kaspar - Madonna - Red Vessel - Ganesa - Cowboys - Sun - Fire Engine - Kneeling Woman - Blowing Bubbles - Bridge and Horse and Cloud - Kasper Hauser - Eyeball and Watering Can - Red Head - Bombay - Blue Eyes and monkey God - Blue Girl With Buddha

Emptiness and becoming : integrating Madhyamika Buddhism and process philosophy

Beginning with a comparison of process philosophy and Madhyamika Buddhism -focussing in particular on Charles Hartshorne and Nagarjuna - which seeks to find points of similarity and difference, this thesis goes on to ask whether the differences are disagreements or complementary insights that may be integrated by means of a hermeneutical framework which can facilitate the enrichment of both systems. It is argued that process philosophy's method of creative synthesis and Madhyamika's method of negative dialectics are complementary rather than rival methods, because: (1) the Madhyamika bi-negation of symmetrical internal and external relations is complemented by process philosophy's argument that asymmetrical relations have primacy, which can be integrated into a theory of 'asymmetrical interdependence'; (2) the Madhyamika bi-negation of being and non-being is complemented by process philosophy's argument that becoming has primacy; (3) Madhyamika's emptiness (or openness) and process philosophy's creativity are complementary ideas that can be integrated into a ‘creative emptiness’; (4) Madhyamika's deconstruction of theism and acceptance of a conventional (and thus empty) ‘Cosmic Buddha-Bodhisattva’ and process philosophy's panentheism are complementary and can be integrated in the idea of an ‘empty God’; (5) The creative emptiness and the empty God are two different but complementary ultimates - the ultimate activity and the ultimate actuality; (6) Madhyamika’s two truths -conventional (empty world) and ultimate (emptiness) - can be enriched by expanding the conventional to include ultimate actuality (empty God), and not subordinating the conventional to the ultimate; (7) process philosophy can be similarly enriched by meditating on creative emptiness, which reveals the empty God-world, which is not dominant vis-a-vis creative emptiness. An attempt is made to develop a hermeneutical framework for the comparison and integration of Madhyamika and process thought, which can also be used to construct a general theory of worldviews and a theory of interreligious dialogue. Finally, the practical applications of the integration of process thought and Madhyamika Buddhism are explored, focussing on ethical and socio-political issues and how the integration of the two systems can be used to advantage in these contexts.

Camilo Pessanha e o Tao Te Ching: um capítulo

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Parameters of Reform and Unification in Modern Japanese Buddhist Thought: Murakami Senshō and Critical Buddhism

Reform is a word that, one might easily say, characterizes more than any other the history and development of Buddhism. Yet, it must also be said that reform movements in East Asian Buddhism have often taken on another goal—harmony or unification; that is, a desire not only to reconstruct a more worthy form of Buddhism, but to simultaneously bring together all existing forms under a single banner, in theory if not in practice. This paper explores some of the tensions between the desire for reform and the quest for harmony in modern Japanese Buddhism thought, by comparing two developments: the late 19th century movement towards ‘New Buddhism’ (shin Bukkyō) as exemplified by Murakami Senshō 村上専精 (1851–1929), and the late 20th century movement known as ‘Critical Buddhism’ (hihan Bukkyō), as found in the works of Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗 and Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭. In all that has been written about Critical Buddhism, in both Japanese and English, very little attention has been paid to the place of the movement within the larger traditions of Japanese Buddhist reform. Here I reconsider Critical Buddhism in relation to the concerns of the previous, much larger trends towards Buddhist reform that emerged almost exactly 100 years previous—the so-called shin Bukkyō or New Buddhism of the late-Meiji era. Shin Bukkyō is a catch-all term that includes the various writings and activities of Inoue Enryō, Shaku Sōen, and Kiyozawa Manshi, as well as the so-called Daijō-hibussetsuron, a broad term used (often critically) to describe Buddhist writers who suggested that Mahāyāna Buddhism is not, in fact, the Buddhism taught by the ‘historical’ Buddha Śākyamuni. Of these, I will make a few general remarks about Daijō-hibusseturon, before turning attention more specifically to the work of Murakami Senshō, in order to flesh out some of the similarities and differences between his attempt to construct a ‘unified Buddhism’ and the work of his late-20th century avatars, the Critical Buddhists. Though a number of their aims and ideas overlap, I argue that there remain fundamental differences with respect to the ultimate purposes of Buddhist reform. This issue hinges on the implications of key terms such as ‘unity’ and ‘harmony’ as well as the way doctrinal history is categorized and understood, but it also relates to issues of ideology and the use and abuse of Buddhist doctrines in 20th-century politics.

