Points to consider for prioritizing clinical genetic testing services: a European consensus process oriented at accountability for reasonableness.

Given the cost constraints of the European health-care systems, criteria are needed to decide which genetic services to fund from the public budgets, if not all can be covered. To ensure that high-priority services are available equitably within and across the European countries, a shared set of prioritization criteria would be desirable. A decision process following the accountability for reasonableness framework was undertaken, including a multidisciplinary EuroGentest/PPPC-ESHG workshop to develop shared prioritization criteria. Resources are currently too limited to fund all the beneficial genetic testing services available in the next decade. Ethically and economically reflected prioritization criteria are needed. Prioritization should be based on considerations of medical benefit, health need and costs. Medical benefit includes evidence of benefit in terms of clinical benefit, benefit of information for important life decisions, benefit for other people apart from the person tested and the patient-specific likelihood of being affected by the condition tested for. It may be subject to a finite time window. Health need includes the severity of the condition tested for and its progression at the time of testing. Further discussion and better evidence is needed before clearly defined recommendations can be made or a prioritization algorithm proposed. To our knowledge, this is the first time a clinical society has initiated a decision process about health-care prioritization on a European level, following the principles of accountability for reasonableness. We provide points to consider to stimulate this debate across the EU and to serve as a reference for improving patient management.

Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors.

[spa] En este trabajo se analiza con datos de España los efectos de la corrupción local sobre los resultados electorales. En base a las noticias publicadas entre 1996 y 2009, se construye una nueva base de datos que recoge los casos de corrupción y noticias relativas a cambios en los planes urbanísticos que no han seguido el procedimiento legal. La base de datos muestra que los primeros escándalos de corrupción urbanística surgieron durante el mandato electoral de 1999-2003, pero que éstos alcanzaron sus niveles máximos justo antes de las elecciones de 2007. Se estima una ecuación del porcentaje de voto obtenido por el partido en el poder en estas elecciones locales y se encuentra que la pérdida media de voto después de un caso de corrupción se sitúa alrededor del 4%. Este efecto es más elevado (del 9%) si el caso de corrupción ha recibido una amplia cobertura por los diarios. Los efectos estimados para las elecciones de 2003 son significativamente inferiores. Cuando se consideran los casos en que los políticos han tenido cargas judiciales por corrupción y amplia cobertura por los diarios, la pérdida de voto asciende hasta el 12%. No obstante, la cobertura por los diarios genera un efecto negativo en el voto incluso cuando no hay cargas judiciales.

Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors.

[spa] En este trabajo se analiza con datos de España los efectos de la corrupción local sobre los resultados electorales. En base a las noticias publicadas entre 1996 y 2009, se construye una nueva base de datos que recoge los casos de corrupción y noticias relativas a cambios en los planes urbanísticos que no han seguido el procedimiento legal. La base de datos muestra que los primeros escándalos de corrupción urbanística surgieron durante el mandato electoral de 1999-2003, pero que éstos alcanzaron sus niveles máximos justo antes de las elecciones de 2007. Se estima una ecuación del porcentaje de voto obtenido por el partido en el poder en estas elecciones locales y se encuentra que la pérdida media de voto después de un caso de corrupción se sitúa alrededor del 4%. Este efecto es más elevado (del 9%) si el caso de corrupción ha recibido una amplia cobertura por los diarios. Los efectos estimados para las elecciones de 2003 son significativamente inferiores. Cuando se consideran los casos en que los políticos han tenido cargas judiciales por corrupción y amplia cobertura por los diarios, la pérdida de voto asciende hasta el 12%. No obstante, la cobertura por los diarios genera un efecto negativo en el voto incluso cuando no hay cargas judiciales.

The empirical assessment of agency accountability: A regime approach and an application to the German Bundesnetzagentur

Regulation has in many cases been delegated to independent agencies, which has led to the question of how democratic accountability of these agencies is ensured. There are few empirical approaches to agency accountability. We offer such an approach, resting upon three propositions. First, we scrutinize agency accountability both de jure (accountability is ensured by formal rights of accountability 'fora' to receive information and impose consequences) and de facto (the capability of fora to use these rights depends on resources and decision costs that affect the credibility of their sanctioning capacity). Second, accountability must be evaluated separately at political, operational and managerial levels. And third, at each level accountability is enacted by a system of several (partially) interdependent fora, forming together an accountability regime. The proposed framework is applied to the case of the German Bundesnetzagentur's accountability regime, which shows its suitability for empirical purposes. Regulatory agencies are often considered as independent, yet accountable. This article provides a realistic framework for the study of accountability 'regimes' in which they are embedded. It emphasizes the need to identify the various actors (accountability fora) to which agencies are formally accountable (parliamentary committees, auditing bodies, courts, and so on) and to consider possible relationships between them. It argues that formal accountability 'on paper', as defined in official documents, does not fully account for de facto accountability, which depends on the resources possessed by the fora (mainly information-processing and decision-making capacities) and the credibility of their sanctioning capacities. The article applies this framework to the German Bundesnetzagentur.

The uncertain relationship between transparency and accountability revisited through four Swiss cases

Accountability and transparency are of growing importance in contemporary governance. The academic literature have broadly studied the two concepts separately, defining and redefining them, and including them into various framework, sometimes mistakenly using them as synonyms. The relationship between the two concepts has, curiously, only been studied by a few scholars with preliminary approaches. This theoretical paper will focus on both concepts, trying first to describe them taking into account the various evolutions in the literature and the recent evolutions as well as the first attempts to link the two concepts. In order to show a new approach linking the concepts, four cases from the Swiss context will be portrayed and will demonstrate the necessity to reconsider the relationship between transparency and accountability. Consequently, a new framework, based on Fox's framework (2007) will be presented and theoretically delimited.

The uncertain relationship between transparency and accountability revisited through four Swiss cases

Accountability and transparency are of growing importance in contemporary governance. The academic literature have broadly studied the two concepts separately, defining and redefining them, and including them into various framework, sometimes mistakenly using them as synonyms. The relationship between the two concepts has, curiously, only been studied by a few scholars with preliminary approaches. This theoretical paper will focus on both concepts, trying first to describe them taking into account the various evolutions in the literature and the recent evolutions as well as the first attempts to link the two concepts. In order to show a new approach linking the concepts, four cases from the Swiss context will be portrayed and will demonstrate the necessity to reconsider the relationship between transparency and accountability. Consequently, a new framework, based on Fox's framework (2007) will be presented and theoretically delimited.

The Impact of Supervisor's Advice, Codes of Conduct, Accountability and Moral Attentiveness of Individuals on Discriminatory Behaviour Against Immigrants.

Past studies on the personnel selection demonstrated that a supervisor's advice to discriminate can lead to compliant behaviours. This study had the aim to extend past findings by examining what can overcome the powerful influence of the hierarchy. 50 Swiss managers participated to an in-basket exercise. The main task was to evaluate Swiss candidates (in-group) and foreigners (out-groups: Spanish and Kosovo Albanians) and to select two applicants for a job interview. Main results were the effect of codes of conduct to prevent discrimination against out-group applicants in the presence of a supervisor's advice to prefer in-group members. But, when participants were accountable to an audience, this beneficial effect disappears because participants followed the supervisor's advice. The second aim was to assess if the difference in responses between participants was related to their difference in moral attentiveness. Results showed some significant relationships but not always in the direction expected.

Accountability and corruption : a study into political institutions as referees between principals and agents

