Prejudice against female children: Economics and cultural explanations, and India evidence

Shows how economic theories based on parental self-interest may explain parental discrimination against daughters relative to sons. However, such theories often need to be adjusted (or even discarded) to allow for altruism of parents towards their children, and to take account of cultural influences on parental desires to have children of particular gender, and care equally for their children of different gender. The latter point is illustrated by a study of two different communities. In one situated in the Santal tribal belt I West Bengal, discrimination against daughters is found to be marked and accords (given the structure of society) with predictions of economic theories based on the pursuit of parental self-interest. By contrast, it is found that although the Knondh-dominated community in Orissa experiences similar economic conditions and social structures to the West Bengal communities, parental discrimination against daughters is almost absent. The differences seem to arise from a difference between the cultural values shared by the Kondhs in Orissa and those shared by the West Bengal community consisting of Santals and Bengali Hindus. This suggests that the applicability of economic theories of the family depends significantly on the social contexts in which they are to be applied. In this respect, both social structures and cultural values are important.

Family size, economics and child gender preference: A case study in the Nyeri district of Kenya

Kenyan women have more children, especially in rural areas, than in most developing nations. This is widely believed to be an impediment to Kenya’s economic development. Thus, factors influencing family size in the Kenyan context are important for its future. A brief review of economic theories of fertility leads to the conclusion that both economics and social/cultural factors must be considered simultaneously when examining factors that determine the number of children in a family. The need to do this is borne out in Kenya’s situation by utilising responses from a random sample of rural households in the Nyeri district of Kenya. Economic and social/cultural factors intertwine to influence family sizes in this district. After providing a summary of the main statistical results from the survey, we use multiple regression analysis to explore the influences of a woman’s age, level of education, whether she has outside employment, whether the family keeps livestock, whether she expresses a preference for more boys than girls, whether the family uses only family labour (including child labour) and the size of the farm, which is used as a proxy for family income. It was found that preference for male children has an important positive influence on family size in this district. Women were found to have greater preference for male children than their male counterparts possibly because of their fear of being disinherited if they do not produce an heir for their husbands. Preference for sons was also found in allocation of human capital resources at the household level in that the female respondents were found to have lower levels of education than their male counterparts. Various long-term policies are outlined that may help to reduce the number of offspring of women in Kenya.

Talk on water ecological economics and participatory watershed governance

Dissertação apresentada para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em Ambiente pela Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia

Analysis of the progress of lifelong learning strategies of Portuguese Economics and Management Schools

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Higher education branding: Nova School of Business and Economics and Bocconi University

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.

Essays in banking and corporate finance

Abstract This paper presents a model of executive compensation in which the executive is risk-averse and has specific knowledge -knowledge about the optimal actions to take that is costly to transfer to the principal. The model generates predictions that are consistent with the available evidence and provides a rationale for a number of unresolved puzzles in executive compensation. Notably, we find that relative performance evaluation is optimal only if the quality of specific knowledge is low. We also show (1) why some common risk components are not filtered out of executives' pay, (2) why performance is more likely to be evaluated relative to aggregate market movements than relative to industry movements, and (3) why executives with higher perceived abilities are given stronger incentives. Finally, we demonstrate that the relation between risk and incentives may be positive or negative, depending on the quality of the executive's specific knowledge.