Crises and growth: A re-evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

Financing constraints, irreversibility and investment dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financingconstraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firmscannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint thatthey can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examinethe cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and outputin the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields threemain results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investmentis reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint onvariable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interactionbetween the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and materialdeliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they arehighly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

The sustainable debts of Philip II: A reconstruction of Castile's fiscal position, 1566-1596

The defaults of Philip II have attained mythical status as the origin of sovereigndebt crises. We reassess the fiscal position of Habsburg Castile, derivingcomprehensive estimates of revenue, debt, and expenditure from new archivaldata. The king s debts were sustainable. Primary surpluses were large and rising.Debt-to-revenue ratios remained broadly unchanged during Philip s reign.Castilian finances in the sixteenth century compare favorably with those of otherearly modern fiscal states at the height of their imperial ambitions, includingBritain. The defaults of Philip II therefore reflected short-term liquidity crises,and were not a sign of unsustainable debts.

Japan's lost decade: Does money have a role?

We study the contribution of the stock of money to the macroeconomic outcomesof the 1990s in Japan using a small scale structural model. Likelihood-basedestimates of the parameters are provided and time stabilities of the structural relationshipsanalyzed. Real balances are statistically important for output and inflationfluctuations and their role has changed over time. Models which give moneyno role give a distorted representation of the sources of cyclical fluctuations. Thesevere stagnation and the long deflation are driven by different causes.

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.

Why do emerging economies borrow short term?

We argue that one reason why emerging economies borrow short term is that it is cheaperthan borrowing long term. This is especially the case during crises, as in these episodes therelative cost of long-term borrowing increases. We construct a unique database of sovereignbond prices, returns, and issuances at di¤erent maturities for 11 emerging economies from 1990to 2009 and present a set of new stylized facts. On average, these countries pay a higher riskpremium on long-term than on short-term bonds. During crises, the di¤erence between the tworisk premia increases and issuance shifts towards shorter maturities. To illustrate our argument,we present a simple model in which the maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharingproblem between an emerging economy subject to rollover crises and risk averse internationalinvestors.

Job creation under liquidity constraints: The Spanish case

This paper shows that liquidity constraints restrict jobcreation even when labor markets are flexible. In a dynamicmodel of labor demand, I show that in an environment of imperfect capital and imperfect labor markets, firms usetemporary contracts to relax financial constraints. Evidence for the predictions of the model is presented using Spanish data from the CBBE (Central de Balances del Banco de España - Balance Sheet data from the Bank of Spain). It is shown that firms substitute temporary laborfor permanent one and use less debt as their financial position improves. In particular, it is rejected that Spanish firms operate in an environment of free capital markets and of no labor adjustment costs. The labor reform of 1984, which created temporary contracts, implied to some extent a relaxation of liquidity constraints.Accordingly, firms used these contracts more extensivelyand used less debt; however, as capital markets continueto be imperfect, permanent job creation continues to beslow. Consequently, relaxation of liquidity constraints should also be part of a job creation strategy.

The dot-com bubble, the Bush deficits and the US current account

Over the past decade the US has experienced widening current account deficits and a steady deterioration of its net foreign asset position. During the second half of the 1990s, this deterioration was fueled by foreign investment in a booming US stock market. During the first half of the 2000s, this deterioration has been fuelled by foreign purchases of rapidly increasing US government debt. A somewhat surprising aspect of the current debate is thatstock market movements and fiscal policy choices have been largely treated as unrelated events. Stock market movements are usually interpreted as reflecting exogenous changes in perceived or real productivity, while budget deficits are usually understood as a mainly political decision. We challenge this view here and develop two alternative interpretations. Both are based on the notion that a bubble (the dot-com bubble) has been driving the stock market, but differ in their assumptions about the interactions between this bubble and fiscal policy (the Bush deficits). The benevolent view holds that a change in investorsentiment led to the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the Bush deficits were a welfare-improving policy response to this event. The cynical view holds instead that the Bush deficits led to the collapse of the dot-com bubble as the new administration tried to appropriate rents from foreign investors. We discuss the implications of each of these views for the future evolution of the US economy and, in particular, its net foreign asset position.

The overhang hangover

We revisit the debt overhang question. We first use non-parametric techniques to isolate a panel of countries on the downward sloping section of a debt Laffer curve. In particular, overhang countries are ones where a threshold level of debt is reached in sample, beyond which (initial) debt ends up lowering (subsequent)growth. On average, significantly negative coefficients appear when debt face value reaches 60 percent of GDP or 200 percent of exports, and when its present value reaches 40 percent of GDP or 140 percent of exports. Second, we depart from reduced form growth regressions and perform direct tests of the theory on the thus selected sample of overhang countries. In the spirit of event studies, we ask whether, as overhang level of debt is reached: (i)investment falls precipitously as it should when it becomes optimal to default, (ii) economic policy deteriorates observably, as it should when debt contracts become unable to elicit effort on the part of the debtor, and (iii) the terms of borrowing worsen noticeably, as they should when it becomes optimal for creditors to pre-empt default and exact punitive interest rates. We find a systematic response of investment, particularly when property rights are weakly enforced, some worsening of the policy environment, and a fall in interest rates. This easing of borrowing conditions happens because lending by the private sector virtually disappears in overhang situations, and multilateral agencies step in with concessional rates. Thus, while debt relief is likely to improve economic policy (and especially investment) in overhang countries, it is doubtful that it would ease their terms of borrowing, or the burden of debt.

