Balance Between Investment Protection and Sustainable Development in BITs: the Example of Switzerland

The objective of this article is to examine how substantive and procedural rights granted to foreign investors by Swiss bits are gradually being balanced with social and environmental provisions. Switzerland has enjoyed a long bit practice, as it signed its first treaty with Tunisia fifty years ago. Swiss bits rely on the post-establishment model and include usual standards of treatment. From 1981, they also systematically provide for a dispute settlement mechanism for disputes arising between an investor and a host State. Since the Switzerland - El Salvador bit in 1994, sustainable development concerns have been expressly inserted in some Swiss bits, as well as in several recent free trade agreements. Provisions on this theme are however far from being systematic in Switzerland's bit practice and essentially remain declaratory in nature. The trend towards wider inclusion of sustainable development provisions in bits still faces several practical and political challenges.

On information and competition in private value auctions

How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment?We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers updated expected valuations. We define the class of precision criteria following this approach and different notions of dispersion, and relate them to existing criteria of informativeness. Using supermodular precision, we obtain three results: (1) a more precise information structure yields a more efficient allocation; (2) the auctioneer provides less than the efficient level of information since more information increases bidder informational rents; (3) there is a strategic complementarity between information and competition, so that both the socially efficient and the auctioneer s optimal choice of precision increase with the number of bidders, and both converge as the number of bidders goes to infinity.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, September 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

The overhang hangover

We revisit the debt overhang question. We first use non-parametric techniques to isolate a panel of countries on the downward sloping section of a debt Laffer curve. In particular, overhang countries are ones where a threshold level of debt is reached in sample, beyond which (initial) debt ends up lowering (subsequent)growth. On average, significantly negative coefficients appear when debt face value reaches 60 percent of GDP or 200 percent of exports, and when its present value reaches 40 percent of GDP or 140 percent of exports. Second, we depart from reduced form growth regressions and perform direct tests of the theory on the thus selected sample of overhang countries. In the spirit of event studies, we ask whether, as overhang level of debt is reached: (i)investment falls precipitously as it should when it becomes optimal to default, (ii) economic policy deteriorates observably, as it should when debt contracts become unable to elicit effort on the part of the debtor, and (iii) the terms of borrowing worsen noticeably, as they should when it becomes optimal for creditors to pre-empt default and exact punitive interest rates. We find a systematic response of investment, particularly when property rights are weakly enforced, some worsening of the policy environment, and a fall in interest rates. This easing of borrowing conditions happens because lending by the private sector virtually disappears in overhang situations, and multilateral agencies step in with concessional rates. Thus, while debt relief is likely to improve economic policy (and especially investment) in overhang countries, it is doubtful that it would ease their terms of borrowing, or the burden of debt.

Firm investment in imperfect capital markets: A structural estimation

We set up a dynamic model of firm investment in which liquidity constraintsenter explicity into the firm's maximization problem. The optimal policyrules are incorporated into a maximum likelihood procedure which estimatesthe structural parameters of the model. Investment is positively related tothe firm's internal financial position when the firm is relatively poor. This relationship disappears for wealthy firms, which can reach theirdesired level of investment. Borrowing is an increasing function of financial position for poor firms. This relationship is reversed as a firm's financial position improves, and large firms hold little debt.Liquidity constrained firms may be unused credits lines and the capacity toinvest further if they desire. However the fear that liquidity constraintswill become binding in the future induces them to invest only when internalresources increase.We estimate the structural parameters of the model and use them to quantifythe importance of liquidity constraints on firms' investment. We find thatliquidity constraints matter significantly for the investment decisions of firms. If firms can finance investment by issuing fresh equity, rather than with internal funds or debt, average capital stock is almost 35% higher overa period of 20 years. Transitory shocks to internal funds have a sustained effect on the capital stock. This effect lasts for several periods and ismore persistent for small firms than for large firms. A 10% negative shock to firm fundamentals reduces the capital stock of firms which face liquidityconstraints by almost 8% over a period as opposed to only 3.5% for firms which do not face these constraints.

