914 resultados para Bank financing
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The SME access-to-finance problem is not universal in the European Union and there are reasons for the fall in credit aggregates and higher SME lending rates in southern Europe. Possible market failures, high unemployment and externalities justify making greater and easier access to finance for SMEs a top priority. Previous European initiatives were able to support only a tiny fraction of Europe’s SMEs; merely stepping-up these programmes is unlikely to result in a breakthrough. Without repairing bank balance sheets and resuming economic growth, initiatives to help SMEs get access to finance will have limited success. The European Central Bank can foster bank recapitalisation by performing in the toughest possible way the asset quality review before it takes over the single supervisory role. Of the possible initiatives for fostering SME access to finance, a properly designed scheme for targeted central bank lending seems to be the best complement to the banking clean-up, but other options, such as increased European Investment Bank lending and the promotion of securitisation of SME loans, should also be explored.
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• The European quantitative easing programme, the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), started on 9 March 2015 and will last at least until September 2016. Purchases will be composed of sovereign bonds and securities from European institutions and national agencies. • The European Central Bank Governing Council imposed limits to ensure that the Eurosystem will not breach the prohibition on monetary financing. However, these limits will constrain the size and duration of the programme, especially if it is sustained after September 2016. The possibility for national central banks to also buy national agency securities could alleviate this, but the small number of eligible agencies could limit their role as a back-up purchase. • The Eurosystem should find other eligible agencies, especially in countries in which public debt is small, or waive the limits for countries respecting the investment grade eligibility criteria. The same issue arises with European institutions: their number and outstanding debt securities are limited. The waiver of the limits proposed for sovereigns should be applied to institutions with high ratings. • The PSPP profits that will ultimately be repatriated to national treasuries will be small. This was to be expected, given current very low yields. Profits will also come from the major increase in reserves resulting from the implementation of QE, combined with the negative deposit rates on excess reserves at the ECB.
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Shipping list no.: 2005-0187-P (pt. 1A), 2005-0195-P (pt. 1B), 2005-0178-P (pts. 2-3), 2005-0204-P (pt. 4), 2006-0101-P (pt. 5).
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Shipping list no.: 2006-0243-P (pt. 1A), 2006-0276-P (pt. 1B), 2006-0329-P (pt. 2), 2006-0315-P (pt. 3), 2007-0101-P (pt. 4).
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06
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This exploratory paper, developing a conceptual model of owner-manager characteristics and access to finance, aims to investigate whether the concept of strategic groups plays a role in the process of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) accessing finance. Strategic groups are groups of firms making similar patterns of investments in order to achieve their goals. This paper explores how strategic groups, which represent a classification of SMEs based upon their realised strategies, helps to provide an understanding of the success of SMEs in raising finance. The data, from a representative survey of 400 SMEs conducted by the Barclays Bank Telephone Research Unit, were subject to two-stage cluster analysis, thus codified into strategic groups using the natural rhythm of the data, rather than any subjective and value-laden categories being imposed by the authors. The findings show clear differentiation between strategic groups of SMEs, the characteristics of their owner-managers, and the financing strategies adopted. As such, the paper develops a novel typology of strategic groups of SMEs which, therefore, informs their financing strategies, as well as advising other stakeholders.
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The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission has developed, in consultation with many partners, the DOPA as a global reference information system to support decision making on protected areas (PAs) and biodiversity conservation. The DOPA brings together the World Database on Protected Areas with other reference datasets on species, habitats, ecoregions, threats and pressures, to deliver critical indicators at country level and PA level that can inform gap analyses, PA planning and reporting. These indicators are especially relevant to Aichi Targets 11 and 12, and have recently contributed to CBD country dossiers and capacity building on these targets. DOPA also includes eConservation, a new module that provides a means to share and search information on conservation projects, and thus allows users to see “who is doing what where”. So far over 5000 projects from the World Bank, GEF, CEPF, EU LIFE Programme, CBD LifeWeb Initiative and others have been included, and these projects can be searched in an interactive mapping interface based on criteria such as location, objectives, timeframe, budget, the organizations involved, target species etc. This seminar will provide an introduction to DOPA and eConservation, highlight how these services are used by the CBD and others, and include ample time for discussion.
