Stochastic optimal bid to electricity markets with environmental risk constraints

There are many factors that influence the day-ahead market bidding strategies of a generation company (GenCo) in the current energy market framework. Environmental policy issues have become more and more important for fossil-fuelled power plants and they have to be considered in their management, giving rise to emission limitations. This work allows to investigate the influence of both the allowances and emission reduction plan, and the incorporation of the derivatives medium-term commitments in the optimal generation bidding strategy to the day-ahead electricity market. Two different technologies have been considered: the coal thermal units, high-emission technology, and the combined cycle gas turbine units, low-emission technology. The Iberian Electricity Market and the Spanish National Emissions and Allocation Plans are the framework to deal with the environmental issues in the day-ahead market bidding strategies. To address emission limitations, some of the standard risk management methodologies developed for financial markets, such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR), have been extended. This study offers to electricity generation utilities a mathematical model to determinate the individual optimal generation bid to the wholesale electricity market, for each one of their generation units that maximizes the long-run profits of the utility abiding by the Iberian Electricity Market rules, the environmental restrictions set by the EU Emission Trading Scheme, as well as the restrictions set by the Spanish National Emissions Reduction Plan. The economic implications for a GenCo of including the environmental restrictions of these National Plans are analyzed and the most remarkable results will be presented.

Comparison of Work Scheduling Using Constraint Programming or Auctions

Business processes designers take into account the resources that the processes would need, but, due to the variable cost of certain parameters (like energy) or other circumstances, this scheduling must be done when business process enactment. In this report we formalize the energy aware resource cost, including time and usage dependent rates. We also present a constraint programming approach and an auction-based approach to solve the mentioned problem including a comparison of them and a comparison of the proposed algorithms for solving them

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Internet Auctions: "Going, Going, Gone!", June 2003

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Internet Auctions: "Going, Going, Gone!"

Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium

Economics is the science of want and scarcity. We show that want andscarcity, operating within a simple exchange institution (double auction),are sufficient for an economy consisting of multiple inter--related marketsto attain competitive equilibrium (CE). We generalize Gode and Sunder's(1993a, 1993b) single--market finding to multi--market economies, andexplore the role of the scarcity constraint in convergence of economies to CE.When the scarcity constraint is relaxed by allowing arbitrageurs in multiple markets to enter speculative trades, prices still converge to CE,but allocative efficiency of the economy drops. \\Optimization by individual agents, often used to derive competitive equilibria,are unnecessary for an actual economy to approximately attain such equilibria.From the failure of humans to optimize in complex tasks, one need not concludethat the equilibria derived from the competitive model are descriptivelyirrelevant. We show that even in complex economic systems, such equilibriacan be attained under a range of surprisingly weak assumptions about agentbehavior.

Auctions of licences and market structure

This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to operate in amarket where those firms that obtain at least one licence then engage ina symmetric market game. I employ a new refinement of Nash equilibrium,the concept of {\sl Markovian recursively undominated equilibrium}.The unique solution satisfies the following properties: (i) when severalfirms own licences before the auction (incumbents), new entrants buylicences in each stage, and (ii) when there is no more than one incumbent,either the single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs inevery stage, depending on the parameter configuration.

On information and competition in private value auctions

How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment?We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers updated expected valuations. We define the class of precision criteria following this approach and different notions of dispersion, and relate them to existing criteria of informativeness. Using supermodular precision, we obtain three results: (1) a more precise information structure yields a more efficient allocation; (2) the auctioneer provides less than the efficient level of information since more information increases bidder informational rents; (3) there is a strategic complementarity between information and competition, so that both the socially efficient and the auctioneer s optimal choice of precision increase with the number of bidders, and both converge as the number of bidders goes to infinity.

English Auctions with toeholds: An experimental study

We run experiments on English Auctions where the bidders already own a part (toehold) ofthe good for sale. The theory predicts a very strong effect of even small toeholds, however wefind the effects are not so strong in the lab. We explain this by analyzing the flatness of thepayoff functions, which leads to relatively costless deviations from the equilibrium strategies.We find that a levels of reasoning model explains the results better than the Nash equilibrium.Moreover, we find that although big toeholds can be effective, the cost to acquire them mightbe higher than the strategic benefit they bring. Finally our results show that in general theseller s revenues fall when the playing field is uneven.