Representativ demokrati innebär att medborgare istället för att själv göra beslut i frågor som angår dem, ofta delegerar dylikt beslutsfattande till representanter. Det här betyder att viktiga beslut görs av personer som medborgarna i allmänhet inte känner speciellt väl, och i vars ageranden medborgarna endast har lite insyn. Vanliga medborgare och deras representanter har därtill ofta mycket olika intressen, d.v.s. har olika syn på vad som är viktigt. Representanterna har följaktligen både möjligheter och incitament att missbruka den makt som anförtrotts dem, bl.a. genom korrupt verksamhet. Denna avhandling analyserar mekanismer genom vilka korruption bland representanter kan förebyggas, och (då korrupta handlingar redan ägt rum) upptäckas. Avhandlingen granskar mekanismer som a) ger medborgare och andra ansvarsutkrävare mer information om representanternas målsättningar och ageranden, b) som tvingar representanterna att rättfärdiga sina ageranden gentemot medborgare och andra ansvarsutkrävare, och c) som gör det möjligt för medborgare och andra ansvarsutkrävare att straffa representanter som agerat korrupt. Avhandlingen hävdar att tillämpandet av dylika mekanismer minskar lockelsen för och möjligheterna att engagera sig i korrupta handlingar. Avhandlingen studerar de mekanismer för ansvarsutkrävande som skapas genom politiskt institutionsbyggande. Bl.a. analyseras i vilken grad olika valsystem och typer av maktfördelning gör det möjligt att hålla representanter till svars, och därmed förhindra och upptäcka korruption. Sambandet mellan institutionsbyggande, möjligheter till ansvarsutkrävande och förekomst av korruption studeras på såväl makro- som mikronivå. Studien på makronivå inkluderar ett flertal länder och analyserar sambandet med hjälp av statistisk analys. Studien på mikronivå däremot består av två fallstudier (Österrike och Botswana) och utgör en djupdykning i dessa länders politiska institutioner, möjligheter till ansvarsutkrävande inom ramen för institutionerna, och följder i form av korruption.

Accounting for competition, governance and accountability during institutional change in not-for-profit and public sector organisations

Purpose The aim of this thesis1 is to analyse theoretically how institutionalisation of competitive tendering2, governance and budgetary policies cannot be taken for granted to lead to accountability among institutional actors3. The nature of an institutionalised management accounting policy, its relevance as a source of power in organisational decision making, and in negotiating inter-organisational relationships, are also analysed. Practical motivation The practical motivation of the thesis is to show how practitioners and policy makers can institutionalise changes which improve the power of management accounting and control systems4 as a mechanism of accountability among institutional actors and in negotiating relationships with other organisations. Theoretical motivation and conceptual approach The theoretical motivation of the thesis is to extend the institutional framework of management accounting change proposed by Burns and Scapens (2000) by using the theories of critical realism, communicative action, negotiated order and the framework of circuits of power. The Burns and Scapens framework needs further theorisation to analyse the relationship between the institutionalisation of management accounting and accountability; and the relevance of management accounting information in negotiating in inter-organisational relationships. Methodology and field studies Field research took place in public and not-for-profit health care organisations and a municipality in Finland from 2008 to 2013. Data were gathered by document analysis, interviews, participation in meetings and observations. Findings The findings are explained in four different essays that show that institutionalisation of competitive tendering, governance and budgetary policies cannot be taken for granted to lead to accountability among institutional actors. The ways by which institutional actors think and act can be influenced by other institutional mechanisms, such as inter-organisational circuits of power and intraorganisational governance policies, independent of the institutional change process. The relevance of institutionalised management accounting policies in negotiating relationships between two or more organisations depends on processes and contexts through which institutional actors use management accounting information as a tool of communication, mutual understanding and power. Research limitations / implications The theoretical framework used can be applied validly in other studies. The empirical findings cannot be generalised directly to other organisations than the organisations analysed. Practical implications Competitive tendering and budgetary policies can be institutionalised to shape actions of institutional actors within an organisation. To lead to accountability, practitioners and policy makers should implement governance policies that increase the use of management accounting information in institutional actors’ thinking, actions and responsibility for their actions. To reach a negotiated order between organisations, institutionalised management accounting policies should be used as one of the tools of communication aiming to reach mutual agreement among institutional actors.

"School accountability" no Brasil: experiências e dificuldades

This paper analyses the most important experiences with school accountability policy (SA) in Brazil. The analysis suggests that their impacts on the quality of education are not significant due to the fact that: (i) either it does not incorporate a system in which the school is responsible for the students’ performance; (ii) or the incentive schemes are not appropriately designed. Finally, it discusses the main barriers to the adoption of an efficient SA at the national level in Brazil.

Alternativa de política educacional para o Brasil: School Accountability

An alternative to the education policy in Brasil: School accountability. This paper examines the school accountability (SA) policies adopted in the US. Significant impacts on the quality of education occur when the SA incorporates a set of sanctions and rewards to schools based on their students' performance. In comparison with other policies, it is also more efficient. Potential problems of adopting the SA (bias toward cognitive ability, gaming and difficulty in measuring the school contribution) can be overcome. The analysis suggests that the SA should be considered as an alternative to improve the quality of education in Brazil.