Resource Curse or Destructive Creation: A Tale of Crony Capitalism in Transition

This paper explores the “resource curse” problem as a counter-example of creative performance and innovation by examining reliance on capital and physical resources, showing the gap between expectations and ex-post actual performance became clearer under conditions of economic turmoil. The analysis employs logistic regressions with dichotomous response and predictor variables, showing significant results.Several findings that have use for economic and business practice follow. First, in a transition period, a typical characteristic of successful firms was their reliance on either capital resources or physical asset endowments, whereas the innovation factor was not significant.Second, poor-performing enterprises exhibited evidence of over reliance on both capital and physical assets. Third, firms that relied on both types of resources tended to downplay creative performance. Fourth, reliance on capital/physical resources and adoption of “creative discipline/innovations” tend to be mutually exclusive. In fact, some evidence suggests that firms face more acute problem caused by the law of diminishing returns in troubled times. The Vietnamese corporate sector’s addiction to resources may contribute to economic deterioration, through a downward spiral of lower efficiency leading to consumption of more resources. The “innovation factor” has not been tapped as a source of economic growth. The absence of innovations and creativity has made the notion of “resource curse” become identical to “destructive creation” implemented by ex-ante resource-rich firms, and worsened the problem of resource misallocation in transition turmoil.

Coevolution of capitalism and political representation: The choice of electoral systems

Protocorporatist West European countries in which economic interests were collectively organized adopted PR in the first quarter of the twentieth century, whereas liberal countries in which economic interests were not collectively organized did not. Political parties, as Marcus Kreuzer points out, choose electoral systems. So how do economic interests translate into party political incentives to adopt electoral reform? We argue that parties in protocorporatist countries were representative of and closely linked to economic interests. As electoral competition in single member districts increased sharply up to World War I, great difficulties resulted for the representative parties whose leaders were seen as interest committed. They could not credibly compete for votes outside their interest without leadership changes or reductions in interest influence. Proportional representation offered an obvious solution, allowing parties to target their own voters and their organized interest to continue effective influence in the legislature. In each respect, the opposite was true of liberal countries. Data on party preferences strongly confirm this model. (Kreuzer's historical criticisms are largely incorrect, as shown in detail in the online supplementary Appendix.). © 2010 American Political Science Association.

Tenant Right and Agrarian Society in Ulster 1600-1870

The book has been described by various Irish historians as "the definitive treatment of that most peculiar institution--the Ulster Custom--and its tangled relationship with irish land and politics" (Liam Kennedy), "a brilliantly reconceptualised sketch of the Irish land question" (David Miller). "All previous discussion," according to another reviewer, "must take second place to Dowling's exhaustive survey, which draws on the whole range of surviving estate records to examine the theory and practice of tenant right across three centuries" (Sean Connolly).

Knowledge as Power, Knowledge as Capital: A Political Economy Critique of Modern 'Academic Capitalism'

We are constantly reminded that we live in a 'knowledge society, and indeed that with a 'knowledge economy' a nation's international competiveness is directly linked to its ability to innovate, out-compete and successfully commercialise knowledge. INcreasingly, research within universities is being directed, incetivized and ultimately disciplined towards clear 'economic' priorities. This article offers a critical analysis - employing a broad political economy approach - of the ways in which research within universities and other places of higher learning has become increasingly orientated towards a narrow set of economic goals.