The sustainable debts of Philip II: A reconstruction of Castile's fiscal position, 1566-1596

The defaults of Philip II have attained mythical status as the origin of sovereigndebt crises. We reassess the fiscal position of Habsburg Castile, derivingcomprehensive estimates of revenue, debt, and expenditure from new archivaldata. The king s debts were sustainable. Primary surpluses were large and rising.Debt-to-revenue ratios remained broadly unchanged during Philip s reign.Castilian finances in the sixteenth century compare favorably with those of otherearly modern fiscal states at the height of their imperial ambitions, includingBritain. The defaults of Philip II therefore reflected short-term liquidity crises,and were not a sign of unsustainable debts.

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.

Why do emerging economies borrow short term?

We argue that one reason why emerging economies borrow short term is that it is cheaperthan borrowing long term. This is especially the case during crises, as in these episodes therelative cost of long-term borrowing increases. We construct a unique database of sovereignbond prices, returns, and issuances at di¤erent maturities for 11 emerging economies from 1990to 2009 and present a set of new stylized facts. On average, these countries pay a higher riskpremium on long-term than on short-term bonds. During crises, the di¤erence between the tworisk premia increases and issuance shifts towards shorter maturities. To illustrate our argument,we present a simple model in which the maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharingproblem between an emerging economy subject to rollover crises and risk averse internationalinvestors.

Job creation under liquidity constraints: The Spanish case

This paper shows that liquidity constraints restrict jobcreation even when labor markets are flexible. In a dynamicmodel of labor demand, I show that in an environment of imperfect capital and imperfect labor markets, firms usetemporary contracts to relax financial constraints. Evidence for the predictions of the model is presented using Spanish data from the CBBE (Central de Balances del Banco de España - Balance Sheet data from the Bank of Spain). It is shown that firms substitute temporary laborfor permanent one and use less debt as their financial position improves. In particular, it is rejected that Spanish firms operate in an environment of free capital markets and of no labor adjustment costs. The labor reform of 1984, which created temporary contracts, implied to some extent a relaxation of liquidity constraints.Accordingly, firms used these contracts more extensivelyand used less debt; however, as capital markets continueto be imperfect, permanent job creation continues to beslow. Consequently, relaxation of liquidity constraints should also be part of a job creation strategy.

The dot-com bubble, the Bush deficits and the US current account

Over the past decade the US has experienced widening current account deficits and a steady deterioration of its net foreign asset position. During the second half of the 1990s, this deterioration was fueled by foreign investment in a booming US stock market. During the first half of the 2000s, this deterioration has been fuelled by foreign purchases of rapidly increasing US government debt. A somewhat surprising aspect of the current debate is thatstock market movements and fiscal policy choices have been largely treated as unrelated events. Stock market movements are usually interpreted as reflecting exogenous changes in perceived or real productivity, while budget deficits are usually understood as a mainly political decision. We challenge this view here and develop two alternative interpretations. Both are based on the notion that a bubble (the dot-com bubble) has been driving the stock market, but differ in their assumptions about the interactions between this bubble and fiscal policy (the Bush deficits). The benevolent view holds that a change in investorsentiment led to the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the Bush deficits were a welfare-improving policy response to this event. The cynical view holds instead that the Bush deficits led to the collapse of the dot-com bubble as the new administration tried to appropriate rents from foreign investors. We discuss the implications of each of these views for the future evolution of the US economy and, in particular, its net foreign asset position.

The overhang hangover

We revisit the debt overhang question. We first use non-parametric techniques to isolate a panel of countries on the downward sloping section of a debt Laffer curve. In particular, overhang countries are ones where a threshold level of debt is reached in sample, beyond which (initial) debt ends up lowering (subsequent)growth. On average, significantly negative coefficients appear when debt face value reaches 60 percent of GDP or 200 percent of exports, and when its present value reaches 40 percent of GDP or 140 percent of exports. Second, we depart from reduced form growth regressions and perform direct tests of the theory on the thus selected sample of overhang countries. In the spirit of event studies, we ask whether, as overhang level of debt is reached: (i)investment falls precipitously as it should when it becomes optimal to default, (ii) economic policy deteriorates observably, as it should when debt contracts become unable to elicit effort on the part of the debtor, and (iii) the terms of borrowing worsen noticeably, as they should when it becomes optimal for creditors to pre-empt default and exact punitive interest rates. We find a systematic response of investment, particularly when property rights are weakly enforced, some worsening of the policy environment, and a fall in interest rates. This easing of borrowing conditions happens because lending by the private sector virtually disappears in overhang situations, and multilateral agencies step in with concessional rates. Thus, while debt relief is likely to improve economic policy (and especially investment) in overhang countries, it is doubtful that it would ease their terms of borrowing, or the burden of debt.