First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness

I study monotonicity and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies in a two-person first price auction with affiliated signals. I show thatwhen the game is symmetric there is a unique Nash equilibrium thatsatisfies a regularity condition requiring that the equilibrium strategies be{\sl piecewise monotone}. Moreover, when the signals are discrete-valued, the equilibrium is unique. The central part of the proof consists of showing that at any regular equilibrium the bidders' strategies must be monotone increasing within the support of winning bids. The monotonicity result derived in this paper provides the missing link for the analysis of uniqueness in two-person first price auctions. Importantly, this result extends to asymmetric auctions.

Disseny i implementació d'una pàgina web de subhastes

Amb la situació econòmica actual pot ser interessant poder vendre objectes que ja no s’utilitzen i també poder-ne comprar de segona mà. Amb aquesta idea sorgeix el projecte de crear una pàgina de subhastes online on la gent pugui comerciar amb les coses que ja no necessita. Tenint en compte el concepte inicial, el propietari de la pàgina no rebrà cap retribució ni percentatge de cada subhasta, tot l’import serà pel venedor. L’objectiu principal és el de poder oferir un lloc on després de registrar-se, els usuaris puguin veure i pujar per els articles que altres persones estan subhastant i també la possibilitat de crear les seves pròpies subhastes. Cada usuari disposarà d’un espai personal on veure les subhastes amb les que ha interactuat i així no perdre-les de vista i també on poder veure en cada moment l’estat de les subhastes que ha creat. La vista d’una subhasta s’actualitzarà automàticament sense haver de recarregar la pàgina i si algú puja durant l’últim minut la subhasta s’allargarà un minut més per evitar puges a l’últim moment i així maximitzar el preu final. Hi haurà un administrador que serà l’encarregat de gestionar el bon funcionament de la pàgina amb permís per afegir, editar, consultar i eliminar tota la informació disponible. Per portar a terme el projecte s’ha utilitzat PHP per la part de programació i MySQL com a sistema gestor de bases de dades.

Parámetros e indicadores de calidad en la evaluación de una revista electrónica. El caso de BiD: textos universitaris de biblioteconomia i documentació

El objetivo del artículo es el establecimiento de un conjunto de parámetros e indicadores que permitan la evaluación de revistas electrónicas accesibles vía web. La metodología empleada consiste en analizar los parámetros e indicadores genéricos descritos por Lluís Codina y concretarlos, a partir de ejemplos, para que puedan ser aplicados en un recurso web específico: una revista electrónica. Una vez definidos los indicadores específicos, se procederá a evaluar con ellos la revista BiD, de la Facultat de Biblioteconomia i Documentació de la Universitat de Barcelona, con la finalidad de comprobar su funcionalidad. Del resultado del estudio, se destacan los puntos débiles que en la actualidad presenta la revista y se establecen un conjunto de propuestas destinadas a mejorarlos.

La figura del consultor a empreses del sector tecnològic: oportunitats d'ocupació per als titulats en BiD

The article offers an extrapolation based on the author's own experience, describing the main characteristics of projects undertaken by companies in the technological sector and the typical functions performed by consultants in this area. The principal objective is to introduce the profile of consultant as a potential employment niche for those graduates in Library and Information Science who would like to specialise in this area, once having acquired the complementary training that is needed

Paràmetres i indicadors de qualitat en l'avaluació d'una revista electrònica. El cas de BiD: textos universitaris de biblioteconomia i documentació

L'objectiu de l'article és l'establiment d'un conjunt de paràmetres i indicadors que permetin l'avaluació de revistes electròniques accessibles via web. La metodologia emprada consisteix a analitzar els paràmetres i indicadors genèrics descrits per Lluís Codina i concretar-los, a partir d'exemples, perquè puguin ser aplicats en un recurs web específic: una revista electrònica. Una vegada definits els indicadors específics, es procedirà a avaluar la revista BiD, de la Facultat de Biblioteconomia i Documentació de la Universitat de Barcelona, amb la finalitat de comprovar-ne la funcionalitat. Del resultat de l'estudi, es destaquen els punts febles que presenta actualment la revista i s'estableix un conjunt de propostes destinades a millorar-los.

List of Bid Proposal Holders, April 11, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders

List of Bid Proposal Holders, April 14, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders

List of Bid Proposal Holders, April 15, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders