932 resultados para Accident insurance.
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Includes indexes.
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v. 1. Assurance contre la maladie.--v. 2. Assurance contre les accidents.--v. 3. Assurance contre l'invalidité.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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This paper presents an easy to use methodology and system for insurance companies targeting at managing traffic accidents reports process. The main objective is to facilitate and accelerate the process of creating and finalizing the necessary accident reports in cases without mortal victims involved. The diverse entities participating in the process from the moment an accident occurs until the related final actions needed are included. Nowadays, this market is limited to the consulting platforms offered by the insurance companies. Copyright 2014 ACM.
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Volunteering is a very important part of life in Australia with an estimated 36% of the adult population volunteering in 2010. Voluntary work generates economic benefits, addresses community needs and develops the social networks that form the backbone of civil society. Without volunteers, many essential services would either cease to exist or become too expensive for many people to afford. These volunteers, who by definition are not in receipt of any remuneration for their work and services, are exposed to personal injury and to legal liability in the discharge of their functions. It is therefore appropriate that statutory protection is extended to volunteers and that volunteer organisations procure public liability and personal accident cover where possible. However, given the patchwork quilt of circumstances where statutory or institutional cover is available to volunteers and the existence of many and diverse exclusions, it is important to have regard also to what scope a volunteer may have to avail themselves of protection against liability for volunteering activity by relying upon their own personal insurance cover. This article considers the extent of private insurance cover and its availability to volunteers under home and contents insurance and under comprehensive motor vehicle insurance. The most common policies in the Australian market are examined and the uncertain nature of protection against liability afforded by these policies is discussed. This uncertainty could be reduced should the Federal Government through amendments to the Insurance Contracts Regulations standardise the circumstances and extent to which liability protection was afforded to an insured holding home and contents insurance and comprehensive motor vehicle insurance cover.
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Baby Boomers are a generation of life long association joiners, but following generations prefer spontaneous and episodic volunteering. This trend is apparent not only during natural disasters, but in most other spheres of volunteering. Legal liability for such volunteers is a growing concern, which unresolved, may dampen civic participation. We critically examine the current treatment of these liabilities through legislation, insurance and risk management.
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In multi-vehicle motorcycle crashes, the motorcycle rider is less likely to be at-fault but more commonly severely injured than the other road user. Therefore, not surprisingly, crashes in which motorcycle riders are at-fault and particularly the injuries to the other road users in these crashes have received little research attention. This paper aims to address this gap in the literature by investigating the factors influencing the severity of injury to other road users in motorcyclist-at-fault crashes. Five years of data from Queensland, Australia, were obtained from a database of claims against the compulsory third party (CTP) injury insurance of the at-fault motorcyclists. Analysis of the data using an ordered probit model shows higher injury severity for crashes involving young (under 25) and older (60+) at-fault motorcyclists. Among the not at-fault road users, the young, old, and males were found to be more severely injured than others. Injuries to vehicle occupants were less severe than those to pillions. Crashes that occurred between vehicles traveling in opposite directions resulted in more severe injuries than those involving vehicles traveling in the same direction. While most existing studies have analyzed police reported crash data, this study used CTP insurance data. Comparison of results indicates the potential of using CTP insurance data as an alternative to police reported crash data for gaining a better understanding of risk factors for motorcycle crashes and injury severity.
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I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.
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We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Report presents results of a survey made by the Bureau of the Census and Westat Research, inc. for the Automobile Insurance and Compensation Study of the Dept. of Transportation.
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Includes index.
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At head of title : The Commonwealth of Massachusetts.