Dret costumari a la Barbagia sarda

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada al Dipartimento di Diritto pubblico e studi sociali de la Università degli studi di Cagliari, Italia, durant els mesos de maig i juny del 2006. L’estada s’insereix com a part del necessari treball de camp d’una recerca sobre el dret costumari de la Barbagia, regió interior i de muntanya de l’illa d’economia històricament basada en el pasturatge. Durant l’estada es van assolir satisfactòriament els tres principals objectius que es perseguien: realitzar algunes entrevistes i recollir testimonis sobre un aspecte concret de la recerca, la institució costumària de mediació “sos omines”; aconseguir l’accés a casos judicials significatius de la fenomenologia vindicativa local; i observar i recollir informació sobre “su tussorju”, l’esquilada anual de les ovelles, esdeveniment important dins el calendari festiu i el cicle econòmic agropastoral. Aquest últim objectiu s’inscriu dins l’actitud que ha actuat com a constant en tota la fase de treball de camp etnogràfic, consistent en tractar de conèixer i viure la dinàmica de la vida social sense exigir-li en concret: simplement viure-la a prop, deixant-se portar per ella per anar coneixent d’una forma natural els seus “secrets”, actitud clàssica del treball de camp antropològic però que en aquest cas esdevé una necessitat i pràcticament una exigència, donada la delicadesa de les qüestions que tracta. D’aquesta manera, la observació de l’esquilada de les ovelles, que ha format part històricament d’una sèrie d’esdeveniments importants per a la vida dels pobles un cop tornen (o tornaven: actualment són molt pocs els que ho fan a peu ) els pastors de la transhumància al pla, ha significat una ocasió més per respondre els contractes i la confiança amb la gent d’allà, un altre dels objectius de l’estada.

Using information from telephone panel surveys to predict reasons for refusal

One of the key problems in conducting surveys is convincing people to participate.¦However, it is often difficult or impossible to determine why people refuse. Panel surveys¦provide information from previous waves that can offer valuable clues as to why people¦refuse to participate. If we are able to anticipate the reasons for refusal, then we¦may be able to take appropriate measures to encourage potential respondents to participate¦in the survey. For example, special training could be provided for interviewers¦on how to convince potential participants to participate.¦This study examines different influences, as determined from the previous wave,¦on refusal reasons that were given by the respondents in the subsequent wave of the¦telephone Swiss Household Panel. These influences include socio-demography, social¦inclusion, answer quality, and interviewer assessment of question understanding and¦of future participation. Generally, coefficients are similar across reasons, and¦between-respondents effects rather than within-respondents effects are significant.¦While 'No interest' reasons are easier to predict, the other reasons are more situational. Survey-specific issues are able to distinguish¦different reasons to some extent.

The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible

Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).

A follow-up study on the quality of alcohol dependence-related information on the web.

ABSTRACT: In order to evaluate the one-year evolution of web-based information on alcohol dependence, we re-assessed alcohol-related sites in July 2007 with the same evaluating tool that had been used to assess these sites in June 2006. Websites were assessed with a standardized form designed to rate sites on the basis of accountability, presentation, interactivity, readability, and content quality. The DISCERN scale was also used, which aimed to assist persons without content expertise in assessing the quality of written health publications. Scores were highly stable for all components of the form one year later (r = .77 to .95, p < .01). Analysis of variance for repeated measures showed no time effect, no interaction between time and scale, no interaction between time and group (affiliation categories), and no interaction between time, group, and scale. The study highlights lack of change of alcohol-dependence-related web pages across one year.

"MIATA"-minimal information about T cell assays.

Immunotherapy, especially therapeutic vaccination, has a great deal of potential in the treatment of cancer and certain infectious diseases such as HIV (Allison et al., 2006; Fauci et al., 2008; Feldmann and Steinman, 2005). Numerous vaccine candidates have been tested in patients with a variety of tumor types and chronic viral diseases. Often, the best way to assess the clinical potential of these vaccines is to monitor the induced T cell response, and yet there are currently no standards for reporting these results. This letter is an effort to address this problem.

