Information revelation and market incompleteness

\documentstyle[portada,11pt]{article}This paper shows that the presence of private information in aneconomy can be a source of market incompleteness even when it is feasibleto issue a set of securities that completely eliminates the informationalasymmetries in equilibrium. We analyze a simple security design model in which avolume maximizing futures exchange chooses not only the characteristics ofeach individual contract but also the number of contracts. Agents have rationalexpectations and differ in information, endowments and, possibly, attitudestoward risk. The emergence of complete or incomplete markets in equilibriumdepends on whether the {\it adverse selection effect} is stronger or weakerthan the {\it Hirshleifer effect}, as new securitiesare issued and prices reveal more information. When the Hirshleifer effectdominates, the exchange chooses an incomplete set of financial contracts, andthe equilibrium price is partially revealing.

The wage effect of an indexation clause: Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms

An endogenous switching model of ex-ante wage changes under indexed and non-indexed settlements is estimated for the Spanish manufacturing sector using collective bargaining firm data for the 1984-1991 period. The likelihood of indexing the settlement is higher for nationwide unions than for other union groups within the works council and increases with the expected level of inflation. For wage change equations, a common structure for indexed and non-indexed settlements is strongly rejected, showing a source of nominal rigidity. For indexed contracts, the expected ex-ante total inflation coverage is nearly complete. It is also shown that workers pay a significant ex-ante wage change premium (differential) to obtain a cost of living allowance clause. However, the realised contingent compensation exceeds such a premium for all industries. Finally, important spillover effects in wage setting and the decision to index the settlement have been detected.

OS CONTRACTOS DE CONCESSÃO NO CONTEXTO DO SISTEMA DE NORMALIZAÇÃO CONTABILÍSTICA E DE RELATO FINANCEIRO

A mudança do normativo contabilístico ocorrido em 2009, alterou o paradigma de reconhecimento e mensuração de activos. Embora a natureza das operações contínua presente no processo contabilístico, muitas coisas foram alteradas tendo em conta a substância da informação e a sua realidade económica. O caso dos contratos de concessão é disto um bom exemplo. Há casos em que no normativo anterior eram reconhecidos como activos fixos tangíveis e actualmente são reconhecidos como intangíveis. O estudo em causa tem como objetivo principal analisar o conceito dos contratos de concessão, bem como os procedimentos para o reconhecimento, mensuração e divulgação nas demonstrações financeiras. Considerados activos intangíveis (de facto a entidade acaba por ter um “Direito” de explorar um determinado activo), o processo contabilístico é feito a luz do disposto na Norma de Relato Financeiro nº6 – Activos Intangíveis. Os contractos de concessão apresentam especificidades próprias e por esta razão o IASB emitiu uma IFRIC (nº 12) com o objectivo de clarificar o tratamento contabilístico desta problemática. Não existindo no normativo nacional tal norma interpretativa as empresas nacionais que convivem com esta realidade vêem-se na contingência de, supletivamente, recorrer às normas internacionais de contabilidade para resolver o assunto. É o caso da ELECTRA para os activos afectos a distribuição. Neste sentido, o estudo debruça sobre esta problemática, apresenta um enquadramento teórico, analisar os principais aspectos de reconhecimento a luz dos dois normativos contabilísticos nacionais (o antigo Plano Nacional de Contabilidade e o actual Sistema de Normalização Contabilística e de Relato Financeiro) e termina utilizando as informações da ELECTRA, SARL para ilustrar este processo de reconhecimento contabilístico. The change of a the accounting regulatory occurred in 2009, changed the paradigm for recognizing and measuring assets. Although the continuous nature of the operations in this accounting process, many things have changed in view of the substance of information and its economic reality. The case of concession contracts, it is a good example. There are cases where the former were recognized as legal and tangible fixed assets are currently recognized as intangible assets. The study is aimed to analyzing the concept of concession contracts, as well as procedures for the recognition, measurement and disclosure in the financial statements. Considered intangible assets (in fact the entity turns out to have a “right” to exploit a particular asset) the accounting process is done in light of the provisions of Financial Reporting Standard No. 6 – Intangible Assets. The concession contracts have specific characteristics and for this reason the IASB issued IFRIC one (Ner. 12 ) in order to clarify the accounting treatment of this problem. In the absence of such a standard national regulatory interpretative national companies that live with this reality find themselves in contingency, additionally, make use of international accounting standards to resolve the matter. ELECTRA is the case of the assets connected to the distribution. In this sense, the study focuses on this issue, presents a theoretical framework to analyze the main aspects of recognition light of both national accounting standards (formerly the National Accounting Standards and the current system of accounting and financial reporting) and ends up using the information the Electra SARL to illustrate this process of accounting recognition.

