Banks and development: Jewish communities in the Italian Renaissance and current economic performance

Are differences in local banking development long-lasting? Do they affect long-term economic performance?I answer these questions by relying on an historical development that occurred in Italian cities during the 15thcentury. A sudden change in the Catholic doctrine had driven the Jews toward money lending. Cities thatwere hosting Jewish communities developed complex banking institutions for two reasons: first, the Jews werethe only people in Italy who were allowed to lend for a profit and, second, the Franciscan reaction to Jewishusury led to the creation of charity lending institutions, the Monti di Pietà, that have survived until today andhave become the basis of the Italian banking system. Using Jewish demography in 1500 as an instrument, Iprovide evidence of (1) an extraordinary persistence in the level of banking development across Italian cities (2)large effects of current local banking development on per-capita income. Additional firm-level analyses suggestthat well-functioning local banks exert large effects on aggregate productivity by reallocating resources towardmore efficient firms. I exploit the expulsion of the Jews from the Spanish territories in Italy in 1541 to arguethat my results are not driven by omitted institutional, cultural and geographical characteristics. In particular,I show that, in Central Italy, the difference in current income between cities that hosted Jewish communitiesand cities that did not exists only in those regions that were not Spanish territories in the 16th century.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages ofeconomic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

Banks, government bonds, and default: what do the data say?

We use data from Bankscope to analyze the holdings of public bonds by over 18,000 banks located in 185 countries and the role of these bonds in 18 sovereign debt crises over the period 1998-2012. We find that: (i) banks hold a sizeable share of their assets in government bonds (about 9% on average), particularly in less financially developed countries; (ii) during sovereign crises, banks on average increase their bondholdings by 1% of their assets, but this increase is concentrated among larger and more profitable banks, and; (iii) the correlation between a bank's holdings of public bonds and its future loans is positive in normal times, but turns negative during defaults. A 10% increase in bank bond-holdings during default is associated with a 3.2% reduction in future loans, and bonds bought in normal times account for 75% of this effect. Our results are consistent with the view that there is a liquidity benefit for banks to hold public bonds in normal times, which is critical for understanding bank fragility during sovereign crises.

Independent Central Banks: Low inflation at no cost?: A model with fiscal policy

In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal policy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that, with this extension, the politically induced variance of output is not always eliminated nor reduced by delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank. Further, in flation and output stabilisation will be affected by the degree of conservativeness of the central bank and by the probability of the less in flation averse party gaining power. Keywords: rational partisan theory; fiscal policy; independent central bank JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

The Same, but Different: Central Banks, Regulatory Agencies, and the Politics of Delegation to Independent Authorities

Independent regulatory agencies are the institutional foundations of the regulatory state that, during the past 15 years, has gained prominence throughout Europe. This article studies the rise of independent authorities in European countries by comparing regulatory agencies and central banks. Delegation to independent central banks and to independent regulatory agencies is similar in many respects. In both cases, agents are deliberately made independent from political principals through a specific institutional design. Moreover, it has been argued that delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies is linked to the need for policy-makers to improve the credibility of policy commitments, to the wish of incumbent politicians to tie the hands of future majorities, and to the extent to which the institutional contexts safeguard policy stability. Through an analysis of the formal independence of central banks and regulatory agencies in Western Europe, this article identifies an empirical puzzle that casts doubts on the accuracy of current explanations. Veto players and the uncertainty of incumbent policy-makers in respect to their re-election prospects matter for delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies, but in opposite ways. Making sense of these anomalies is necessary to achieve a better understanding of delegation to independent authorities.

Sovereign default, domestic banks and financial institutions

We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaultsare costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutionsallow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults.Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines in private credit, and these declines should belarger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds.In these same countries, government defaults should be less likely. Using a large panel of countries, we findevidence consistent with these predictions.