Entrepreneurial risk, investment and innovation

In this paper I develop a general equilibrium model with risk averse entrepreneurialfirms and with public firms. The model predicts that an increase in uncertainty reducesthe propensity of entrepreneurial firms to innovate, while it does not affect thepropensity of public firms to innovate. Furthermore, it predicts that the negativeeffect of uncertainty on innovation is stronger for the less diversified entrepreneurialfirms, and is stronger in the absence of financing frictions in the economy. In thesecond part of the paper I test these predictions on a dataset of small and mediumItalian manufacturing firms.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, October 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, November 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, December 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Government consumption and private consumption correlations

This paper examines whether the introduction of government consumptionexpenditure in a standard one good model of the international real businesscycle is sufficient to reconcile the theory with the existing pattern ofinternational consumption and output correlations. I calibrate the model totwo different pairs of countries and generate the simulated distribution ofconsumption and output correlations implied by several specifications of themodel. It is shown that the model can account for existing internationalconsumption correlations only under very specific assumptions about the sizeof effect of government expenditure on agents' utility or the variabilityof government expenditure shocks. Crucial parameters are identified and thesensitivity of the results discussed.

The Value of Private Information within Evolving Groups

This note offers an analytical framework aimed at explaining how individual agents purposefully act with the goal of managing the value of their information sets. Agents undertake a process of private accumulation of information, which takes into account the non-rival nature of this peculiar entity. Non rivalry introduces an externality that might trigger long-term endogenous fluctuations. The dynamics of interaction, namely the possibility of entering or exiting the group to which the individuals belong, wil l determine time trajectories for the information flows that are unique for the specific conditions of interaction that are being considered at a given momentEste artigo apresenta uma estrutura analítica que tem por objetivo explicar como é que os agentes individuais atuam, de modo intencional, com o propósito de gerir o valor da informação que detêm. Os agentes prosseguem um processo de acumulação privada de informação, o qual toma em consideração a natureza não rival desta entidade que detém características específicas. A não rivalidade introduz uma externalidade que pode despoletar flutuações endógenas de longo prazo. A dinâmica de interação, nomeadamente a possibilidade de entrar ou sair do grupo a que os indivíduos pertencem, vai determinar a formação de trajetórias no tempo para os fluxos de informação, as quais são únicas para as condições particulares de interação que estão a ser consideradas num determinado momento.

2008 Annual Report of the Iowa Railway Finance Authority

The Iowa Railway Finance Authority (IRFA) was created in 1980 by the 68th General Assembly to provide for the financing of rail facilities and to enhance and continue the operation of essential rail facilities. IRFA was authorized to offer financial assistance for the acquisition, rehabilitation, construction, refinancing, extension, replacement, maintenance, repair, or leasing of any rail facility. Rail Revolving Loan and Grant Program The 2005 legislative session amended Iowa Code 327H.20 by assigning all repayments of IRFA and other Iowa Department of Transportation (Iowa DOT) rail assistance loans to the Rail Revolving Loan and Grant Program (RRLGP). In addition, the following annual appropriations were allocated to the fund: • FY 2007: $235,000 • FY 2008: $2 million • FY 2009: $2 million Since the creation of the RRLGP in 2005, IRFA has awarded funding to 23 projects totaling over $7.2 million in grants and loans in its three rounds of competitive funding. These projects have pledged to create 1,672 jobs within two years of project completion and 1,361 jobs have been retained. Funded projects are associated with over $2 billion in total private capital investment. In 2008, the IRFA Board directed all available funds be used to help repair railroads devastated by summer flooding. On July 31, $3.9 million in deferred payment loans were offered to seven Iowa based railroads to allow for immediate repair of rail beds, including the cost of materials, labor and equipment.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, January 2009

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Rebuild Iowa Infrastructure Investment Bonds: Creating Iowa Jobs by Investing in Iowa Infrastructure, January, 2009

The Rebuild Iowa Infrastructure Investment Bonds are exactly that: an investment in Iowa and Iowans. Proposed by Governor Chet Culver in his 2009 Condition of the State address, the Rebuild Iowa bonds are an investment of $700 million to create jobs by addressing much-needed infrastructure projects across the state.

Private borrowing during the financial revolution: Hoare’s Bank and its customers, 1702-1724

The financial revolution improved the British government s ability to borrow, andthus its ability to wage war. North andWeingast argued that it also permitted privateparties to borrow more cheaply and widely.We test these inferences with evidencefrom a London bank.We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the earlyeighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, thegovernment reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of privateclients that could be served profitably.