State of Iowa Directory of certified Disadvantaged Business Enterprises, September 2007

The Iowa DOT takes affirmative action to ensure that Disadvantaged Business Enterprises have the maximum practical opportunity to get Iowa DOT contracts for construction, professional, and technical service. The Iowa DOT also has taken specific steps to ensure there is no discrimination in the awarding and administering of contracts. The department's DBE Program, which has been developed under this policy, is administered by the Office of Contracts.

Portfolio delegation under short-selling constraints

In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when themanager's ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previousresults, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjustedcontracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gatherinformation. The risk-averse manager's optimal effort is an increasingfunction of her share in the portfolio's return. This result affectsthe risk-averse investor's optimal contract decision. The first best,purely risk-sharing contract is proved to be suboptimal. Usingnumerical methods we show that the manager's share in the portfolioreturn is higher than the rst best share. Additionally, this deviationis shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager's risk aversion and (ii)larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. When the constraint isrelaxed the optimal contract converges towards the first best risksharing contract.

Institutional constraints on organizations: The case of Spanish car dealerships

We study the effect of organizational choice and institutions on the performance ofSpanish car dealerships. Using outlet-level data from 1994, we find that verticallyintegrateddealerships showed substantially lower labor productivity, higher labor costs andlower profitability than franchised ones. Despite these gaps in performance, no verticallyintegratedoutlet was separated until 1994, yet the few outlets that were eventuallyseparated systematically improved their performance. We argue that the conversion ofintegrated outlets into franchised ones involved significant transaction costs, due to aninstitutional environment favoring permanent, highly-unionized employment relations. Inline with this argument, we find that the observed separations occurred in distributionnetworks that underwent marked reductions in worker unionization rates, following thelegalization of temporary labor contracts.

Demand for private health insurance: Is there a quality gap?

Quality of care is qualified as a main determinant of the demand forvoluntary private health insurance (PHI) in National Health Systems(NHS). This paper provides new evidence on the influence of the qualitygap between public and private health insurance and other demanddeterminants in the demand for PHI in Catalonia. The demand for PHI ismodelled as a demand for health care quality. Unlike previous studies, the database employed allows for the development of a link between thetheoretical and the empirical model dealing with unobserved heterogeneityand endogeneity issues. Results suggest that a rise in PHI qualityenhances an equivalent influence in the demand for PHI as an equalreduction of NHS quality. Income and price elasticity estimates areconsistent with the observed feature that PHI appears to be a luxurygood and individuals tend to be relatively insensible to tax relief'sand monetary co-payments in insurance contracts.

Does privatising public service provision reduce accountability?

This paper studies how privatising service provision (shifting control rights and contractualobligations to providers) affects accountability. There are two main effects. (1) Privatisation demotivates governments from investigating and responding to public demands, since providers then hold up service adaptations. (2) Privatisation demotivates the public from mobilising to pressure for service adaptations, since providers then indirectly holdup the public by inflating the government s cost of implementing these adaptations. So, when choosing governance mode, politicians may be biased towards privatising as a way to escape public attention; relatedly, privatising utilities may reduce public pressure and increase consumer prices.

Competition, innovation and growth with limited commitment

We study how barriers to business start-up affect the investment in knowledge capital when contracts are not enforceable. Barriers to business start-up lower the competition for knowledge capital and, in absence of commitment, reduce the incentive to accumulate knowledge. As a result, countries with large barriers experience lower income and growth. Our results are consistent with cross-country evidence showing that the cost of business start-up is negatively correlated with the level and growth of income.

Globalization and the provision of incentives inside the firm: The effect of foreign competition

This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.

The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

Leasing como alternativa de financiamento de empresas em Cabo Verde - Análise prática de efeitos económicos, financeiros e contabilísticos