Efeitos do nim sobre tetranychus urticae Koch (Acari: Tetranychidae) e os predadores Phytoseiulus macropilis (Banks) e Neoseiulus californicus (Mcgregor) (Acari: Phytoseiidae)

O objetivo deste trabalho foi avaliar a eficiência de controle e os efeitos adversos de dois produtos à base de nim Azamax® (Azadiractina A/B 12g/L) e Neemseto® (Azadiractina A/B, Nimbina e Salanina 2,389 g/L) sobre o ácaro-rajado Tetranychus urticae e os predadores Phytoseiulus macropilis e Neoseiulus californicus em laboratório. Para o ácaro-rajado, foram consideradas as variáveis mortalidade, fecundidade, efeito ovicida e persistência biológica, enquanto para os fitoseídeos consideraram-se mortalidade e fecundidade. A mortalidade máxima observada para o ácaro-rajado foi de 89,7% e 91,5% para Azamax® e Neemseto®, respectivamente, na concentração de 0,5% após a reaplicação do produto no sétimo dia. Também foram observados efeitos adversos sobre a fecundidade e a viabilidade dos ovos quando tratados com os produtos comerciais (p.c.). A persistência biológica dos produtos foi de aproximadamente três dias após a pulverização. As formulações apresentaram seletividade em relação aos fitoseídeos, porém causaram redução da fecundidade dos mesmos.

The Regulation of Foreign Banks in Switzerland (1956-1972)

The Swiss financial centre witnessed an important shift during the 1960s: the number of foreign banks and their importance in relation to the domestic banking sector significantly increased. Faced with this rapid development, Swiss bank representatives and political and monetary authorities reacted strongly. This paper investigates the evolution of the regulatory response by Swiss banking policy actors to the proliferation of foreign financial in- stitutions. In 1969, those reactions led to the adoption of a discriminatory regime, setting higher entry barriers for foreign banks than for domestic institutions. After examining possible reasons for the attractiveness of Switzerland to foreign banks, this paper will analyse the concerns and fears of the domestic banking sector and its regulators. In this regard, it appears that issues such as mere competition, preservation of the international reputation of the Swiss banks and anti-inflationary monetary policy were central to the chosen regulatory regime. Moreover, this paper shows that foreign banks were used as scapegoats in the evolution of the Swiss system of banking supervision. They were more tightly regulated, yet the general framework remained very lax.

Sovereigns and banks in the euro area : a tale of two crises

This study attempts to identify and trace inter-linkages between sovereign and banking risk in the euro area. To this end, we use an indicator of banking risk in each country based on the Contingent Claim Analysis literature, and 10-year government yield spreads over Germany as a measure of sovereign risk. We apply a dynamic approach to testing for Granger causality between the two measures of risk in 10 euro area countries, allowing us to check for contagion in the form of a significant and abrupt increase in short-run causal linkages. The empirical results indicate that episodes of contagion vary considerably in both directions over time and within the different EMU countries. Significantly, we find that causal linkages tend to strengthen particularly at the time of major financial crises. The empirical evidence suggests the presence of contagion, mainly from banks to sovereigns.

Banks, Lies and Bricks: The Determinants of Home Value Inflation in Spain during the Housing Boom

During the first decade of this century, Spain experienced the most important economic and housing boom in its recent history. This situation led the lending industry to dramatically expand through the mortgage market. The high competition among lenders caused a dramatic lowering of credit standards. During this period, lenders operating in the Spanish mortgage market artificially inflated appraised home values in order to draw larger mortgages. By doing this, lenders gave financially constrained households access to mortgage credit. In this paper, we analyze this phenomenon for this first time. To do so, we resort to a unique dataset of matched mortgage-dwelling-borrower characteristics covering the period 2004–2010. Our data allow us to construct an unbiased measure of property’s over-appraisal, since transaction prices in our data also includes any potential side payment in the transactions. Our findings indicate that i) in Spain, appraised home values were inflated on average by around 30% with respect to transaction prices; ii) creditconstrained households were more likely to be involved in mortgages with inflated house values; and iii) a regional indicator of competition in the lending market suggests that inflated appraisal values were also more likely to appear in more competitive regional mortgage markets. Keywords: Housing demand, appraisal values, house prices, housing bubble, credit constraints, mortgage market. JEL Classification: R21, R31