A Blueprint for Buddhist Revolution: The Radical Buddhism of Seno’o Girō (1889–1961) and the Youth League for Revitalizing Buddhism

In the early decades of the twentieth century, as Japanese society became engulfed in war and increasing nationalism, the majority of Buddhist leaders and institutions capitulated to the status quo. One notable exception to this trend, however, was the Shinkō Bukkyō Seinen Dōmei (Youth League for Revitalizing Buddhism), founded on 5 April 1931. Led by Nichiren Buddhist layman Seno’o Girō and made up of young social activists who were critical of capitalism, internationalist in outlook, and committed to a pan-sectarian and humanist form of Buddhism that would work for social justice and world peace, the league’s motto was “carry the Buddha on your backs and go out into the streets and villages.” This article analyzes the views of the Youth League for Revitalizing Buddhism as found in the religious writings of Seno’o Girō to situate the movement in its social and philosophical context, and to raise the question of the prospects of “radical Buddhism” in twenty-first century Japan and elsewhere.

From Matterhorn to Mt Everest: empowering rescuers and improving medical care in Nepal.

This article describes a private initiative in which professional Swiss rescuers, based at the foot of the Matterhorn, trained Nepalese colleagues in advanced high altitude helicopter rescue and medical care techniques. What started as a limited program focused on mountain safety has rapidly developed into a comprehensive project to improve rescue and medical care in the Mt Everest area for both foreign travelers and the local Nepalese people.

Na 50 Nachlass Arthur Schopenhauer - 'Schopenhauer-Archiv', 281 - Dankesschreiben an Otto Hörth mit Ausführungen zur so genannten Erlösungs-Philosophie ihres Bruders Philipp Mainländer

u.a.: Hervorhebung Hessens; Buddhismus als Quelle; Minna Batz;

Na 50 Nachlass Arthur Schopenhauer - 'Schopenhauer-Archiv', 1174 - Bericht über den ersten Besuch bei Arthur Schopenhauer

Pudel; Haushälterin Margarete Schnepp; Charakterbeschreibung Schopenhauers; Plan für eine Sprechstunde; Meinung über Frauen; Richard Wagner; Qualität von Heidelberg und Göttingen als Studienorte; Lebensalter; Johann Friedrich Blumenbach; Naturwissenschaften; Preisschrift der Universität Leipzig; Buddha-Statue; Brahmanentum;

TENDENCIA THATCHERITIS OR ENGLISHNESS REMADE: The Fictions of Julian Barnes, Hanif Kureishi and Pat Barker

Julian Barnes, Pat Barker, and Hanif Kureishi are all canonical authors whose fictions are widely believed to reflect the cultural and political state of a nation that is post-war, post-imperial and post-modern. While much has been written on how Barker’s and Kureishi’s early works in particular respond to and intervene in the presiding political narrative of the 1980s – Thatcherism – treatment of how revenants of Thatcherism have shaped these writers’ works from 1990 on has remained cursory. Thatcherism is more than an obvious historical reference point for Barker, Barnes, and Kureishi; their works demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of how Thatcher’s reworkings of the repertoires of Englishness – a representational as well as political and cultural endeavour – persist beyond her time in office. Barnes, Barker, and Kureishi seem to have reached the same conclusion as political and cultural critics: Thatcher and Thatcherism have remade not only the contemporary political and cultural landscapes but also the electorate and consequently the English themselves. Tony Blair’s conception of the New Britain proved less than satisfactory because contemporary repertoires of Englishness repeat and rework historical and not incidentally imperial formulations of England and Englishness rather than envision civic and populist formulations of renewal. Barnes’s England, England and Arthur & George confront the discourse of inevitability that has come to be attached to contemporary formulations of both political and cultural Englishness – both in terms of its predictable demise and its belated celebration. Kureishi’s The Buddha of Suburbia and “The Body” speak to an alteration that has taken place in which historical Englishness and Thatcherism have become complementary rather than contrasting discourses. What Barker’s Border Crossing and Double Vision offer against this backdrop is a subtle interrogation of how renewal itself comes to be a presiding mode of cultural reflection that absorbs revolutionary possibility.