Firm investment in imperfect capital markets: A structural estimation

We set up a dynamic model of firm investment in which liquidity constraintsenter explicity into the firm's maximization problem. The optimal policyrules are incorporated into a maximum likelihood procedure which estimatesthe structural parameters of the model. Investment is positively related tothe firm's internal financial position when the firm is relatively poor. This relationship disappears for wealthy firms, which can reach theirdesired level of investment. Borrowing is an increasing function of financial position for poor firms. This relationship is reversed as a firm's financial position improves, and large firms hold little debt.Liquidity constrained firms may be unused credits lines and the capacity toinvest further if they desire. However the fear that liquidity constraintswill become binding in the future induces them to invest only when internalresources increase.We estimate the structural parameters of the model and use them to quantifythe importance of liquidity constraints on firms' investment. We find thatliquidity constraints matter significantly for the investment decisions of firms. If firms can finance investment by issuing fresh equity, rather than with internal funds or debt, average capital stock is almost 35% higher overa period of 20 years. Transitory shocks to internal funds have a sustained effect on the capital stock. This effect lasts for several periods and ismore persistent for small firms than for large firms. A 10% negative shock to firm fundamentals reduces the capital stock of firms which face liquidityconstraints by almost 8% over a period as opposed to only 3.5% for firms which do not face these constraints.

Serial defaults, serial profits: Returns to sovereign lending in Habsburg Spain, 1566-1600

Philip II of Spain accumulated debts equivalent to 60% of GDP. He also defaulted four times onhis short-term loans, thus becoming the first serial defaulter in history. Contrary to a commonview in the literature, we show that lending to the king was profitable even under worst-casescenario assumptions. Lenders maintained long-term relationships with the crown. Lossessustained during defaults were more than compensated by profits in normal times. Defaultswere not catastrophic events. In effect, short-term lending acted as an insurance mechanism,allowing the king to reduce his payments in harsh times in exchange for paying a premium intranquil periods. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Inflationary expectations during Germany's great slump

Was the German slump inevitable? This paper argues that -despite thespeed and depth of Germany's deflation in the early 1930s - fear ofinflation is evident in the bond, foreign exchange, and commodity marketsat certain critical junctures of the Great Depression. Therefore, policyoptions were more limited than many subsequent critics of Brüning'spolicies have been prepared to admit. Using a rational expectationsframework, we find strong evidence from the bondmarket to suggest fearof inflation. Futures prices also reveal that market participants werebetting on price increases. These findings are discussed in the contextof reparations and related to the need for a regime shift to overcomethe crisis.

Conglomeration with bankruptcy costs: Separate or joint financing?

The paper analyzes the determinants of the optimal scope of incorporation in the presenceof bankruptcy costs. Bankruptcy costs alone generate a non-trivial tradeoff between thebenefit of coinsurance and the cost of risk contamination associated to joint financing corporate projects through debt. This tradeoff is characterized for projects with binary returns,depending on the distributional characteristics of returns (mean, variability, skewness, heterogeneity, correlation, and number of projects), the bankruptcy recovery rate, and the taxrate advantage of debt relative to equity. Our testable predictions are broadly consistentwith existing empirical evidence on conglomerate mergers, spin-offs, project finance, andsecuritization.

Credit derivatives in emerging markets

Credit Derivatives are securities that offer protection against credit or default risk ofbonds or loans. The credit derivatives emerging market has grown rapidly and creditderivatives are widely used. This paper describes the emerging credit derivativesmarket structure. The current market activity is analyzed through elementary pricingdynamics and the study of the term structure of default risk. Focusing on theperformance of credit derivatives in stress situation, including legal and market risks,we discuss the potential consequences of a debt restructuring in a large emergingmarket borrower. The contribution of credit derivatives to the risk sharing in emergingmarkets is also examined.

The State of the Judiciary, 2009

Thank you for inviting me again this year to talk with you about the condition of Iowa’s judicial branch. As your partner in government, we look forward to working with you on issues affecting the administration of justice. If I could capture the condition of our courts, indeed the condition of our state, in a few words, it would be: “We live in challenging times.” No one knows the true meaning of this phrase better than those Iowans hit by natural disasters. But my focus today is, of course, on the courts. Ensuring the delivery of equal, affordable and accessible justice is always challenging work, but it will be especially so this year and the next in light of the State’s budget problems. Given the magnitude of this challenge, it is even more imperative that we work together in the spirit of unity, candor and cooperation. And I address you today in this spirit. We are deeply concerned, as you are, about the present financial situation and its effect on individual Iowans. Naturally, we are particularly troubled about its impact on the delivery of justice to our citizens. Even in good economic times, the administration of justice is difficult to fulfill given the sheer volume and complexity of problems Iowans bring to their courthouses. Because of the effects of the nation’s economic downturn, people will need access to justice now more than ever. We already see this happening. The number of mortgage foreclosure cases in Iowa rose 14% in the past year. Debt collection cases increased 20% in the same time. An increase in these types of cases is predictable in tough economic times, but other types of problems may escalate as well. Some experts fear that a recession may also give rise to more crime, child abuse, domestic violence, and substance abuse. Naturally, for the sake of the people who may be harmed by these problems, we hope they do not occur. If they do, however, these matters will demand our immediate attention.