Declaració sobre la crisi econòmica global i el seu impacte en les compres consorciades (19 de gener de 2009)

Redactada en nom dels molts consorcis de biblioteques de tot el món que participen a l'ICOLC, aquesta declaració té dos propòsits. Té la intenció d'ajudar als editors i altres proveïdors de contingut amb els quals tenim accés als recursos d'informació electrònica (d'ara en endavant simplement anomenats editors) a entendre millor com l'actual crisi econòmica única afecta a la comunitat de la informació de tot el món. El segon propòsit és suggerir un ventall de propostes que creiem són de benefici comú per a les biblioteques i els proveïdors de serveis d'informació.

Declaración sobre la crisis económica global y su impacto en las compras consorciadas (19 de enero de 2009)

Redactada en nombre de los muchos consorcios de bibliotecas de todo el mundo que participan en ICOLC, esta declaración tiene dos propósitos. Tiene la intención de ayudar a los editores y otros proveedores de contenido con los cuales tenemos acceso a los recursos de información electrónica (de ahora en adelante simplemente llamados editores) a entender mejor cómo la actual crisis económica única afecta a la comunidad de la información de todo el mundo. El segundo propósito es sugerir un abanico de propuestas que creemos son de beneficio común para las bibliotecas y los proveedores de servicios de información.

Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information

This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of the literature on the topic and contributes with original research. We first revise models of mechanism design and sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this optimism, we move to the analysis of the recent literature that considers the existence of limited confrontations that allow bargaining to resume. In the presence of private information, these limited conflicts convey information and thus become a bargaining instrument. The paper closes with a discussion on the related empirical literature, the challenges that it faces and some potential avenues for further research.

Optimal contracting with private information on cost expectation and variability

We study the screening problem that arises in a framework where, initially, the agent is privately informed about both the expected production cost and the cost variability and, at a later stage, he learns privately the cost realization. The speci c set of relevant incentive constraints, and so the characteristics of the optimal mechanism, depend nely upon the curvature of the principal s marginal surplus function as well as the relative importance of the two initial information problems. Pooling of production levels is optimally induced with respect to the cost variability when the principal's knowledge imperfection about the latter is sufficiently less important than that about the expected cost.

Expert Information and Majority Decisions

This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member receives not only a private signal but also a public signal observed by all of them. The public signal represents, e.g. expert information presented to an entire committee and its quality is higher than that of each individual private signal. We identify two informative symmetric strategy equilibria, namely i) the mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; and ii) the pure strategy equilibrium where they follow the public signal for certain. The former outperforms the latter. The presence of the public signal precludes the equilibrium where every member follows their own signal, which is an equilibrium in the absence of the public signal. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal outperforms the sincere voting equilibrium without the public signal, but the latter may be more efficient than the pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal. We suggest that whether expert information improves committee decision making depends on equilibrium selection.

The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality

During the past four decades both between and within group wage inequality increased significantly in the US. I provide a microfounded justification for this pattern, by introducing private employer learning in a model of signaling with credit constraints. In particular, I show that when financial constraints relax, talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducated pool, this decreases unskilled inexperienced wages and boosts wage inequality. This explanation is consistent with US data from 1970 to 1997, indicating that the rise of the skill and the experience premium coincides with a fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time skilled or experienced wages do not change much. The model accounts for: (i) the increase in the skill premium despite the growing supply of skills; (ii) the understudied aspect of rising inequality related to the increase in the experience premium; (iii) the sharp growth of the skill premium for inexperienced workers and its moderate expansion for the experienced ones; (iv) the puzzling coexistence of increasing experience premium within the group of unskilled workers and its stable pattern among the skilled ones. The results hold under various robustness checks and provide some interesting policy implications about the potential conflict between inequality of opportunity and substantial economic inequality, as well as the role of minimum wage policy in determining the equilibrium wage inequality.

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.

What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.