Firm investment in imperfect capital markets: A structural estimation

We set up a dynamic model of firm investment in which liquidity constraintsenter explicity into the firm's maximization problem. The optimal policyrules are incorporated into a maximum likelihood procedure which estimatesthe structural parameters of the model. Investment is positively related tothe firm's internal financial position when the firm is relatively poor. This relationship disappears for wealthy firms, which can reach theirdesired level of investment. Borrowing is an increasing function of financial position for poor firms. This relationship is reversed as a firm's financial position improves, and large firms hold little debt.Liquidity constrained firms may be unused credits lines and the capacity toinvest further if they desire. However the fear that liquidity constraintswill become binding in the future induces them to invest only when internalresources increase.We estimate the structural parameters of the model and use them to quantifythe importance of liquidity constraints on firms' investment. We find thatliquidity constraints matter significantly for the investment decisions of firms. If firms can finance investment by issuing fresh equity, rather than with internal funds or debt, average capital stock is almost 35% higher overa period of 20 years. Transitory shocks to internal funds have a sustained effect on the capital stock. This effect lasts for several periods and ismore persistent for small firms than for large firms. A 10% negative shock to firm fundamentals reduces the capital stock of firms which face liquidityconstraints by almost 8% over a period as opposed to only 3.5% for firms which do not face these constraints.

Serial defaults, serial profits: Returns to sovereign lending in Habsburg Spain, 1566-1600

Philip II of Spain accumulated debts equivalent to 60% of GDP. He also defaulted four times onhis short-term loans, thus becoming the first serial defaulter in history. Contrary to a commonview in the literature, we show that lending to the king was profitable even under worst-casescenario assumptions. Lenders maintained long-term relationships with the crown. Lossessustained during defaults were more than compensated by profits in normal times. Defaultswere not catastrophic events. In effect, short-term lending acted as an insurance mechanism,allowing the king to reduce his payments in harsh times in exchange for paying a premium intranquil periods. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Conglomeration with bankruptcy costs: Separate or joint financing?

The paper analyzes the determinants of the optimal scope of incorporation in the presenceof bankruptcy costs. Bankruptcy costs alone generate a non-trivial tradeoff between thebenefit of coinsurance and the cost of risk contamination associated to joint financing corporate projects through debt. This tradeoff is characterized for projects with binary returns,depending on the distributional characteristics of returns (mean, variability, skewness, heterogeneity, correlation, and number of projects), the bankruptcy recovery rate, and the taxrate advantage of debt relative to equity. Our testable predictions are broadly consistentwith existing empirical evidence on conglomerate mergers, spin-offs, project finance, andsecuritization.

Credit derivatives in emerging markets

Credit Derivatives are securities that offer protection against credit or default risk ofbonds or loans. The credit derivatives emerging market has grown rapidly and creditderivatives are widely used. This paper describes the emerging credit derivativesmarket structure. The current market activity is analyzed through elementary pricingdynamics and the study of the term structure of default risk. Focusing on theperformance of credit derivatives in stress situation, including legal and market risks,we discuss the potential consequences of a debt restructuring in a large emergingmarket borrower. The contribution of credit derivatives to the risk sharing in emergingmarkets is also examined.