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Cikkünkben a vállalkozók külső finanszírozásának modelljét terjesztjük ki arra az - irodalom által eddig nem tárgyalt - esetre, amikor a vállalkozónak van nem fizető vevője. Szerződéselméleti megközelítésünkben a vállalkozó hitelképességére vonatkozó információ aszimmetrikus a tranzakcióban részt vevő felek között, s ez morális kockázatnak ad teret. Megfigyelhető, hogy ilyenkor a pontosan fizető vevők számára is hitelszűke lép fel. A vállalkozó és a finanszírozó közötti optimális szerződés nem fizető vevő hatására további hitelszűkösséget generál. Két esetet vizsgálunk: az egyikben a vállalkozó információs előnyben van a vevő nemfizetésére vonatkozóan, a másikban nincs ilyen előny. A két modellváltozat alapján információs paradoxon jellemzi a kialakuló finanszírozási helyzetet: a vállalkozó kisebb összegű hitelhez jut az említett információs előnye esetén, mint amikor közte és a finanszírozó között szimmetrikus az információ. A modell azt a - magyar kis- és középvállalkozóknál látott - jelenséget írja le, amikor nem transzparens a szállító-vevő viszonya, és a finanszírozó bank e miatt az információs hátrány miatt kevesebb hitelt nyújt kis- és középvállalati ügyfeleinek. _____ The model of external financing of the firm is extended here to cases where there may be defaults on account receivables. Information asymmetry between entrepreneur and lender on a firm's creditworthiness leads to moral hazard and credit rationing, even in the absence of default risk. The authors show an optimal debt contract that formulates the situation, and focus on two cases: where the entrepreneur has an information advantage on defaults on receivables, and where the information is symmetric. A comparison of these cases revealed a paradoxical knowledge issue in external financing: a better informed entrepreneur may be able to afford a smaller financing ability. The model describes a frequent phenomenon in small businesses, when the relationship between buyer and seller lacks transparency, and lenders offer lower amount of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises.
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This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the parameters.
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O financiamento do SUS é regido pelo modelo de federalismo fiscal, pelas regras de partilha do Orçamento da Seguridade Social (OSS), por normas do Ministério da Saúde, e pela Emenda Constitucional nº. 29 (EC-29), que vincula à saúde recursos dos entes federados brasileiros. Discute-se aqui a sustentabilidade do gasto público com saúde no nível municipal. Foram estudados 21 municípios, utilizando-se dados dos balanços municipais. De 1996 a 2006 as receitas correntes gerais per capita subiram 280% acima da inflação acumulada e do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) nacional, variando conforme o porte do município, o qual também definiu a composição dos orçamentos municipais. Já o orçamento que conforma a base da EC-29 elevou-se bem menos (178%), impondo limitações ao incremento da contrapartida municipal em saúde. Acredita-se que o observado nesses municípios se reproduza em milhares de municípios brasileiros e comprometa a capacidade de investimento municipal em saúde, principalmente a partir de 2008. A situação ainda pode se agravar tendo em vista a extinção da Contribuição Provisória sobre a Movimentação ou Transmissão de Valores e de Créditos e Direitos de Natureza Financeira (CPMF), a tramitação dos Projetos de Lei nº. 306/08 e nº. 233/08, e a recessão mundial, a partir da crise do sistema financeiro norte-americano.
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FAPESP n. 03/04061-2
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This paper measured the variations in performance of small municipalities in the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil, regarding the technical efficiency in the use of public funds in public primary health care actions concerning the funding profile, in a scenario of fiscal federalism. Technical efficiency is one of the parameters of evaluation of public sector performance and was measured by means of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The correlation analysis of DEA score was used to verify possible associations between technical efficiency and the funding profile of expenses with health care. The results showed that 6.41% of the municipalities were considered efficient. They also showed that the level of municipality dependence to inter-governmental general purpose grants and the national health funding specific purpose grants have negative correlation with efficiency scores.
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A number of contemporary studies rightly emphasize the notion that policy outcomes result from institutional determinants. But as a growing literature on institutional development notes, these institutions are themselves impermanent. Sometimes, in crisis moments, institutions are replaced wholesale. More frequently, institutions evolve gradually over time. Using the Brazilian Central Bank as a case study, this article illustrates that the policy-making process itself can be a central driver of gradual institutional development, with institutions evolving through the accumulation of policy choices made over many years and under different policymakers in response to contemporaneous events and unforeseeable economic and political challenges.
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BACKGROUND: Persons with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) risk behaviors are excluded from donation to reduce the risk of transfusion-transmitted infection. Persons donating to be tested for HIV may therefore deny risk behaviors. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: A random sample of donors completed a survey on motivations, knowledge, and attitudes on the screening process. Donors were considered test seekers if they agreed with two statements ""I think that blood donation is a good, fast, and anonymous way to get my blood tested"" and ""I donate to get my test results."" This study was conducted from June to November 2006 at the largest blood bank in Sao Paulo, Brazil. RESULTS: Of 3061 participants, 208 (7%) were test seekers. They tended to be male and had a lower educational level. They were more likely to have incorrect knowledge about blood safety (e.g., not knowing that a unit can test antibody negative and still transmit infection, 60% vs. 42%, p = 0.02), express dissatisfaction with screening questions (e.g., feeling that important questions were not asked, 14% vs. 5%, p < 0.01), and concur that donors do not answer questions truthfully (e.g., donors have more sexual partners than they admit, 29% vs. 18%, p < 0.01). Test seekers were more likely to believe that it is acceptable to donate blood to get tested for HIV (41% vs. 10%, p < 0.01). CONCLUSIONS: Test-seeking motivation, coupled with low knowledge of window period risk, is counter to improving blood safety and to donor prevention needs. Donor education needs to be improved along with availability of appropriate HIV counseling and testing.