Environmental policies in an international mixed duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets. We suppose that the firm in the home country is a welfare-maximizing public firm, while the firm in the foreign country is its own profit-maximizing private firm. We find that the environmental tax can be a strategic instrument for the home government to distribute production from the foreign private firm to the home public firm. An additional effect of the home environmental tax is the reduction of the foreign private firm's output for local consumption, thereby expanding the foreign market for the home public firm.

Simultaneous decisions or leadership in an international competition

In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Managing Informal Learning in professional contexts: the learner’s perspective

Informal Learning is present in everyone's life but its awareness only recently has been reported. The need to keep track of the knowledge acquired this way is increasing as its sources diversity also increases. This work presents the pilots trials on the use of a tool developed to help keeping track of the learners’ informal learning, within a number of companies spread out in three countries. This tool developed through the European Commission funded project TRAILER, is still under development, which will allow integrating the set of improving suggestions obtained from users during the piloting phase. The overall idea of managing one’s informal learning was well accepted and welcomed, which validated the emerging need for a tool with this purpose.

Um retrato do Empreendedorismo em Malanje-Angola: análise de negócios criados entre 2008-2012

Dissertação de Mestrado em Empreendedorismo e Internacionalização apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Empreendedorismo e Internacionalização, sob orientação de Professora Doutora Celsa Maria Carvalho Machado e Mestre Maria Luísa Verdelho Alves

On international cost-sharing of pharmaceutical R&D

Ramsey pricing has been proposed in the pharmaceutical industry as a principle to price discriminate among markets while allowing to recover the (fixed) R&D cost. However, such analyses neglect the presence of insurance or the fund raising costs for most of drug reimbursement. By incorporating these new elements, we aim at providing some building blocks towards an economic theory incorporating Ramsey pricing and insurance coverage. We show how coinsurance affects the optimal prices to pay for the R&D investment. We also show that under certain conditions, there is no strategic incentive by governments to set coinsurance rates in order to shift the financial burden of R&D. This will have important implications to the application of Ramsey pricing principles to pharmaceutical products across countries.

Desenvolvimento de um jogo de simulação do sistema de produção Lean ferramentas: balanceamento da linha, VSM e SMED

Uma grande parte do tempo de uma organização é despendida em atividades que não criam qualquer tipo de valor. Este tipo de atividades são consideradas como desperdícios, pois consomem recursos e tempo, como é o caso de deslocações, controlos, ajustes, armazenamento de materiais, resolução de problemas, entre tantos outros, levando a um elevado custo dos produtos disponibilizados. Em 1996 a designação de Lean Thinking foi usada, pela primeira vez, por Womack e Jones, onde é falada como uma filosofia de gestão, que tem como principal objetivo reduzir os desperdícios num processo produtivo. Reduzindo os desperdícios aumenta-se a qualidade e diminui-se os tempos de processamento e, consequentemente, os custos de produção. É nesta base que assenta o documento aqui presente, que tem o objetivo de criar e desenvolver um jogo de simulação onde seja possível aplicar várias ferramentas Lean. O jogo de simulação é uma continuação de uma pesquisa e estudo teórico de um aluno de erasmus e faz parte de um projeto internacional do Lean Learning Academy (LLA). Criou-se um processo produtivo de montagem de canetas que fosse o mais semelhante ao que se encontram nas empresas, com todos os acessórios para o pleno funcionamento da simulação, como é o caso de instruções de montagem, procedimentos de controlo e ordens de produção, para assim posteriormente ser possível analisar os dados e as dificuldades encontradas, de modo a aplicar-se as ferramentas Lean. Apesar de serem abordadas várias ferramentas Lean neste trabalho, foram trabalhadas mais detalhadamente as seguintes: - Value Stream Mapping (VSM); - Single Minute Exchange of Dies (SMED); - Balanceamento da linha. De modo a ser percetível o conteúdo e as vantagens das três ferramentas Lean mencionadas no trabalho, estas foram aplicadas e simuladas, de forma a existir uma componente prática no seu estudo, para mais fácil compreensão e rápida aprendizagem.

Commercial agentes portfolio optimization in electricity markets

As it is well known, competitive electricity markets require new computing tools for power companies that operate in retail markets in order to enhance the management of its energy resources. During the last years there has been an increase of the renewable penetration into the micro-generation which begins to co-exist with the other existing power generation, giving rise to a new type of consumers. This paper develops a methodology to be applied to the management of the all the aggregators. The aggregator establishes bilateral contracts with its clients where the energy purchased and selling conditions are negotiated not only in terms of prices but also for other conditions that allow more flexibility in the way generation and consumption is addressed. The aggregator agent needs a tool to support the decision making in order to compose and select its customers' portfolio in an optimal way, for a given level of profitability and risk.

Deslocalização de empresas num contexto de globalização: estudo de caso de uma empresa portuguesa

Dissertação apresentada ao Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Empreendedorismo e Internacionalização Orientador: Professor Doutor José de Freitas Santos

Desirable role in a price-setting international mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the order of moves in a mixed international duopoly for differentiated goods, where firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. We discuss the desirable role of the public firm by comparing welfare among three games. We find that, in the three possible roles, the domestic public firm put a lower price, and then produces more than the foreign private firm.

Desirable role in an international duopoly model with tariffs

In this paper, we study an international market model in which the home government imposes a tariff on the imported goods. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize a function that cares about the home firm’s profit and the total revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Environmental and international tariffs in a mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets, in which the public firm maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and its profit. We also analyse the effects of privatization. The model has two stages. In the first stage, governments choose environmental taxes and import tariffs, simultaneously. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output levels for the domestic market and to export. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Designing market-based instruments for biodiversity conservation: learning with the Australian experience and evaluating Portugal's potential

Dissertação apresentada na Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia do Ambiente, perfil Gestão de Sistemas Ambientais

O modo de internacionalização e investimento direto português em economias em desenvolvimento : o caso "Grupo" Jerónimo Martins na Colômbia

Mestrado em Contabilidade e Gestão das Instituições Financeiras

International Stackelberg model with tariffs

This paper analyses the effects of tariffs on an international economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, located in two countries, each one producing a homogeneous good for both home consumption and export to the other identical country. We consider a game among governments and firms. First, the government imposes a tariff on imports and then we consider the two types of moving: simultaneous (Cournot-type model) and sequential (Stackelberg-type model) decisions by the firms. We also compare the results obtained in each model.

Licensing in an international triopoly

We study the effects of entry of two foreign firms on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the incumbent is technologically superior to the entrants. We consider two different situations: (i) the cost-reducing innovation is licensed to both entrants; (ii) the cost- reducing innovation is licensed to just one of the entrants. We analyse three kind of license: (lump- sum) fixed-fee; (per-unit) royalty; and two-part tariff, that is a combination of a fixed-fee and a royalty. We prove that a two part tariff is never an optimal licensing scheme for the incumbent. Moreover, (i) when the technology is licensed to the two entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only output royalty; and (ii) when the technology is licensed to just one of the entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only a fixed-fee.