Orbits of operators commuting with the Volterra operator

Asymptotic estimates of the norms of orbits of certain operators that commute with the classical Volterra operator V acting on L-P[0,1], with 1 0, but also to operators of the form phi (V), where phi is a holomorphic function at zero. The method to obtain the estimates is based on the fact that the Riemann-Liouville operator as well as the Volterra operator can be related to the Levin-Pfluger theory of holomorphic functions of completely regular growth. Different methods, such as the Denjoy-Carleman theorem, are needed to analyze the behavior of the orbits of I - cV, where c > 0. The results are applied to the study of cyclic properties of phi (V), where phi is a holomorphic function at 0.

Operators, commuting with the Volterra operator, are not weakly supercyclic

We prove that any bounded linear operator on $L_p[0,1]$ for $1\leq p

Heterogeneity assumptions in the specification of bargaining models: a study of household level trade-offs between commuting time and salary

With many real world decisions being made in conjunction with other decision makers, or single agent decisions having an influence on other members of the decision maker's immediate entourage, there is strong interest in studying the relative weight assigned to different agents in such contexts. In the present paper, we focus on the case of one member of a two person household being asked to make choices affecting the travel time and salary of both members. We highlight the presence of significant heterogeneity across individuals not just in their underlying sensitivities, but also in the relative weight they assign to their partner, and show how this weight varies across attributes. This is in contrast to existing work which uses weights assigned to individual agents at the level of the overall utility rather than for individual attributes. We also show clear evidence of a risk of confounding between heterogeneity in marginal sensitivities and heterogeneity in the weights assigned to each member. We show how this can lead to misleading model results, and argue that this may also explain past results showing bargaining or weight parameters outside the usual [0,1] range in more traditional joint decision making contexts. In terms of substantive results, we find that male respondents place more weight on their partner's travel time, while female respondents place more weight on their partner's salary.