Criar mecanismos que produzam e dinamizem o alcance de novos produtos financeiros surge como uma condição necessária para estimular o investimento. Além das condições intrínsecas próprias de uma economia o financiamento é quase que a espinha dorsal para favorecer o desenvolvimento e crescimento económicos. Diversificar as fontes de financiamento para que estas se adaptem à realidade económico-financeira das empresas é essencial, pois não só possibilita o crescimento das empresas nacionais, mas também cria um ambiente de negócios propício ao investimento externo. Convicto da relevância, o presente trabalho tem como escopo uma temática que a nível nacional pouco se tem abordado: trata-se locação financeira que na gíria financeira é entendida por leasing - que de forma sintética se traduz num contrato pelo qual uma das partes concede à outra o gozo temporário de uma coisa contra uma retribuição, e que posteriormente pode ser adquirida, num prazo convencionado, mediante pagamento de um preço determinado ou determinável, nos termos do próprio contrato. O enfoque está em estudar a relevância assumida pelo leasing enquanto fonte de financiamento de médio e longo prazo, no contexto cabo-verdiano, comparativamente à outra fonte – empréstimo bancário de médio e longo prazo. O trabalho reveste-se de uma componente teórica e uma prática. Na componente teórica trata-se do tema no geral, abrangendo uma resenha histórica, o enquadramento legal, das sociedades de locação financeira e dos contratos de locação financeira, tratamento contabilístico, as características específicas que se associam ao tema em apreço e igualmente uma breve análise fiscal. A parte prática desenvolve uma análise comparativa do leasing com o empréstimo bancário de médio e longo prazo onde foram retiradas as conclusões chegadas com o estudo. Resumidamente, pode-se que o leasing é certamente uma das melhores opções de financiamento não só para empresas como igualmente para clientes particulares, sendo, uma opção rápida, simples e vantajosa para o cliente bancário, especialmente se o facto de a propriedade do bem não pertencer ao titular do leasing não causar qualquer incómodo. Create mechanisms that produce and streamline the range of new financial products emerges as a necessary condition to stimulate investment. In addition to its own intrinsic conditions of an economy funding is almost the backbone to promote economic development and growth. Diversify the sources of funding for these adapt to the reality of the economic-financial firms is essential because not only enables the growth of domestic companies, but also creates a business environment conducive to foreign investment. Convinced of the relevance, this work is scoped to a theme that nationally there has been little discussed: it is leasing in slang that is understood by financial leasing - which synthetically translates into a contract whereby one party grants to the another the temporary enjoyment of a thing against retribution, and that can later be acquired within the agreed upon payment of a specified or ascertainable under the contract. The focus is on studying the relevance assumed by leasing as a source of financing medium and long term, the Cape Verdean context, compared to other sources - bank loan of medium and long term. The work has a theoretical and a practical component. In the theoretical part it is the theme in general, covering a historical perspective, the legal framework, the leasing companies and financial leasing contracts, accounting treatment, specific characteristics that are associated to the topic at hand and equally a brief fiscal analysis. The practical part develops a comparative analysis of leasing with bank loan of medium and long term which were withdrawn with the conclusions reached with the study. Briefly, it may be that leasing is certainly one of the best financing options not only by companies as also by private customers, being a fast, simple and profitable for the bank customer, especially if the fact that the ownership of the property does not belong the holder of the lease does not cause any discomfort.

Wage structures and family economies in the Catalan textile industry in an age of nascent capitalism

This paper deals with changes in managerial practices in Catalonia in anage of nascent capitalism (1830-1925) and adaptive family strategies inorder to face the absence of state welfare. During the 19 t h Century andin the absence of recorded labor contracts, human resources of the firmwere organized by means of implicit contracts and informal labor markets.With the advent of scientific organization of labor, wage per hour workedbegan to be recorded. This is why in the 1920s the perfect competitionmodel applies to our case. On the other hand, in the same period, and inthe absence of state welfare, ideas stemming from cooperative game theoryapply to the pattern of household income formation. Kin related networkswere used to improve the living standards of the household. In thisparticular direction we also show that there was a demonstration effectby means of which migrant s living standards were higher than those ofnatives.

Influence activity and the organization of research and development

The organizational design of research and development conditions theincentives of the researchers of the research project. In particular,the organizational form determines the allocation of effort of theresearcher between time spent on research and time spent lobbying management. Researchers prefer to spend their time on research. However,the researchers only get utility from performing research if theproject is approved for its full duration. Spending time lobbyingmanagement for the continuation of the researcher s project increasesthe probability that the management observes a favorable signal aboutthe project. Organizing a research joint venture increases theflexibility of the organizational form with respect to the continuationdecision. For low correlation between the signals of the partners aboutthe expected profitability of the project, we find that the organizationof a research joint venture reduces influence activity by the researchersand increases expected profits of the partners. For high correlationbetween the signals, internal research projects lower influence activityby the researchers. We try to relate the correlation of the partnerssignals to the characteristics of basic research versus more appliedresearch projects, and find that the model is consistent with theobservation that research joint ventures seem involved in more basicresearch projects compared to internal R&D departments, whichconcentrate on more applied research.

How binding are legal limits? Transitions from temporary to permanent work in Spain

This paper studies the duration pattern of xed-term contracts and the determinantsof their conversion into permanent ones in Spain, where the share of xed-termemployment is the highest in Europe. We estimate a duration model for temporaryemployment, with competing risks of terminating into permanent employment versusalternative states, and exible duration dependence. We nd that conversion rates aregenerally below 10%. Our estimated conversion rates roughly increase with tenure,with a pronounced spike at the legal limit, when there is no legal way to retain theworker on a temporary contract. We argue that estimated di¤erences in conversionrates across categories of workers can stem from di¤erences in worker outside optionsand thus the power to credibly threat to quit temporary jobs.