The State of the Judiciary, 2009

Thank you for inviting me again this year to talk with you about the condition of Iowa’s judicial branch. As your partner in government, we look forward to working with you on issues affecting the administration of justice. If I could capture the condition of our courts, indeed the condition of our state, in a few words, it would be: “We live in challenging times.” No one knows the true meaning of this phrase better than those Iowans hit by natural disasters. But my focus today is, of course, on the courts. Ensuring the delivery of equal, affordable and accessible justice is always challenging work, but it will be especially so this year and the next in light of the State’s budget problems. Given the magnitude of this challenge, it is even more imperative that we work together in the spirit of unity, candor and cooperation. And I address you today in this spirit. We are deeply concerned, as you are, about the present financial situation and its effect on individual Iowans. Naturally, we are particularly troubled about its impact on the delivery of justice to our citizens. Even in good economic times, the administration of justice is difficult to fulfill given the sheer volume and complexity of problems Iowans bring to their courthouses. Because of the effects of the nation’s economic downturn, people will need access to justice now more than ever. We already see this happening. The number of mortgage foreclosure cases in Iowa rose 14% in the past year. Debt collection cases increased 20% in the same time. An increase in these types of cases is predictable in tough economic times, but other types of problems may escalate as well. Some experts fear that a recession may also give rise to more crime, child abuse, domestic violence, and substance abuse. Naturally, for the sake of the people who may be harmed by these problems, we hope they do not occur. If they do, however, these matters will demand our immediate attention.

The elusive costs and the immaterial gains of fiscal contraints

We study whether and how fiscal restrictions alter the business cycle features macrovariables for a sample of 48 US states. We also examine the 'typical' transmission properties of fiscal disturbances and the implied fiscal rules of states with different fiscal restrictions. Fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators. There are similarities in second moments of macrovariables and in the transmission properties of fiscal shocks across states with different fiscal constraints. The cyclical response of expenditure differs in size and sometimes in sign, but heterogeneity within groups makes point estimates statistically insignificant. Creative budget accounting isresponsible for the pattern. Implications for the design of fiscal rules and thereform of the Stability and Growth Pact are discussed.

Banks, government bonds, and default: what do the data say?

We use data from Bankscope to analyze the holdings of public bonds by over 18,000 banks located in 185 countries and the role of these bonds in 18 sovereign debt crises over the period 1998-2012. We find that: (i) banks hold a sizeable share of their assets in government bonds (about 9% on average), particularly in less financially developed countries; (ii) during sovereign crises, banks on average increase their bondholdings by 1% of their assets, but this increase is concentrated among larger and more profitable banks, and; (iii) the correlation between a bank's holdings of public bonds and its future loans is positive in normal times, but turns negative during defaults. A 10% increase in bank bond-holdings during default is associated with a 3.2% reduction in future loans, and bonds bought in normal times account for 75% of this effect. Our results are consistent with the view that there is a liquidity benefit for banks to hold public bonds in normal times, which is critical for understanding bank fragility during sovereign crises.

Recreating the South Sea bubble: Lessons from an experiment in financial history

Major bubble episodes are rare events. In this paper, we examine what factors might cause some asset price bubbles to become very large. We recreate, in a laboratory setting, some of the specific institutional features investors in the South Sea Company faced in 1720. Several factors have been proposed as potentially contributing to one of the greatest periods of asset overvaluation in history: an intricate debt-for-equity swap, deferred payment for these shares, and the possibility of default on the deferred payments. We consider which aspect might have had the most impact in creating the South Sea bubble. The results of the experiment suggest that the company?s attempt to exchange its shares for government debt was the single biggest contributor to the stock price explosion, because of the manner in which the swap affected fundamental value. Issuing new shares with only partial payments required, in conjunction with the debt-equity swap, also had a significant effect on the size of the bubble. Limited contract enforcement, on the other hand, does not appear to have contributed significantly.

Reprisals remembered: German-Greek conflict and car sales during the Euro crisis

During the Greek debt crisis after 2010, the German government insisted on harshausterity measures. This led to a rapid cooling of relations between the Greekand German governments. We compile a new index of public acrimony betweenGermany and Greece based on newspaper reports and internet search terms. Thisinformation is combined with historical maps on German war crimes during theoccupation between 1941 and 1944. During months of open conflict between Germanand Greek politicians, German car sales fell markedly more than those of cars fromother countries. This was especially true in areas affected by German reprisals duringWorldWar II: areas where German troops committed massacres and destroyed entirevillages curtailed their purchases of German cars to a greater extent during conflictmonths than other parts of Greece. We conclude that cultural aversion was a keydeterminant of purchasing behavior, and that memories of past conflict can affecteconomic choices in a time-varying fashion. These findings are compatible withbehavioral models emphasizing the importance of salience for individual decision-making.